Investment Performance Corporation v. Herbert Richardson and John E. Gilmore

In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ____________ NO. 01-00-00575-CV ____________ DOV AVNI KAMINETZKY, A/K/A DOV K. AVNI, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ASSIGNEE OF HI-NOI CORPORATION, AND INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE CORPORATION, Appellants V. HERBERT RICHARDSON AND JOHN E. GILMORE, Appellees On Appeal from the 61st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 99-40435 MEMORANDUM OPINION Herbert Richardson and John E. Gilmore, appellees, sued Dov Avni Kaminetzky, Hi-Noi Corporation, and Investment Performance Corporation (IPC), appellants, to quiet title to real property bought at a foreclosure sale. The trial court rendered post-answer default judgment in favor of Richardson and Gilmore. Kaminetzky presents 15 issues for review and Hi-Noi and IPC present 14 issues for review. We affirm. Background Kaminetzky and Hi-Noi Corporation were the record owners of Johanna Square Apartments. In August of 1999, Richardson and Gilmore purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. The instrument that was being foreclosed upon was a purchase-money deed of trust. After the foreclosure sale, Kaminetzky entered the property and attempted to collect rents from tenants, threatened tenants if they did not pay him, and filed documents in the real property records clouding Richardson and Gilmore’s title. Richardson and Gilmore then filed suit to quiet title and then sought and was granted a temporary injunction against appellants enjoining them from collecting rents, from excluding Richardson and Gilmore from possession of the property and from filing documents in the real property records. On February 3, 2000, after appellants did not appear, the trial court rendered a post-answer default judgment in favor of Richardson and Gilmore. Hi-Noi Corporation In his answer, Kaminetzky claimed to be appearing on behalf of himself and “as the complete assignee of record of all causes of action, claims, defenses, and liabilities of Hi-Noi Corporation.” He filed an assignment of “causes of action and rights of recovery” with the answer. Based on this assignment of rights, Kaminetzky filed motions and made objections on behalf of Hi-Noi. On appeal, Hi-Noi relies on these motions and objections to preserve error. Having assigned its cause of action, claims, defenses, and liabilities to Kaminetzky, Hi-Noi had no standing to participate at trial, nor does it have standing to participate in this appeal. Torrington Co. v. Stuzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 843 (Tex. 2000) (holding that Texas courts have long held that an appealing party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect it or that merely affect the rights of others). Accordingly, we overrule all of Hi-Noi’s points of error. IPC In its first through fourth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and eleventh through fourteenth points of error, IPC either relies on objections and motions made by Kaminetzky to support its arguments that the trial court erred or complains of harm that it did not incur. IPC cannot rely on the motions and objections made by other defendants to preserve error, and it has no standing to complain about harm which it did not incur. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Beutel v. Dallas Cty. Flood Control Dist., 916 S.W.2d 685, 694. (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, writ denied) (holding that in trial involving multiple defendants, each party must make its own objection to preserve error for appeal); Torrington Co., 46 S.W.3d at 843.In its fifth issue, IPC contends that the trial judge erred in disregarding evidence that the assignment of notes and liens by appellees’ affiliate was fraudulently generated and backdated, and thus the purchase of Johanna Square Apartments was void. In its seventh issue, IPC contends that the trial court committed reversible error by denying it all pre-trial discovery. In its tenth issue, IPC contends that the court erred in granting summary judgment against it. In its original answer, IPC disclaimed any interest in the title of the property that was the subject matter of the lawsuit and stated that it was not in possession of the premises or any part of the property. On January 26, 2000, the trial court found that IPC had filed a valid disclaimer, and that it had formally disputed plaintiff’s title to the property prior to filing its disclaimer. Based on these facts and the arguments of the parties, the court held that IPC was estopped from making a claim to the property at issue and entered summary judgment against IPC. A disclaimer in a pleading is regarded as a judicial admission requiring no proof of the admitted fact and authorizing the introduction of no evidence which contradicts it. Kennesaw Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Goss, 694 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). To be effective, a disclaimer need only assert that the defendant does not claim any title or interest in the land and does not assert any claim to it. Jordan v. Exxon, 802 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1991, no writ). A disclaimer cannot be retracted or withdrawn except upon permission of the court. Sanders v. Taylor, 500 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1973, no writ). IPC filed a valid disclaimer, and the trial court did not give it permission to withdraw it. Because it filed a valid disclaimer that was not withdrawn, IPC’s fifth, seventh, and tenth points of error are without merit. IPC lacks standing to complain that the assignment was fraudulent because it disclaimed any interest in the property. Because IPC disclaimed interest in the property in its original answer, and because the only judgment entered against it simply recognized this fact, it is unclear how IPC was denied discovery. Moreover, because it was undisputed that IPC did not own the property at issue, the trial court did not err in holding such. Accordingly, we overrule all of IPC’s points of error. Kaminetzky Recusal Issues In his first issue, Kaminetzky contends that Judge Ray erred in overruling Kaminetzky’s section 74.053(b) objection to her assignment to hear his second motion to recuse Judge Donovan. Section 74.053(b) of the Government Code provides that “If a party to a civil case files a timely objection to the assignment, the judge shall not hear the case.