Stevenson v. Cox

(2005) (stating that we review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo). Specifically, further discovery is necessary to determine whether AR 750.04 applies to Stevenson's correspondence with the Florida and Minnesota civilly committed individuals, whom he sent and received letters to and from. The plain language of AR 750.04 prohibits correspondence between incarcerated persons with few exceptions, none of which apply to the facts presented here. AR 750.04(1). The Nevada Department of Correction's Administrative Regulations Manual defines "incarcerated persons" as "[i]ndividuals committed or confined after arrest, before trial and/or following a conviction of a crime." (Emphasis added). Thus, in order to determine if AR 750.04 applies to Stevenson's correspondence with the Florida and Minnesota civilly committed individuals, it must be determined whether the Florida and Minnesota civilly committed individuals were "committed . .. after arrest, before trial and/or following a conviction of a crime." If they were, then AR 750.04 prohibits Stevenson's correspondence with them. If not, then AR 750.04 does not prohibit Stevenson's correspondence with them. We reverse and remand for this factual determination to be made. 2

'The answer to this question is not self-evident because in both Florida and Minnesota a person may be civilly committed without a criminal conviction. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.912(2)(b) (West 2014); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.913 (West 2014); Minn. Stat. § 253B.18(1)(a) (2014); Minn. Stat. § 253B.04(1)(a) (2014). Additionally, while the answer to this question was hinted at in Stevenson's interrogatory responses, it was not decisively answered.

2 Forclarity, we are only reversing the grant of summary judgment as to Stevenson's third cause of action, which sought a declaratory judgment that AR 750.04 does not prohibit his correspondence with civilly committed individuals On appeal, Stevenson did not argue the constitutionality of the regulation or its effect on his rights. Consequently, continued on next page . . . SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (D) 1947A

As to Stevenson's second argument, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Stevenson access to the evidence supporting NDOC's motion for summary judgment. 3 See generally Howard v. State, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 67, 291 P.3d 137 (2012) (explaining that a court has discretion over its records); SRCR 3. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.

J. Saitta

Gibbons

J.

. continued

we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Stevenson's first and second causes of action, which alleged that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (stating that this court need not consider claims that are not cogently argued or supported by relevant authority).

3 We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit.

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cc: Hon. Jim C. Shirley, District Judge Snell & Wilmer, LLP/Las Vegas Attorney General/Carson City Pershing County Clerk

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