Messina v. Anvarzadeh

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Winslow, J.), entered April 2, 2014, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident. *915 Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the cervical region of the plaintiffs spine did not constitute a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]). The defendants further submitted evidence demonstrating, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Karpinos v Cora, 89 AD3d 994, 995 [2011]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Hall and Maltese, JJ., concur.