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.053(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003). A brief recitation of pertinent facts is necessary. On September 20, 1999, Kaminetzky filed a motion to recuse Judge Donovan for bias. On October 14, 1999, Judge McAdams denied Kaminetzky’s motion to recuse. On October 21, 1999 Kaminetzky filed a second motion to recuse Judge Donovan for bias. On November 10, 1999, Kaminetzky objected to the assignment of Judge McAdams to hear his second motion to recuse Judge Donovan pursuant to section 74.053(b). Id. On November 11, 1999, Judge McAdams overruled Kaminetzky’s objection and denied his second motion to recuse Judge Donovan. On December 13, 1999, Judge McAdams vacated the November 11, 1999 orders and sustained Kaminetzky’s objection to his assignment. On January 11, 2000, Judge Ray was assigned to hear Kaminetzky’s second motion to recuse Judge Donovan. On January 13, 2000, Kaminetzky objected to Judge Ray’s assignment pursuant to section 74.053(b). The next day, Judge Ray denied his objection to recuse her and denied his second motion to recuse Judge Donovan. Kaminetzky contends that, because Judge Ray did not recuse herself or request the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district to assign a judge to hear the motion, as required by Rule 18(a)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the denial of his second motion to recuse Judge Donovan was void. We disagree. Section 74.053(b) limits each party to one objection per case, unless the assigned judge is a “former judge or justice who was not a retired judge.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.053(b) and (d) (Vernon Supp. 2003). Having already objected to Judge McAdams pursuant to section 74.053(b), Kaminetzky was not entitled to object to Judge Ray under that section. Judge Ray did not err in denying his objection to her assignment, and, therefore, her order denying Kaminetzky’s second motion to recuse Judge Donovan was not void. We overrule Kaminetzky’s first issue. In his second issue, Kaminetzky contends that Judge Donovan erred when he continued to make orders and take action after Kaminetzky filed a motion to recuse him and prior to a hearing on that motion. On September 20, 1999, Kaminetzky filed a motion to vacate or modify the August 20, 1999 temporary injunction entered against him and, alternatively, to recuse Judge Donovan for bias. He also filed a notice that oral hearing on this motion would be held on September 24, 1999. On September 24, 1999, Judge Donovan denied the motion to vacate and the motion to recuse. On October 14, 1999, Judge McAdams denied Kaminetzky’s motion to recuse Judge Donovan. When a motion to recuse is filed, a trial court has only two options: recusal or referral of the motion to the presiding judge for a determination as to the merits of the motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(c); Johnson v. Pumjani, 56 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). If the judge declines to recuse himself, “Except for good cause stated in the order in which further action is taken, the judge shall make no further orders and shall take no further action in the case after filing of the motion and prior to a hearing on the motion.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(d). In pursuing an option unavailable under the rule, the trial judge abuses his discretion as a matter of law. Johnson, 56 S.W.3d at 672. Furthermore, if a trial court fails to comply with the rules governing motions for recusal, all subsequent actions by the court in the case taken before the motion to recuse is ruled upon are void. Id. Because Judge Donovan took action by denying Kaminetzky’s motion to vacate the injunction before Judge McAdams ruled on the motion to recuse, and because no good cause was stated in the order, the order denying the motion to vacate is void. Because this voided order did not effect the disposition of the case, we conclude that this error was harmless. We overrule Kaminetzky’s second issue. In his fifth issue, Kaminetzky contends that Judge Donovan should have been disqualified under Rule 18(c)(2) because his pervasive bias prevented him from conducting impartial proceedings. Kaminetzky argues that Judge Donovan was biased against him because he held two ex parte hearings, one on August 18, 1999, and one on August 24, 1999, and because he denied one of his motions. On October 14, 1999 Judge McAdams denied Kaminetzky’s first motion to recuse Judge Donovan. An order denying a motion to recuse is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(f); In re M.C.M., 57 S.W.3d 27, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard to guiding legal principles, or without supporting evidence. