Craig Aaron Smith v. State

In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ____________ NOS. 01-04-01042-CR 01-04-01043-CR ____________ CRAIG AARON SMITH, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 337th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 994245 and 908114 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Craig Aaron Smith, pleaded guilty to the offense of attempting to obtain a controlled substance through a fraudulent prescription in cause number 908114 on September 25, 2002. In accordance with the plea bargain agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication of guilt, placed appellant on community supervision for three years, and assessed a $500 fine. On July 14, 2004, a criminal complaint was filed against appellant, charging him with attempting to possess a controlled substance through the use of a fraudulent prescription in cause number 994245. The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt in cause number 908114 on July 26, 2004. On August 25, 2004, appellant entered into a plea bargain agreement with the State, pleading true to the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt in cause number 908114 and guilty to attempting to possess a controlled substance through the use of a fraudulent prescription in cause number 994245 in exchange for a sentence of four years’ confinement in each case and a $500 fine in cause number 908114, with the sentences to run concurrently. The trial court found appellant guilty in both cases and assessed punishment at confinement for four years, and a fine of $500 in cause number 908114, the sentences to run concurrently. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal in each case. The trial court’s certifications of the right to appeal state that these are plea-bargained cases and appellant has no right to appeal. Because the certifications are true and supported by the record, we must dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Rule 25.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that, in a plea-bargained case in which the punishment assessed does not exceed the plea agreement, a defendant may appeal only those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or after obtaining the trial court’s permission to appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Both of these appeals are limited by this rule. In both cases, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge, entered into a plea bargain agreement with the State as to punishment, and the trial court did not exceed that agreement at sentencing. Appellant could therefore appeal only those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or after obtaining the trial court’s permission to appeal. Griffin v. State, 145 S.W.3d 645, 648-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Comb v. State, 101 S.W.3d 724, 725-26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see also Teel v. State, 104 S.W.3d 266, 267-68 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, no pet.). The trial court’s certifications do not state that appellant was appealing from the denial of pretrial written motions or that he had the court’s permission to appeal. We must dismiss an appeal if the trial court’s certification shows there is no right to appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals for want of jurisdiction. All pending motions are denied as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack, and Justices Keyes and Alcala. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).