Stephen A. Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 14 2015, 10:01 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jeffrey Elftman Gregory F. Zoeller Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Kokomo, Indiana

Brian Reitz Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Stephen A. Jones April 14, 2015

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 34A05-1412-CR-551 v. Appeal from the Howard County Superior Court 1 Honorable William C. Menges, State of Indiana, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff Cause No. 34D01-1008-FB-698

Friedlander, Judge. [1] Stephen A. Jones presents a single issue on appeal, whether the trial court erred

in its determination of credit time. [2] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1412-CR-551 | April 14, 2015 Page 1 of 5 [3] On August 19, 2010 Jones was charged in Howard County with three counts of

dealing in a schedule I controlled substance as a class B felony, possession of a

controlled substance as a class D felony, neglect of a dependent as class D

felony, and two counts of dealing in marijuana as a class A misdemeanor. On

January 19, 2011, Jones pleaded guilty to two counts of dealing in a schedule I

controlled substance as a class B felony and one count of possession of

marijuana as a class A misdemeanor. Jones was sentenced to an aggregate

term of ten years in the Department of Correction (DOC), with four years

suspended to supervised probation. At the time of sentencing Jones was given

one hundred credit days. [4] On October 25, 2011, Jones filed a petition to modify his sentence to supervised

probation or home detention. The petition was granted on December 21, 2011,

and Jones was ordered to complete the Howard County Community Transition

Program (CTP) before serving 499 executed days on home detention. While

participating in the CTP and on home detention, Jones was on GPS

monitoring. He received 2 sanctions resulting in incarceration for 6 actual days

and a total of 12 credit days. On July 2, 2014 the State filed a petition to

revoke Jones’s suspended sentence because he was terminated from the CTP.

Jones admitted the alleged violations on October 9, 2014, and the court

imposed the remaining 2866 days of his suspended sentence, to be served in the

DOC. Jones received credit time for 282 days spent awaiting the disposition of

the termination and probation revocation and for the 12 days of jail sanctions.

The trial court determined, “he’s not entitled to credit time on CTP, and

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number two, to the extent that he was on a bracelet as a condition of probation,

he’s not entitled to credit time for that either.” Transcript at 12, 3. As a result,

the trial court did not award him any credit time for time spent on home

detention and GPS monitoring. On October 29, 2014, Jones filed a motion to

correct errors, which the trial court denied. Jones now appeals. [5] Jones argues that the trial court erred in not awarding him credit time for the

time he spent on home detention and GPS monitoring. We agree. We review

the trial court’s factual determinations for an abuse of discretion, and its legal

conclusions de novo. Strowmatt v. State, 779 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

On appeal, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the trial court erred

in calculating the credit time. Gardner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App.

1997). [6] With respect to credit for time spent in a community corrections program—

here, in-home detention—a person who is serving a criminal sentence and

placed in such a program is entitled to earn one day of credit time for each day

the person is on home detention, plus any earned credit time. See I.C. § 35–38-

2.6-6(b); Pharr v. State, 2 N.E.3d 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). That person,

however, may be deprived of earned credit time as provided by rules adopted by

the DOC. See I.C. § 35–38–2.6–6(d). Only the DOC may deprive a community

corrections participant of earned credit time. Pharr v. State, 2 N.E.3d 10, 12

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that “the statutes do not authorize trial courts to

deprive offenders of credit time while in a community corrections program”

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and instead the trial court is “authorized only to determine the credit time

earned” by a defendant in such a program). [7] The State and Jones agree that Jones is entitled to credit time for his time on

home detention and under GPS monitoring. Jones and the State disagree,

however, as to the number of credit-time days to which he is entitled and

whether he is eligible for good-time credit. Jones argues he is eligible for 1028

actual days and 1028 good-time credit days spent on electronic monitoring for

an aggregate of 2056 credit days. The State argues he spent only 875 actual

days on electronic monitoring and home detention and that we must remand

for a determination by the DOC as to whether he is entitled to good-time credit,

and, if so, how many days should be awarded. [8] Two critical pieces of information are ambiguous in the record. First, it is

unclear whether the DOC made a determination as to whether Jones was

entitled to good-time credit. Second, it is unclear from the record whether the

Howard County Superior Court supervises Community Corrections in Howard

County and thus is entitled to make a determination of good-time credit. If that

were the case, then the trial court would, in theory, be authorized to determine

whether Jones is entitled to good-time credit. Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783

(Ind. 2004). We note that Jones admitted to a violation of his in-home

detention and, as such, is subject to a loss of good-time credit. But it is unclear

whether the entity that made the determination to deny Jones credit time in this

case was authorized to do so. Therefore, we remand with instructions to

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identify the entity statutorily authorized to make a credit-time determination

with respect to Jones’s sentence and that said entity make that determination. [9] We conclude that Jones is entitled to credit for actual time served on in-home

detention and electronic monitoring. We remand with instructions to

determine how much time he actually served and to include any good-time

credit that the appropriate entity determines Jones should receive. [10] Judgment reversed and remanded.

Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.

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