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). Where a party challenges a denial of a recusal motion based on alleged bias or impartiality, the party must show that this bias arose from an extrajudicial source and not from actions during the pendency of the trial court proceedings, unless these actions during proceedings indicate a high degree of favoritism or antagonism that renders fair judgment impossible. In re M.C.M., 57 S.W.3d at 33. There is no evidence in the record that Judge Donovan held ex parte hearings. Nor is there anything in the record to indicate a high degree of favoritism or antagonism rendering fair judgment impossible. Id. Adverse judicial rulings without proof of an extra-judicial source do not constitute a valid basis for recusal. Ludlow v. Deberry, 959 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). Judge McAdams did not abuse his discretion in denying Kaminetzky’s first motion to recuse Judge Donovan. We overrule Kaminetzky’s fifth issue. Inadequate Briefing In his third issue, Kaminetzky contends that Judge Donovan erred by entering post-answer default judgment against him because the case was still pending on Judge Stone’s docket. Judge Stone was assigned to the 61st district court. On January 31, 2000, Judge Stone rendered post-answer default judgment in favor of Richardson and Gilmore because appellants failed to appear. On February 1, 2000, Judge Stone voided the post-answer default judgment because Kaminetzky had filed a timely objection to her assignment under section 74.053(d) of the Government Code. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.053(d) (Vernon Supp. 2003). On February 3, 2000, Judge Donovan rendered a post-answer default judgment in favor of Richardson and Gilmore. Kaminetzky’s argument is without merit. The case was pending in the 61st district court and was not on Judge Stone’s docket. Judge Donovan is the presiding judge in that district. Judge Donovan did not err by presiding over the case. We overrule Kaminetzky’s third issue. Accelerated Appeal In his fourth issue, Kaminetzky contends that Judge Donovan erred by disregarding the pendency of his accelerated appeal and rendering a post-answer default judgment against him. On February 3, 2000, Kaminetzky filed a notice of accelerated appeal challenging the January 26, 2000 order denying his motion to vacate the December 10, 1999 order that required Kaminetzky and Choice Acquisitions to appear for deposition testimony and prohibited “defendants” from seeking or conducting any discovery until after both depositions had been completed. Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Codes lists the orders that may be appealed before final judgment. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 2003). We construe this statute authorizing interlocutory appeals strictly because it is a narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments and orders are appealable. Montgomery County v. Fugua, 22 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. denied). Because the December 10, 1999 order is not the type of order listed under section 51.014, Kaminetzky had no right of accelerated appeal from the order and his argument is without merit. Moreover, on February 3, 2000, Judge Donovan withdrew the December 10, 1999 order and proceeded with a trial on the merits. Rule 29.5 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in relevant part, “While an appeal from an interlocutory order is pending the trial court retains jurisdiction of the case and may make further orders, including one dissolving the order appealed from, and may proceed with a trial on the merits.” Tex. R. App. P. 29.5 Therefore, Judge Donovan did not err. We overrule Kaminetzky’s fourth issue. Judicial Notice In his sixth issue, Kaminetzky contends that the trial court erred when it failed to take judicial notice of certain facts, rules, statutes, and records as requested. Rule 201 of the Rules of Evidence provides: A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Tex. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Public Util. Comm’n of Tex., 878 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1994). Judicial notice is mandatory if “requested by a party and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Tex. R. Evid. 201(d); Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel, 878 S.W.2d at 600. Assertions made by an individual, even under oath, are not the type of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. O’Quinn v. Hall, 77 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet. ); Garza v. State, 996 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. ref’d). Judicial notice applies only to facts that are beyond credible dispute. O’Quinn, 77 S.W.3d at 447. In most of his motions, Kaminetzky requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the “facts and documents referenced in this motion which are on file in this case” after he stated his version of the facts in the case and made a series of allegations. In the same motion, he would then often ask the trial court to take judicial notice of the “laws and rules of civil procedure of the state district court system.” In his brief, Kaminetzky does not specify which facts and documents he is now complaining of. Many of the “facts and documents referenced” in his motions are intermingled with facts and documents that are not the type of facts which are beyond credible dispute. We hold that Kaminetzky has not satisfied the requirement of Rule 38.1(h) that an issue be adequately briefed. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). Accordingly, we overrule Kaminetzky’s sixth issue. In their briefs, IPC and Kaminetsky request this court to take judicial notice of approximately 30 items. A court of appeals has the power to take judicial notice for the first time on appeal. Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel, 878 S.W.2d at 600. To the extent their request for judicial notice includes rules and statutes that are susceptible to “accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” we take judicial notice of them. Tex. