United States v. Frederick Banks

OPINION * PER CURIAM. Frederick Banks appeals the District Court’s order denying his motions challenging the revocation of his supervised release. For the reasons below, we will dismiss the appeal as moot. In 2005, Banks was convicted of mail fraud and was subsequently sentenced to 63 months in prison and-three years of supervised release. After Banks was released from prison, the Government sought to revoke his supervised release. Banks proceeded pro se and filed several motions opposing the revocation. After the District Court revoked Banks’s supervised release and we affirmed, United States v. Banks, 572 Fed.Appx. 162 (3d Cir.2014), the District Court dismissed Banks’s motions as moot. Banks filed the current appeal. Because Banks’s supervised release expired on May 29, 2015, the parties were requested to address whether the appeal is moot. The Government filed a response, but Banks has not. Pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, a federal court may adjudicate only ongoing controversies or cases. Burkey v. *644 Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir.2009). In the motions at issue, Banks challenged the revocation of his supervised release, and his supervised release has now expired. There is no effective relief that we could grant him. See In re Cantwell, 639 F.2d 1050, 1053 (3d Cir.1981) (“[A]n appeal will be dismissed as moot when events occur during the pendency of the appeal which prevent the appellate court from granting any effective relief.”). Banks has not argued that there are any collateral consequences caused by the revocation of his supervised release. See Burlcey, 556 F.3d at 148 (when a prisoner challenges a sentence that has been served, the appeal is moot unless he can show collateral consequences.) Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal as moot. We will deny as moot the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and need not decide whether to issue a certifícate of appealability or to summarily affirm the District Court’s order. Footnotes [*] This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.