Ramiro Garza and J&R Valley Oilfield Services, Inc. v. Ines Gonzalez Garcia

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS ════════════ No. 02-0300 ════════════ Ramiro Garza and J&R Valley Oilfield Services, Inc., Petitioners, v. Ines Gonzalez Garcia, Respondent ════════════════════════════════════════════════════ On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas ════════════════════════════════════════════════════ Argued January 22, 2003 Chief Justice Phillips, joined by Justice Wainwright as to Parts I and II, dissenting. The Court holds today that when a motion to transfer venue on several grounds includes a phrase in a sentence alleging that such transfer will be for the convenience of the parties, and the trial court grants the motion without any indication that it considered or even knew a transfer on convenience grounds was alleged, the transfer is immune from review by any appellate court. Although this result can be supported by a literal reading of the venue statute, I believe it exalts form over substance to undermine the essential purpose of the Legislature=s venue scheme. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I Defendant J&R Valley Oilfield Services, Inc., joined by defendant Ramiro Garza, filed a motion to transfer venue in this personal injury suit from Starr to Hidalgo County. The motion objected to Avenue in Starr County . . . on the grounds that said county is not a proper county and no basis exists mandating or permitting venue in [Starr County],@ because J&R is Anot a resident of Starr County@ and Adoes not have [its] principal office@ or any agent in Starr County. J&R then asserted that A[v]enue is maintainable in Hidalgo County . . . because all of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Hidalgo County, Texas, [and] Hidalgo County is the county of [J&R=s] residence . . . .@ At the end of the motion, J&R added this single sentence: AAlternatively . . . venue should be transferred to Hidalgo County for the convenience of the parties.@ In reply to J&R=s motion to transfer venue, plaintiff Ines Gonzalez Garcia alleged several reasons why Garza was a resident of Starr County, where Garcia brought suit. First, he pointed to the report prepared by the state trooper following the accident that was the basis of this suit, which listed Garza=s address as Rio Grande City. Second, Garza owned a home in Rio Grande City, where his wife and children resided, on which Garza paid taxes for the year the accident occurred. Finally, Garza gave the Rio Grande City address to a magistrate when he appeared in court on an unrelated Driving While Intoxicated charge. In support of these claims, Garcia attached Garza=s deposition and a court document from Garza=s DWI arraignment. The trial court conducted two hearings at which both parties presented live testimony. Neither party, however, introduced any argument on, or even referenced the term Aconvenience of the parties.@ The trial court granted J&R=s motion, stating in its order: A[A]fter considering the motion, the pleadings, the affidavits, the responses as well as arguments of counsel and after a hearing, the Court grants Defendant=s Motion to Transfer Venue.@ The order gave no reasons for granting the transfer, and in particular never mentioned the term Aconvenience of the parties.@ This case was then tried in Hidalgo County. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Garcia, awarding her $120,000 for past and future physical pain and mental anguish and for past medical care, but nothing for past and future physical impairment or disfigurement. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. Despite the generally favorable judgment, Garcia appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in transferring the case from Starr County to Hidalgo County. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence supported venue in Starr County, where Garcia brought suit. 70 S.W.3d 362. J&R and Garza argued that the court could not reverse the transfer because section 15.002(c) prohibits appellate review of transfers for convenience. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ' 15.002(c). The court of appeals refused to presume that the transfer was based on the convenience of the parties, noting that such a presumption would insulate most venue determinations from review. 70 S.W.3d at 367-68. Because venue exceptions and mandatory venue provisions have always been strictly construed, and because all venue determinations except for the transfer for convenience are subject to review, the court of appeals held: [I]n order to fall within the parameters of subsection (c), that is, in order to be exempt from appellate review, a venue order must expressly state that the cause is or is not transferred for the convenience of the parties under section 15.002(b), or the record must contain express findings of fact in accordance with section 15.002(b). Id. at 368. The court then reviewed the transfer under the general venue provision and held that the trial court erred in granting the transfer. It therefore remanded the case for the trial court in Hidalgo County to transfer the case to Starr County for a new trial. Id. at 372. II The principal venue statute in Texas is section 15.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Section 15.002(a) includes four subsections for determining in what county a suit is properly brought. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ' 15.002(a). There is no immediate appeal from an adverse ruling, but if on appeal venue is determined to have been improper, Ait shall in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error.