Jose Armando Escamilla v. State

In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ____________ NOS. 01-04-00878-CR 01-04-00879-CR ____________ JOSE ARMANDO ESCAMILLA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 339th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 962954 and 939813 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Jose Armando Escamilla, pleaded guilty to the offense of indecency with a child in cause number 939813 on February 20, 2003. In accordance with a plea bargain agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication of guilt, placed appellant on community supervision for eight years, and assessed a fine of $500.. On September 26, 2003, the State filed, in cause number 962954, a criminal complaint against appellant, accusing him of the offense of failure to comply with sexual registration requirements. The State then filed a motion to adjudicate guilt in cause number 939813 on October 1, 2003. On July 16, 2004, appellant entered into plea bargain agreements with the State. He pleaded true to the allegations in the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt in cause number 939813 in exchange for the State’s recommended sentence of confinement for seven years and a $500 fine. He pleaded guilty in cause number 962954 in exchange for the State’s recommended sentence of 180 days in state jail. The trial court found appellant guilty in both cases and assessed punishment in accordance with the plea agreements. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal in both cause numbers. The trial court’s certifications of the right to appeal state that these are plea-bargained cases and appellant has no right to appeal. Because the certifications are supported by the record, we must dismiss both appeals for want of jurisdiction. Rule 25.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that, in a plea-bargained case in which the punishment assessed does not exceed the plea agreement, a defendant may appeal only those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or after obtaining the trial court’s permission to appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Both of these appeals are limited by this rule. In both cases, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge, entered into a plea bargain agreement with the State as to punishment, and the trial court did not exceed that agreement at sentencing. Appellant could therefore appeal only those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or after obtaining the trial court’s permission to appeal. Griffin v. State,145 S.W.3d 645, 648-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Comb v. State, 101 S.W.3d 724, 725-26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see also Teel v. State, 104 S.W.3d 266, 267-68 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, no pet.). The trial court’s certifications do not state that appellant was appealing from the denial of pretrial written motions or that he had the court’s permission to appeal. We must dismiss an appeal if the trial court’s certification shows there is no right to appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. All pending motions are denied as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Bland. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).