J.E. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Jun 30 2015, 8:14 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Mark Olivero Gregory F. Zoeller Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Ian McLean Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

J.E., June 30, 2015

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 02A03-1409-CR-339 v. Appeal from the Allen Superior Court Cause No. 02D04-1306-FC-211 State of Indiana, The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge

Bailey, Judge.

Case Summary [1] J.E. appeals the trial court’s order of involuntary commitment to a state

psychiatric hospital after a jury found him not responsible by reason of insanity

on six criminal charges. We affirm. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1409-CR-339 | June 30, 2015 Page 1 of 15

Issues [2] J.E. presents one issue for our review, which we restate as the following two:

I. Whether the trial court erred by ordering a regular commitment under Indiana Code chapter 12-26-7 when there was evidence that J.E. had previously been committed; and II. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support J.E.’s commitment to Logansport State Hospital, where a report required by Indiana Code section 12-26-7-3(b) was not included in the trial court record.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On June 16, 2013, in Allen County, J.E. stole a car from a residential

subdivision. In the process of fleeing, J.E. caused two car accidents, one with

injury, at which he did not stop. Based on these events, on June 27, 2013, the

State charged J.E. with the following: Battery, as a Class C felony; 1 Attempted

Residential Entry, as a Class D felony 2 (“Count 2”); Auto Theft, as a Class D

felony; 3 Receiving Stolen Auto Parts, as a Class D felony; 4 Criminal

Recklessness, as a Class D felony; 5 Failure to Stop after an Accident Resulting

1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(3) (2012). Due to substantial revisions to the Indiana Code effective July 1, 2014, this offense is now a Level 5 felony. Throughout this opinion, we refer to the versions of the statutes in effect at the time of J.E.’s offense. 2 I.C. §§ 35-43-2-1.5 & 35-41-5-1. 3 I.C. § 35-43-4-2.5(b)(1). 4 I.C. § 35-43-4-2.5(c). 5 I.C. §§ 35-42-2-2(b)(1) & (c)(2)(A).

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in Injury or Death, as a Class A misdemeanor; 6 and Failure to Stop after an

Accident Resulting in Damage to a Vehicle, as a Class C misdemeanor. 7 On

September 6, 2013, the court dismissed Count 2 on the State’s motion. [4] On September 4, 2013, J.E. filed his notice of intent to assert the defense of

insanity. The court appointed Dr. Kevin Wieland (“Dr. Wieland”), a

psychologist, and Dr. Rebecca J. Mueller (“Dr. Mueller”), a psychiatrist, to

conduct mental evaluations of J.E. for purposes of the insanity defense. [5] On July 22, 2014, J.E.’s jury trial commenced. After the State’s presentation of

evidence, Drs. Wieland and Mueller testified regarding their evaluations. Dr.

Wieland found that J.E.’s test results were consistent with a diagnosis of

paranoid schizophrenia. Based on her interview, Dr. Mueller also settled on a

likely diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoid type. Both doctors opined that as a

result of mental disease or defect, J.E. was, at the time of his offenses, unable to

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and insane within the meaning of

Indiana Code section 35-41-3-6. The State also elicited testimony from Dr.

Wieland that, in his opinion, long-term commitment would be in J.E.’s best

interest in part because “it is likely that [J.E.] will stop medication on his own

and his erratic behavior would again return.” (Tr. 277.) Dr. Mueller

concurred, noting that if J.E. “is un-medicated he may not only pose a risk to

6 I.C. §§ 9-26-1-1 & 9-26-1-8(a). 7 I.C. §§ 9-26-1-2 & 9-26-1-9.

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himself but to other people.” (Tr. 306.) Her written report expressed that J.E.

“would benefit from re-admission to a state facility for more intensive

treatment.” (Tr. 229.) [6] On July 23, 2014, the jury returned a verdict of not responsible by reason of

insanity on all counts. Immediately following the verdict, the prosecution filed

in open court a petition for involuntary commitment. The court set a hearing

on the petition for August 29, 2014. The court then ordered an updated

psychiatric evaluation of J.E., which Dr. Mueller completed on August 6, 2014.

On August 29, 2014, the court held a hearing on the prosecuting attorney’s

petition. As permitted by Indiana Code section 35-36-2-4(b), the court took

judicial notice of the evidence presented during J.E.’s trial. The court also

reviewed Dr. Mueller’s updated evaluation. [7] At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the prosecuting attorney

showed by clear and convincing evidence that J.E. was mentally ill and

dangerous and, as a result of his mental illness, presented a substantial risk that

he would harm himself or others. The court further found that J.E. was in need

of custody, care, or treatment in a facility for a period expected to be more than

ninety days. The court therefore ordered J.E. committed to a state institution,

specifically Logansport State Hospital (“LSH”). By a letter dated September 4,

2014, the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (“FSSA”)