@ Id. ' 15.064(b). Thus, the price of an improper venue ruling is always a new trial. The Legislature, however, gives the trial court discretion to decide whether to transfer a case to another county for the convenience of the parties and in the interest of justice. Id. ' 15.002(b). This discretion is broad, but not unfettered, because it can only be exercised when three conditions are met. As Section 15.002(b) states: For the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, a court may transfer an action from a county of proper venue under this subchapter or Subchapter C to any other county of proper venue on motion of a defendant filed and served concurrently with or before the filing of the answer, where the court finds: (1) maintenance of the action in the county of suit would work an injustice to the movant considering the movant=s economic and personal hardship; (2) the balance of interests of all the parties predominates in favor of the action being brought in the other county; and (3) the transfer of the action would not work an injustice to any other party. Id. In contrast to the automatic reversal for an erroneous venue determination, however, a trial court=s transfer under section 15.002(b) will not be reversed if it is wrong. In fact, it is not reviewable at all on appeal or by an extraordinary pleading. Section 15.002(c) commands: AA court=s ruling or decision to grant or deny a transfer under Subsection (b) is not grounds for appeal or mandamus and is not reversible error.@ Id. ' 15.002(c). J&R and Garza contend that because their motion to transfer venue requested a transfer based on both sections 15.002(a) and 15.002(b), and the trial court=s order stated only that the motion was granted, the appellate court must presume it to be a transfer for convenience that is immune from review. The court below considered and rejected this claim, but this Court swallows it without pause, pointing to our general practice in Texas that an order granting relief without specifying the grounds is presumed to have been based on all asserted grounds. ___ S.W.3d at ___. The Court states that it does not Abelieve the potential for error or injustice here justifies making an exception to the general rule that trial judges and lawyers need not detail specific findings in every order.@ Id. at ___. Generally as a part of appellate review, we presume that a trial court=s order, which does not specify grounds, is correct if any meritorious ground was before the court. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993) (summary judgment). While this is a useful construct for preventing piecemeal review and relitigation, it has the opposite effect in this case. Because section 15.002(c) precludes appellate review of convenience transfers, applying the general rule here does not facilitate appellate review, it abrogates it. The reason for the presumption is stood on its head, which ought to make us question whether the Legislature meant for it to apply. Instead, I believe the accepted rules of statutory construction suggest that the Legislature did not. Our first duty is to interpret a statute in a way that carries out the Legislature=s intent. Tex. Gov=t Code ' 312.005; State v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Tex. 2000). When interpreting a statute we may consider the object sought to be attained, the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, the consequences of different constructions, and the statute=s legislative history. Tex. Gov=t Code ' 311.023. In requiring a judge to Afind@ each of the three statutory conditions before granting a convenience transfer, I believe the Legislature directed the trial court to communicate in some fashion that three findings had been made so that the parties would know that the law had been followed and a reviewing court would know that it had no power of review. Venue has long been a significant issue in Texas law, which is perhaps not surprising in a diverse state with 254 counties and an elected judiciary. The venue rules in Texas may be traced to our Spanish heritage. Clarence Guittard & John Tyler, Revision of the Texas Venue Statute: A Reform Long Overdue, 32 Baylor L. Rev. 563, 564-66 (1980). The original Texas venue statute, which was enacted by the first Congress of the Republic in 1836, adopted the general Spanish rule that provided a defendant with the privilege of a trial in the county of domicile with certain exceptions. Id. at 565. Since 1836, the Legislature has amended the venue scheme multiple times. Prior to 1983, the general rule that a defendant shall be sued in the county of domicile had been modified by 34 statutory exceptions. Dan R. Price, New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History, 15 St. Mary=s L.J. 855, 857-58 (1984) (citing Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982-1983)(amended 1983)). However, growing displeasure with alleged forum-shopping and plea of privilege delay led to wholesale venue reform in 1983. See Act of May 28, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 385, '' 1-3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119-24. The plea of privilege was replaced with post-judgment venue appeal, subject to the guarantee of automatic appellate reversal for error. See id. at 2124. This provision was meant to Aplac[e] parties at great risk if by fraud, negligence, oversight, or otherwise venue is improper in the ultimate county of suit.@ Price, supra at 879. I find no other instance in the laws of Texas where the Legislature has designated a preliminary determination to be so significant that it cannot be harmless error. Thus, the Legislature clearly considered proper venue to be of critical importance. Beset by continuing allegations that parties were suing nominal defendants and bringing manufactured claims to obtain more favorable fora, the Legislature again undertook comprehensive venue reform in 1995. Act of May 18, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, '' 1-6, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 978-81 (codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code '' 15.001-.66). The Legislature expanded subsection 15.002(a) to include the current four provisions for proper venue,[1] supplanting the venerable single standard, which provided that venue was proper A>in the county in which all or a part of the cause of action accrued or in the county of defendant=s residence if the defendant was a natural person.