Vlach v. Staiano

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff William Vlach brings claims against defendant Philip Staiano pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and New York law. Vlach appeals the District Court’s grant of Stai-ano’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision. This action arises out of Vlach’s arrest and prosecution for an alleged assault of a resident at the state-run facility for individuals with developmental disabilities at which Vlach worked as an aide and Staiano served as a supervisor. The criminal charges against Vlach were ultimately dismissed. Vlach principally argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in Staiano’s favor because a reasonable jury could find Staiano liable for the torts alleged in light of evidence suggesting that Staiano provided materially incomplete information to the New York State Police. Vlach contends that Staiano failed to inform the State Police that Stai-ano himself had performed a violent “take-down” of the alleged victim three days before the reported incident and was potentially the source of the injuries attributed to Vlach. Vlach also maintains that Staiano failed to disclose to the State Police that certain persons Staiano interviewed during an internal investigation were not credible and that at least one of the witnesses partially recanted his allegations. To hold a private individual like Staiano liable for false arrest under § 1983 and New York law, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant took an active role in the arrest of the plaintiff, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act, and that the defendant intended to confíne the plaintiff.” Lowmack v. Eckerd Corp., 303 A.D.2d 998, 757 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (2003) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Liability may attach only when the defendant has “affirmatively induced the officer to act, such as taking an active part in the arrest and procuring it to be made or showing active, officious and undue zeal to the point where the officer is not acting of his own volition.” Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 13-14 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon de novo review, see Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir.2005), we conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Staiano on the false arrest claim. After Staiano reported that Vlach had committed an assault, the State Police undertook their own investigation during which, inter alia, the alleged victim identified Vlach as his assailant. The State Police thereafter arrested Vlach. “When police indepen *79 dently act to arrest a suspect on information provided by a party, that party is not liable for false imprisonment [i.e. arrest]— even if the information provided is later found to be erroneous.” King v. Crossland, Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 257 (2d Cir.1997); see also Quigley v. City of Auburn, 267 A.D.2d 978, 701 N.Y.S.2d 580, 582 (1999). Thus, even if Staiano provided materially incomplete information to the State Police, the false arrest claim against him cannot stand. The standard under which a civilian may be held liable for malicious prosecution mirrors that just discussed for false arrest. A private defendant must have taken an active role in the prosecution, “such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act,” to be found to have initiated a criminal prosecution as required for liability to attach. Rothstein v. Garriere, 373 F.3d 275, 293-94 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Merely “reporting a crime to law enforcement and giving testimony” does not suffice. Id. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Vlach, we discern no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Staiano initiated or took an active role in Vlach’s actual prosecution. When a “criminal charge is the culmination of a lengthy investigation involving various sources of evidence, the mere fact that a witness provided false information to the government” — as Vlach asserts Staiano did here — “does not warrant a conclusion that the witness initiated the prosecution where the rest of the evidence suggests otherwise.” Id. at 294; see also Brown v. Sears Roebuck, 297 A.D.2d 205, 746 N.Y.S.2d 141, 146 (2002) (“While it is a true that a defendant may be said to have initiated a criminal proceeding by providing false evidence to the police or withholding evidence that might affect the determination by the police to make an arrest, the record in this ease conclusively demonstrates that the allegedly false evidence ... did not contribute to the determination to arrest plaintiff.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the District Court properly entered summary judgment on Vlach’s malicious prosecution claim, too. Finally, a plaintiff bringing a claim for abuse of process under New York law must show, inter alia, that a defendant emplqyed “regularly issued legal process to compel performance or forbearance of some act.” Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir.1994). For the reasons discussed above, no reasonable jury could find that Staiano had a sufficient level of involvement in Vlach’s arrest or prosecution to support this count. We conclude that summary judgment was correctly awarded on Vlach’s abuse of process claim as well. We have considered Vlach’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.