designated LSH – Isaac Ray Unit as the appropriate facility for J.E.’s

admission. (App. 188.) The court also ordered the clerk to open a mental

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health cause number for his involuntary commitment. J.E. now appeals the

trial court’s order of involuntary commitment. 8

Discussion and Decision Standard of Review [8] Following a verdict of not responsible by reason of insanity, the prosecuting

attorney must file a written petition for civil commitment of the defendant

under either Indiana Code section 12-26-6-2(a)(3) (temporary commitment) or

chapter 12-26-7 (regular commitment). See I.C. § 35-36-2-4. Here, the

prosecuting attorney filed the petition under the regular commitment statute,

which governs proceedings for an individual who is (1) alleged to be mentally ill

and either dangerous or gravely disabled; and (2) whose commitment is

reasonably expected to require custody, care, or treatment in a facility for more

than ninety days. I.C. § 12-26-7-1. [9] A petitioner who seeks the civil commitment of an individual is required to

prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the individual is mentally ill

and either dangerous or gravely disabled, and (2) detention or commitment of

that individual is appropriate. I.C. § 12-26-2-5(e). When reviewing a decision

made under the statutory requirement of clear and convincing evidence, we will

8 Although J.E. appeals only the trial court’s order of involuntary commitment, the appeal was filed under the trial court cause number in J.E.’s criminal case.

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affirm if, considering only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences

supporting it, without weighing or assessing witness credibility, a reasonable

trier of fact could find the necessary elements proven by clear and convincing

evidence. In re Civil Commitment of T.K., 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). [10] In this case, we are also called upon to interpret certain provisions of the regular

commitment statute. As this Court has set forth:

A question of statutory interpretation is a matter of law. In such interpretation, the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory interpretation apply. We will examine the statute as a whole, and avoid excessive reliance on a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of words. Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is nothing to construe. However, where the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute must be construed to give effect to the legislature’s intent. The legislature is presumed to have intended the language used in the statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an absurd or unjust result. Thus, we must keep in mind the objective and purpose of the law as well as the effect and repercussions of such a construction. Nash v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted),

trans denied.

Section 12-26-7-2 [11] Here, the prosecuting attorney initiated regular commitment proceedings by

filing a written petition in accordance with Indiana Code section 12-26-7-

2(b)(8). Indiana Code section 12-26-7-2 provides:

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(a) This section does not apply to the commitment of an individual if the individual has previously been committed under IC 12-26-6. (b) A proceeding for the commitment of an individual who appears to be suffering from a chronic mental illness may be begun by filing with a court having jurisdiction a written petition by any of the following: [. . . .] (8) A prosecuting attorney in accordance with IC 35-36-2-4 [after a verdict of not responsible by reason of insanity]. I.C. § 12-26-7-2.

[12] J.E. argues that the express language of Indiana Code section 12-26-7-2(a)

prohibits the regular commitment under Section 12-26-7-2(b) of an individual

who has previously been the subject of a temporary commitment under Chapter

12-26-6. Because J.E. was previously committed to LSH and Richmond State

Hospital, he contends that he cannot now be committed under Section 12-26-7-

2(b). 9 [13] In In re Commitment of R.L., 666 N.E.2d 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), R.L. was

temporarily committed under Indiana Code section 12-26-6 following a brief

emergency detention. Id. at 929-30. After less than ninety days of treatment in

LSH, the hospital petitioned for an order of regular commitment, which the

trial court eventually ordered. Id. at 930. On appeal, R.L. argued that the

language of Section 12-26-7-2(a) expressly prohibited the regular commitment

9 As evidence of his prior commitments, J.E. points to trial testimony of Dr. Mueller, Dr. Wieland, and his father that he had been previously committed to LSH and Richmond State Hospital. It is not clear from the record whether these previous commitments were temporary under Indiana Code chapter 12-26-6 or regular under Chapter 12-26-7.

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of an individual when that person was previously subject to temporary

commitment under Chapter 12-26-6. Id. [14] In reviewing the statutory scheme as a whole, this Court found that Section 12-

26-7-4 was helpful in interpreting the meaning of Subsection 12-26-7-2(a). Id. at

932. Section 12-26-7-4 provides that:

(a) Upon receiving: (1) a petition under section 2 [I.C. § 12-26-7-2] of this chapter; or (2) a report under IC 12-26-6-11 that recommends treatment in a facility for more than ninety (90) days; the court shall enter an order setting a hearing date.

