Vlad-Berindan v. Life Worx Inc.

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Lucia Vlad-Berindan, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s April 30, 2014 judgment dismissing her employment discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VH”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 ei seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and various New York state laws for failure to state a claim, and denying her various motions. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and pleadings that “are no more than conclusions ... are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Upon review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Vlad-Berindan’s complaint, substantially for the reason stated in its thorough and well-reasoned April 28, 2014 opinion — namely, Vlad-Berindan failed to establish that her untimely Title VII claims were entitled to equitable tolling. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l); Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 78, 80-81 (2d Cir.2003). As to her remaining claims, Vlad-Berindan failed to raise any arguments on appeal and, accordingly, those claims are deemed to be abandoned. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995). In any event, Vlad-Berindan’s ADA and ADEA claims were unexhausted; her claims under the New York State Human Rights Law were barred by the election of remedies doctrine, see York v. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir.2002); N.Y. Exec. Law § 298; and the District Court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The District Court also properly denied as baseless Vlad-Berindan’s various motions to withdraw consent to jurisdiction by a magistrate judge, for recusal and for reconsideration, to strike defendants’ motion to dismiss, for sanctions, and for default judgment. CONCLUSION We have considered all of the arguments raised by Vlad-Berindan on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the *417 reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s April 30, 2014 judgment.