the Fredericksburg Care Company, L.P. v. Brenda Lira, as Representative of the Estate of Guadalupe Quesada

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 444444444444 NO . 13-0577 444444444444

THE FREDERICKSBURG CARE COMPANY, L.P., PETITIONER,

v.

BRENDA LIRA, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GUADALUPE QUESADA, DECEASED, RESPONDENT

4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444

PER CURIAM

The outcome of this case is controlled by our opinion in Fredericksburg Care Co. v. Perez, __ S.W.3d. __ (Tex. 2015). Both cases, along with a third case styled Williamsburg Care Co. v. Acosta, __ S.W.3d. __ (Tex. 2015) (per curiam), involve the question of whether a federal law, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015, exempts Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.451 from being preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. The court of appeals consolidated this case with Perez and Acosta for oral argument, and issued identical opinions (except for changing the identities of the parties) holding that the MFA exemption from preemption applied to section 74.451. 407 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013). We hold today in Perez that section 74.451 was not a law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance and thus does not qualify for the MFA exemption from *2 preemption. Perez, __ S.W.3d at __. The trial court should have granted the motion to compel arbitration. Id.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for review in this case, and without hearing oral argument, TEX . R. APP . P. 59.1, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand this case to the trial court to proceed in a manner consistent with our opinion in Perez, __ S.W.3d __. OPINION DELIVERED: March 6, 2015