Michael Antonio Davis v. State

In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ____________ NOS. 01-04-00947-CR 01-04-00952-CR ____________ MICHAEL ANTONIO DAVIS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 185th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 843482 and 983806 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Michael Antonio Davis, pleaded guilty to the offense of theft of property having a value of $200,000 or more in cause number 843482 on June 4, 2001. In accordance with the plea bargain agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication of guilt, placed appellant on community supervision for 10 years, and assessed a $3000 fine. On April 9, 2004, a criminal complaint was filed against appellant, charging him with aggravated sexual assault, in cause number 983806. The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt in cause number 843482 on April 15, 2004. A grand jury returned an indictment in cause number 983806 on July 8, 2004. On August 27, 2004, appellant entered into a plea bargain agreement with the State, pleading true to the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt in cause number 843482 and guilty to aggravated sexual assault in cause number 983806 in exchange for a sentence of 20 years in each case. The trial court found appellant guilty in each case and assessed punishment at confinement for 20 years. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal that included both cause numbers. In each case, the trial court’s certification of the right to appeal states that these are plea-bargained cases and the appellant has no right to appeal. Because the certifications are true and supported by the record, we must dismiss both appeals for want of jurisdiction. Rule 25.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that, in a plea-bargained case in which the punishment assessed does not exceed the plea agreement, a defendant may appeal only those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or after obtaining the trial court’s permission to appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Both of these appeals are limited by this rule. In both cases, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge, entered into a plea bargain agreement with the State as to punishment, and the trial court did not exceed that agreement at sentencing. Appellant could therefore appeal only those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or after obtaining the trial court’s permission to appeal. Griffin v. State, 145 S.W.3d 645, 648-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Comb v. State, 101 S.W.3d 724, 725-26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see also Teel v. State, 104 S.W.3d 266, 267-68 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, no pet.). The trial court’s certifications do not state that appellant was appealing from the denial of pretrial written motions or that he had the court’s permission to appeal. We must dismiss an appeal if the trial court’s certification shows there is no right to appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Bland. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).