The Court interpreted Section 12-26-7-4 as authorizing two separate paths to

regular commitment: (1) a formal petition filed under Section 12-26-7-2, or (2) a

report under Section 12-26-6-11. R.L., 666 N.E.2d at 932. The Court then

explained the impact of Section 12-26-7-4 on Subsection 12-26-7-2(a):

Recognizing that there are two independent avenues under I.C. § 12- 26-7-4 from which the trial court can enter a regular commitment, the provision in I.C. § 12-26-7-2 that “this section” does not apply to those previously subject to a temporary commitment is logical. Ind. Code § 12-26-7-2 does not apply to an individual who previously had been temporarily committed because that individual would not be committed pursuant to a petition for regular commitment. Instead, that individual would be processed pursuant to the report filed during the individual’s temporary commitment and on the recommendation of the facility superintendent or attending physician under I.C. § 12–26– 6–11. Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1409-CR-339 | June 30, 2015 Page 8 of 15 [15] We agree with this Court’s interpretation of Section 12-26-7-2 in In re R.L.

When the statute is read as a whole, the mandate in Subsection (a) that “this

section” does not apply to the commitment of an individual previously subject

to a temporary commitment refers to commitment proceedings that will be

initiated via a report, rather than a petition, because of a previous temporary

commitment under Chapter 12-26-6. This interpretation harmonizes the

temporary and regular commitment statutes and allows for a regular

commitment to follow a temporary commitment, a situation that likely often

occurs in the mental health field and for which the legislature logically would

have provided. [16] Even if J.E. was, in the past, temporarily committed under Chapter 12-26-6,

Subsection 12-26-7-2(a) does not bar the prosecuting attorney from filing a

petition under Chapter 12-26-7-2(b) following a verdict of not responsible by

reason of insanity. The trial court did not err in ordering J.E. committed under

Chapter 12-26-7 based on the prosecuting attorney’s petition.

Sufficient Evidence [17] J.E. next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s order

of commitment to the Logansport State Hospital. [18] Following a hearing on a petition for regular commitment and review of the

record, if the trial court finds the individual to be mentally ill and either

dangerous or gravely disabled, the court may enter either of the following

orders: (1) for the individual’s custody, care, or treatment, or continued

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custody, care, or treatment in an appropriate facility, or (2) for the individual to

enter an outpatient therapy program. I.C. § 12-26-7-5(a). J.E. does not

challenge the court’s finding that he is mentally ill and dangerous. Nor does he

argue that outpatient therapy would be a more appropriate alternative for

treatment than custody in a facility. [19] Rather, J.E. argues that there is insufficient evidence that LSH was an

appropriate facility for his placement because the record does not contain a

report from a community mental health center (“CMHC”) as required by

Indiana Code section 12-26-7-3(b). Section 12-26-7-3(b) provides:

(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) [commitment to a research bed at Larue D. Carter Memorial Hospital], if the commitment is to a state institution administered by the division of mental health and addiction, the record of the proceedings must include a report from a [CMHC] stating both of the following: (1) The [CMHC] has evaluated the individual. (2) Commitment to a state institution administered by the division of mental health and addiction under this chapter is appropriate. [20] I.C. § 12-26-7-3(b). 10 As used in Indiana Code title 12, a CMHC is a program

of services that meets the following conditions:

10 As a threshold matter, J.E. contends that there was no evidence presented that LSH is a state institution administered by the division of mental health and addiction (“DMHA”) such that the reporting requirements of subsection (b) would apply to his case. By statute, DMHA “is responsible for administering . . . State institutions listed in IC 12-24-1-3.” I.C. § 12-21-5-1(6). Section 12-24-1-3 includes LSH in its enumerated list of state institutions under the control and responsibility of the director of DMHA. See I.C. § 12-24-1-3(a)(4). Although no specific evidence was presented at J.E.’s commitment hearing about the administration of LSH, we think the presentation of such evidence was unnecessary because, by statute, LSH is a state institution administered by DMHA. The requirements of Section 12-26-7-3(b) thus apply to this case.

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(1) Is approved by the division of mental health and addiction. (2) Is organized for the purpose of providing multiple services for persons with mental illness or a chronic addictive disorder. (3) Is operated by one (1) of the following or any combination of the following: (A) A city, a town, a county, or another political subdivision of Indiana. (B) An agency of the state. (C) An agency of the United States. (D) A political subdivision of another state. (E) A hospital owned or operated by a unit of government described in clauses (A) through (D). (F) A building authority organized for the purpose of constructing facilities to be leased to units of government. (G) A corporation incorporated under IC 23-7-1.1 (before its repeal August 1, 1991) or IC 23-17. (H) A nonprofit corporation incorporated in another state. (I) A university or college. I.C. § 12-7-2-38.