=@ A. Erin Dwyer, Donald Celleluori, & Thomas A. Graves, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Texas Civil Procedure, 49 SMU L. Rev. 1371, 1375-76 (1996) (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 15.001 (Vernon 1986)). These changes were intended Ato eliminate continuing debate about where a cause of action accrued@ and provide Aa general rule specifying venue for all suits brought against corporations.@ Id. at 1376. At the same time, the venue scheme was also amended to include sections 15.002(b) and (c). Act of May 18, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, ' 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 979. Proponents of the amendment described section 15.002(b) as Aa meaningful reform@ to promote Afairness and balance in our venue laws,@ giving the trial court the Aability to balance all of the competing interests that are involved in trying to find a fair place within the venue statute to try a lawsuit.@ An Act Relating to Venue for Civil Actions: Debate on Tex. S.B. 32 on the Floor of the House, 74th Leg., R.S. 4 (May 3, 1995) (testimony of Rep. Duncan) (transcript available at the Texas State Law Library). I refuse to believe that, by adding this provision, the Legislature intended to undermine the careful scheme it had just created in subsection (a). Was the Legislature really so cynical as to represent to litigants that a lawful venue position would be automatically vindicated on appeal, while in fact providing a Aback door@ method that would permit trial courts to insulate their venue transfers from any appellate review at all? Or was the Legislature really so naive as to believe that no lawyer would simply slip the words Aconvenience of the parties@ into a transfer motion while presenting evidence and argument solely on the merits of its venue motion in hopes of luring the trial court into inadvertently making its ruling immune from appeal? I answer both questions Ano.@ As the court of appeals noted, appellate review, and the threat of reversal, are important safeguards against venue fraud. 70 S.W.3d at 368 (citing Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep=t, 886 S.W.2d 259, 261 n.3 (Tex. 1994); Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enter. Prod. Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied)). While introducing some flexibility into the system, the Legislature still must have intended for the judge to make a convenience transfer only after a conscious determination, communicated to the parties, that in the court=s opinion all three of the transfer requirements had been met. Otherwise the Legislature=s intention that venue determinations under section 15.002(a) be automatically reversible on appeal could always be frustrated by a devious judge, clever counsel, or, as likely happened here, simply by accident. Therefore, I conclude that the Legislature required the trial judge to Afind@ all of these factors. For the Court, the simplicity of the general rule trumps all. The Court is not at all curious about the problems its holding creates. Instead the Court=s total analysis is: We acknowledge the court of appeals= concern that the usual presumption in favor of nonspecific orders will make many venue orders >immune from review.= But in transfer orders based on convenience, that appears to have been precisely the Legislature=s intent. And even under the court of appeals= bright-line test, trial judges who are so inclined may make any venue order immune from review simply by adding >granted on convenience grounds.= ___ S.W.3d at ___ (citation omitted). I agree with the court of appeals that the situation presented here is unique. Additionally, I find no other statute providing that a determination by a trial judge may be based on more than one reason, one being automatic error if wrong, and the other requiring a finding by the trial judge but being totally immune from appellate review. Requiring a trial court to state in its order, or otherwise include findings in the record, to establish that a granted motion to transfer venue is based on the convenience of the parties when the defendant has also sought transfer under traditional venue rules is necessary to preserve the Legislature=s mandate that an erroneous section 15.002(a) ruling is automatically reversible. Because the trial court below was presented with multiple grounds for venue transfer, one of which was section 15.002(b), and the trial court did not explain in its order or otherwise that the venue transfer it made was for the convenience of the parties, nor did the trial court make section 15.002(b) findings, I would hold that the trial court=s order in this case is reviewable under section 15.002(a). If the Court were to reach the merits of the venue transfer, I would agree with the court of appeals that Garcia presented prima facie proof that venue was proper in Starr County and that the trial court erred in transferring the case to Hidalgo County. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. ____________________________________ Thomas R. Phillips Chief Justice Opinion delivered: May 14, 2004 [1] Except as otherwise provided . . . all lawsuits shall be brought: (1) in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; (2) in the county of defendant=s residence at the time the cause of action accrued if defendant is a natural person; (3) in the county of the defendant=s principal office in this state, if the defendant is not a natural person; or (4) if Subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) do not apply, in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the cause of action. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ' 15.002(a).