Gregory Carl Ware v. State

Opinion issued March 11, 2004 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas NO. 01-03-00073-CR GREGORY CARL WARE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 263rd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 808306 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Gregory Carl Ware, challenges the convicting court’s denial of his motion for DNA testing. In his sole point of error, appellant contends that he established by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing of the State’s trial evidence. We affirm. Background Complainant, Lisa Johnson, was robbed at gunpoint while working at a Burger King restaurant. Following the robbery, another employee, Earl Johnson, left the restaurant to search for the assailant. Earl spotted appellant and recognized him as the person who committed the robbery. Earl followed appellant to a nearby residence and contacted the police. A short time later, the police brought Lisa to the residence where she identified appellant as the man who had robbed her. Pauline Rogers, another Burger King employee, also identified appellant as the assailant after the police took appellant into custody. Lisa, Earl, and Pauline also identified appellant at trial as the assailant. In addition, evidence was adduced at trial that, while searching the residence, the police found a striped shirt stuffed in a hole in the wall in appellant’s bedroom. Pauline testified that the shirt found by police was the same shirt worn by the assailant during the robbery. A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery and assessed punishment at 10 years’ confinement. Three years later, appellant filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing in which he requested that the shirt found by the police be tested for the presence of appellant’s DNA. After the State filed its written response to the motion, the trial court considered the respective motions and denied appellant’s request for DNA testing. Discussion In his sole point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for post-conviction DNA testing because he established by a preponderance of evidence that a reasonable probability exists that exculpatory DNA test results would prove his innocence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004). In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical-fact issues and application-of-law-to-fact issues that turn on credibility and demeanor, while we review de novo other application-of-law-to-fact issues. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). However, the ultimate question of whether a reasonable probability exists that exculpatory DNA tests would have proven innocence is an application-of-law-to-fact question that does not turn on credibility and demeanor and is, therefore, reviewed de novo. Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). To obtain post-conviction DNA testing, an applicant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “a reasonable probability exists that [he] would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A). The Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted this language to mean that an applicant must show that “a reasonable probability exists that exculpatory DNA tests will prove [his] innocence.” Kutzner v. State, 75 S.W.3d 427, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); accord Rivera, 89 S.W.3d at 59; Torres v. State, 104 S.W.3d 638, 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). A “reasonable probability” of innocence does not exist if there is sufficient evidence, other than the evidence in question, to establish guilt. Torres, 104 S.W.3d at 640-41 (concluding no reasonable probability that absence of complainant’s blood on firearm found in appellant’s possession would have established appellant’s innocence because there was other substantial competent evidence that jury could have used to convict the appellant). In other words, DNA testing must conclusively outweigh all other evidence of the convicted’s guilt. Rivera, 89 S.W.3d at 60 (concluding no reasonable probability of innocence in case in which absence of victim’s DNA under appellant’s fingernails was outweighed by appellant’s confession; “[w]hile the presence of . . . DNA . . . could indicate guilt, the absence . . . would not indicate innocence.”); Thompson, 95 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (holding no reasonable probability of innocence in case in which weapon failed to contain complainant’s blood because such evidence was outweighed by other competent evidence). As stated in the oft-quoted language of the Court of Criminal Appeals, the statutory requirement that testing results be exculpatory is not met if the DNA evidence would “merely muddy the waters.” Rivera, 89 S.W.3d at 59 (citing Kutzner, 75 S.W.3d at 439). Appellant claims that he has met the “reasonable probability” standard because the absence of his DNA on the shirt, which he alleges would be established by DNA testing, would show that he had not been wearing the shirt at the time of the robbery, and would suffice to prove that he was not the person who committed the offense. Despite this contention, evidence, other than the identification evidence derived from appellant’s shirt, exists in the trial record from which a jury could have found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery. As previously detailed, three eyewitnesses to the robbery, including the complainant, identified appellant as the assailant. Even if negative DNA test results were to supply an exculpatory inference, such an inference in this case would not conclusively outweigh the other evidence of appellant’s guilt. See Rivera, 89 S.W.3d at 60; Thompson, 95 S.W.3d at 472. In his brief, appellant also contends, Appellant’s case involved the questionable identification of three witnesses and the only evidence supporting Appellant’s identification was a shirt found at the scene that was used by the prosecution to link Appellant to the robbery. The absence of Appellant’s DNA on this shirt would be compelling evidence that the eyewitness testimony was incorrect and that Appellant did not commit the robbery. In essence, appellant argues that exculpatory DNA test results would call into question the credibility of the identification witnesses. However, credibility attacks are not a valid reason for DNA testing under chapter 64. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 64.01–.05 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (containing statutory provisions governing post-conviction requests for DNA testing); see also Manning v. State, No. 01-02-00806-CR, slip op. at 7, 2003 WL 22511374, at * 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 6, 2003, no pet.) (stating, “Credibility verifications . . . are not a permissible reason for DNA testing under chapter 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication). Rather, the applicant seeking DNA testing must show that a reasonable probability exists that the exculpatory DNA evidence will prove his innocence. See Kutzner, 75 S.W.3d at 438. At most, exculpatory DNA tests on the shirt in this case would “merely muddy the waters.” See id. at 439. We hold that appellant failed to meet his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable probability exists that exculpatory DNA testing of the shirt would prove his innocence. Accordingly, appellant is not entitled to a DNA test under Chapter 64. We overrule appellant’s sole issue. Conclusion We affirm the convicting court’s order denying appellant’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing. Laura Carter Higley Justice Panel consists of Justices Taft, Hanks, and Higley. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).