Miguel Garcia v. Honeywell International

MEMORANDUM ** Miguel Garcia, AKA Miguel Garcia Re-bollo, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his Title VII employment action for wrongful termination, harassment, retaliation, discrimination, unlawful employment practices, and emotional distress. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir.2012) (failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)); Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Garcia’s claims for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, unlawful employment practices, and wrongful termination arising out of his June 9, 2009 termination because Garcia failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under Title VII in a proper manner. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (a person seeking relief under Title VII must file a charge with the state or local EEOC administrative agency within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice). The district court properly dismissed Garcia’s claims for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination arising out of his March 16, 2010 termination because Garcia failed to allege sufficient facts to show that he was subject to adverse employment actions due to a protected activity or status under Title VII. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642, 646 (9th Cir.2003) (elements of hostile work environment, harassment, and retaliation claims under Title VII); Leong, 347 F.3d at 1124 (elements of discrimination claim under Title VII). The district court properly dismissed Garcia’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the conduct alleged in Garcia’s complaint was neither extreme nor outrageous. See Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 10 Ariz.App. 560, 460 P.2d 666, 668 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 783 P.2d 781 (1989) (defendant’s conduct must be so outrageous and extreme “as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be *528 regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Gardner v. Martino, 568 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir.2009) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “[a] district court does not err in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile”).- We reject Garcia’s contentions relating to judicial bias and due process violations. AFFIRMED. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.