[21] J.E. contends, and the State concedes, that there is no report in the record from

a CMHC stating that (1) J.E. was evaluated and (2) commitment to LSH was

appropriate. He therefore argues that there was insufficient evidence to support

the court’s order of commitment to LSH. [22] Under the statutory scheme set forth in Chapter 12-26-7, a petition for

involuntary commitment must include a physician’s written statement that (1)

the physician examined the individual within the past thirty days, and (2) the

physician believes that the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or

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gravely disabled, and in need of custody, care, or treatment in a facility for a

period expected to be more than ninety days. I.C. § 12-26-7-3(a). After the trial

court finds that a person is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely

disabled, the court may enter an order for placement in either an appropriate

facility or an outpatient therapy program. I.C. § 12-26-7-5(a). Sections 12-26-7-

3(b)-(e) require certain reports to support the court’s placement depending on

the facility to which the individual is committed. [23] Based on the statutory scheme, we think the reporting requirement in Section

12-26-7-3(b) is a requirement designed to ensure that, after a determination that

a person is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled, a trial court

places the individual into a facility appropriately suited to address his or her

mental health needs. In other words, “the purpose of the report requirement of

Section 12-26-7-3(b) is to insure that . . . qualified persons have evaluated the

individual and determined that commitment to a state institution is

appropriate.” A.J. v. Logansport State Hospital, 956 N.E.2d 96, 108 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2011). [24] We first observe that J.E. did not raise an objection at his hearing that

placement at a state psychiatric hospital, specifically LSH, was inappropriate.

Nor did J.E. object to the absence of the required CMHC report. More

importantly, on appeal J.E. has failed to show how the absence of the report

has prejudiced his substantial rights. See Ind. Trial Rule 61 (“The court at every

stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding

which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1409-CR-339 | June 30, 2015 Page 12 of 15 [25] Despite the report’s absence, there was ample evidence in the record showing

that qualified persons evaluated J.E. and that a state psychiatric hospital is an

appropriate facility for J.E.’s treatment. The evidence shows that J.E. has a

“long standing history of mental illness,” including a diagnosis of paranoid

schizophrenia. (App. 224.) Results of tests administered by Dr. Wieland

showed that J.E. has “some degree of adequate functioning while under the

benefit of regular psychiatric medication” but that he had “significant difficulty

managing his medications in the past.” (App. 224.) Further, because “it is

likely that [J.E.] will stop medication on his own and his erratic behavior would

again return,” Dr. Wieland opined that long-term commitment would be in

J.E.’s best interest. (Tr. 277.) Dr. Mueller concurred, noting that if J.E. “is un-

medicated he may not only pose a risk to himself but to other people.” (Tr.

306.) Dr. Mueller’s written report expressed that J.E. “would benefit from re-

admission to a state facility for more intensive treatment.” (Tr. 229.) In her

updated psychiatric assessment, Dr. Mueller found that J.E. “continues with a

mental state characteristic of a psychotic thought disorder” and that it “is in his

best interest to be committed involuntary [sic] to a treatment facility for a period

expected to be more than 90 days.” (App. 233-34.) J.E. had previously been

committed to both LSH and Richmond State Hospital. [26] In addition, the record contains a letter from FSSA, which oversees DMHA,

dated September 4, 2014, stating:

We are in receipt of the Order dated August 29, 2014 civilly committing [J.E.] following a finding of Not Guilty by Reason of

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Insanity. We are hereby designating Logansport State Hospital – Isaac Ray Unit as the appropriate facility to be admitted.

(App. 188.) As the State observes “[g]iven the requirement that the record

include a report from a division-approved [CMHC], it is unlikely that [FSSA]

would inform the trial court of [LSH’s] designation as the appropriate facility

for commitment . . . without the existence of a report.” (Appellee’s Br. 14.)

Although the FSSA letter itself does not meet the requirements of Section 12-

26-7-3(b), the letter indicates that J.E. was evaluated by qualified persons such

that FSSA was able to designate LSH as the appropriate facility for his care and

treatment. [27] This is not to say that the statutory reporting requirement should be readily

disregarded or waived in cases of civil commitment. “Civil commitment is a

significant deprivation of liberty that requires the petitioner to show ‘that the

individual suffers from something more serious than is demonstrated by

idiosyncratic behavior.’” In re Commitment of Bradbury, 845 N.E.2d 1063, 1065

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).

For this reason, the commitment statutes provide a person who is the subject of

an involuntary commitment proceeding a plethora of rights, including the right

to a hearing and notice thereof. See I.C. §§ 12-26-7-4(c)-(d); 12-26-6. [28] Although the record in this case does not contain the report required by Indiana

Code section 12-26-7-3(b), we are satisfied from the record before us that

qualified persons evaluated J.E. and determined that commitment to a state

institution was appropriate. Accordingly, we hold that there was sufficient Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1409-CR-339 | June 30, 2015 Page 14 of 15

evidence to support the trial court’s order committing J.E. to a state psychiatric

hospital for treatment.

Conclusion [29] The trial court did not err in ordering regular commitment under Indiana Code

section 12-26-7-2 where J.E. had a prior history of commitment. Sufficient

evidence supported the trial court’s order committing J.E. to Logansport State

Hospital. [30] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Barnes, J., concur.

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