Smith v. State, Dept. of Employment Security Div.

(explaining that a person is ineligible for unemployment benefits when he or she voluntarily left employment without good cause); Kolnik v. Nev. Emp't Sec. Dep't, 112 Nev. 11, 16, 908 P.2d 726, 729 (1996) (noting that mixed questions of law and fact are entitled to deference and the agency's conclusions will not be disturbed by this court if they are supported by substantial evidence). Although harassment by fellow employees can constitute good cause for voluntarily quitting a job if the claimant informed his employer of the harassment and gave his employer an opportunity to understand the nature of his objection before resigning, see Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 654 A.2d 264, 266 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), unsubstantiated complaints do not constitute good cause for voluntarily quitting a job for unemployment benefits purposes, see In re Jones, 602 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). Here, the appeals referee had to weigh the evidence presented to her, including the parties' testimonies and the documentary evidence submitted, and consider whether appellant had resigned for good cause. She found that appellant "perceived he was being harassed," that he knew he was not in jeopardy of losing his job, and that he did not make an internal complaint with the human resources department so as to reasonably attempt to preserve his employment before resigning. While the administrative record contains evidence of a dispute between appellant and his employer, there is no evidence, aside from appellant's testimony, of harassment or abuse by his fellow employees or employer. As this court will not reweigh the evidence or replace the appeals referee's judgment as between two reasonable but conflicting views, see NRS 233B.135; Nellis Motors v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 124 Nev. 1263,

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1269-70, 197 P.3d 1061, 1066 (2008) (explaining that this court will not reweigh the evidence, reassess witness credibility, or substitute our judgment for that of the appeals officer on questions of fact), and substantial evidence supports the appeals referee's determinations, see Wright v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 122, 125, 110 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2005) (recognizing that substantial evidence may be inferred from the lack of certain evidence), we conclude that the Board of Review's decision to affirm the appeals referee's ruling was not arbitrary or capricious. See NRS 233B.135(3)(f); McCracken v. Fancy, 98 Nev. 30, 31, 639 P.2d 552, 553 (1982). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of appellant's petition for judicial review. It is so ORDERED.'

QUIParraguirre

J. AAA. Cherry

cc: Hon. Adriana Escobar, District Judge Bradley Smith State of Nevada/DETR Eighth District Court Clerk

'We have considered appellant's other arguments and conclude they lack merit. See NRS 233B.135(1) (explaining that judicial review is confined to the administrative record); Garcia v. Scolari's Food & Drug, 125 Nev. 48, 52-53, 200 P.3d 514, 517 (2009) (setting forth the district court's standard for presenting evidence not part of the administrative record).

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