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Temporary Injunction In his seventh issue, Kaminetzky contends that the trial court erred in temporarily enjoining him from the following: (1) collecting rents on the property; (2) interfering with plaintiff’s possession of the property; and (3) filing documents in the Real Property Records of Harris County. In his tenth point of error, Kaminetzky contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate the August 20, 1999 temporary injunction. The rendition of a final summary judgment by the trial court renders an appeal relating to the temporary injunction moot. Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group, P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991); Jordan v. Landry's Seafood Restaurant, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet denied). The temporary injunction has expired and no longer exists. Jordan, 89 S.W.3d at 741. The trial court has rendered final judgment in this case. Therefore, Kaminetzky’s complaints that the trial court erred in granting the temporary injunction and that it erred in denying his motion to vacate the injunction are moot. Isuani, 802 S.W.2d at 236. We overrule Kaminetzky’s seventh and tenth points of error. Discovery In his eight issue, Kaminetzky contends that the trial court erred by denying him “all pre-trial discovery.” Kaminetzky was not denied “all pre-trial discovery.” Kaminetzky took the depositions of Richardson and of Clifton A. Goodwin, Jr. (the trustee named in the $123,000 promissory note which was secured by Johanna Square Apartments). Kaminetzky also asked for and received a response to his request for disclosures and an abstract of title. Kaminetzky contends that the December 10, 1999 order requiring Kaminetzky and Choice Acquisitions No. 4 to appear for deposition testimony and prohibiting him from seeking or conducting any discovery in this case or from testifying until after both depositions have been completed was an abuse of discretion. The trial court further ordered that if both Kaminetzky and Choice Acquisitions No. 4 did not appear to provide deposition testimony, Kaminetzky would be prohibited from testifying in any capacity during the trial of this case. To be entitled to reversal, Kaminetzky must not only establish that the trial court erred by entering the sanction of not permitting Kaminetzky to conduct further discovery, but also that the error (1) probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or (2) probably prevented Kaminetzky from presenting his case to this Court. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1)-(2); Ceasar v. Rodriguez, No. 01-02-00027-CV (Tex. App.—Houston[1st Dist.] January 23, 2003) (memorandum opinion). We review the entire record to determine whether an erroneous discovery sanction constitutes reversible error. Ceasar, No. 01-02-00027-CV. Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from conducting additional discovery, Kaminetzky has not established that the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or prevented him from presenting his case to this court. The December 10, 1999 order prohibiting Kaminetzky from conducting discovery until after he and Choice Acquisition No. 4 appeared for their depositions was withdrawn on February 3, 2000. Post-answer default judgment was entered against Kaminetzky on that date because he failed to appear for trial. Kaminetzky did not show that the prohibition against additional discovery caused him to fail to appear at trial nor did he show that the prohibition prevented him from presenting his case to this court. Accordingly, we overrule Kaminetzky’s eighth issue. Necessary Parties In his ninth issue, Kaminetzky contends that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss or abate the case for non-joinder of indispensable parties. In his motion to dismiss, Kaminetzky argued that Choice Personnel No. 4, Inc. and Choice Acquisitions No. Three, Inc. owned an interest in the apartments that were the subject of this suit and were indispensable parties, but that neither the companies, nor their shareholders or successors in interest, were joined in the lawsuit. In a subsequent motion, Kaminetzky argued that Richmore Properties I, Ltd. Spring Garden Apartments, the law firm of Dow, Cogburn and Friedman, and “other co-conspirators” were also necessary parties, but he did not explain what relationship these parties have to the lawsuit or why they were necessary. Rule 39(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part that: A person . . . shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. Tex. R. Civ. P. 39(a). Rule 39(a) no longer speaks of “necessary” and “indispensable” parties, and Texas courts have begun to discard these terms. Sabre Oil & Gas Corp. v. Gibson, 72 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, pet. denied); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1982, writ ref’d n. r. e.). The question of whether to proceed in the absence of a party who would be affected by the judgment is within the discretion of the trial court. Allegro Isle Condominium Ass.n v. Casa Allegro Corp., 28 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); Gibson, 72 S.W.3d at 816; Pampell Interests, Inc. v. Wolle, 797 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ). A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard to guiding legal principles, or without supporting evidence. Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21. Richardson and Gilmore sued the named party defendants in a action to quiet title. Only the named party defendants had filed documents in the real property records clouding appellees’ title. Kaminetzky did not explain how any of the parties he sought to join satisfied the requirements of Rule 39(a). The trial court did not abuse it discretion in refusing to dismiss or abate the case for additional entities and persons. We overrule Kaminetzky’s ninth issue. Summary Judgment In his 11th issue, Kaminetzky contends that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment against IPC. Because Kaminetzky was not a party to the summary judgment proceedings, he has no standing to complain of error, if any. Torrington Co., 46 S.W.3d at 843. We overrule Kaminetzky’s 11th issue. Default Judgment In his 12th issue, Kaminetzky contends that the trial court erred in entering a post-answer default judgment against him because Richardson and Gilmore failed to prove the elements of their cause of action. In his 15th issue, Kaminetzky contends that the trial court erred in failing to vacate the post-answer default judgment. Because the issues are related, we address them together. Kaminetzky contends that the default judgment was erroneous because Richardson and Gilmore did not prove all the elements of their cause of action. Kaminetzky’s arguments are not altogether clear. He seems to be arguing that Richardson and Gilmore did not prove (1) the assignment of the note and related liens that form the basis of the foreclosure, and (2) that the note was not fully paid off before the foreclosure sale. At trial, Ron Cohen, substitute trustee at the foreclosure sale for Johanna Square Apartments, identified the assignment, and the assignment was introduced into evidence. Richardson and Gilmore also introduced evidence that the note was in default and that Kaminetzky owed money on the note. Therefore, we overrule Kaminetzky’s 12th issue. Lack of Notice In his 13th issue, Kaminetzky contends that the trial court erred by failing to give him reasonable notice of the February 3, 2000 trial setting. Rule 245 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the trial court to give parties at least 45 days notice of the first trial setting; but, when a case has been previously set for trial, the trial court is required to give only reasonable notice to reset the trial to a later date. Tex. R. Civ. P. 245; Osborn v. Osborn, 961 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied). On August 20, 1999, the trial court ordered that the case would be tried on the merits on October 4, 1999. During the following months, the trial court reset the case on several occasions. On January 26, 2000, Judge Donovan set the trial for January 31, 2000. On January 31, 2000, Judge Stone rendered a post-answer default judgment against appellants. On February 1, 2000, Judge Stone voided the post-answer default judgment. On February 2, 2000, Kaminetzky received notice that the trial was set for the following day. On the morning of February 3, 2000, Kaminetzky went to the courthouse, filed a notice of accelerated appeal, and then left before the trial commenced. Kaminetzky was given 45 days notice of the first trial setting. As of January 26, 2000, Kaminetzky knew that the case had been set several times on the trial docket. He went to the courthouse on the morning of trial, filed a notice of accelerated appeal, and served the notice of appeal on the plaintiff’s attorney before departing. Under these facts, Kaminetzky had reasonable notice of the trial setting. We overrule Kaminetzky’s 13th issue. Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law In his 14th issue, Kaminetzky contends that the trial court erred in failing to make the findings of facts and conclusions of law that he requested. On February 28, 2000, Judge Donovan filed extensive findings of facts and conclusions of law. Kaminetzky made a timely request for additional findings of facts and conclusions of law. Rule 298 provides, in relevant part, After the court files original findings of fact and conclusions of law, any party may file with the clerk of the court a request for specified additional or amended findings or conclusions. . . . The court shall file any additional or amended findings and conclusions that are appropriate within ten days after such request is filed. Tex. R. Civ. P. 298. Additional findings are not required if the original findings of fact and conclusions of law properly and succinctly relate the ultimate findings of fact and law necessary to apprise the party of adequate information for the preparation of his appeal. Jamestown Partners, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 83 S.W.3d 376, 386 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877, 886 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.). If the record indicates that a party did not suffer injury, the failure to make additional findings does not require reversal. Jamestown Partners, 83 S.W.3d at 386; Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 271, 277 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). If the refusal to file additional findings does not prevent a party from adequately presenting an argument on appeal, there is no reversible error. Jamestown Partners, 83 S.W.3d at 386. The findings of fact made by the trial court in this case clearly support the judgment in appellees’ favor. Kaminetzky does not explain how the trial court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law prevented him from adequately presenting an argument on appeal. Kaminetzky merely asserts that the court should have filed additional findings because this is a complicated case. We overrule Kaminetzky’s 14th issue. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Any pending motions are denied. Adele Hedges Justice Panel consists of Justices Hedges, Nuchia, and Keyes.