Eric Alfredo Berrios v. State

Opinion Issued January 13, 2005 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas NO. 01-04-00168-CR ____________ ERIC ALFREDO BERRIOS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 176th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 933712 MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury found appellant, Eric Alfredo Berrios, guilty of the offense of capital murder. Because the State did not seek the death penalty, the trial court automatically assessed his punishment at confinement for life. In four points of error, appellant contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in submitting instructions in the jury charge concerning the law of parties and transferred intent. We affirm. Facts Houston Police Officer P. LeBlanc testified that, on September 29, 2002, between 4:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., he was one of the first crime-scene investigators to be dispatched to a shooting scene in a large parking lot at the 6300 block of Fairdale street. However, initially, he first went to a street a block away, where a green Ford Explorer had stopped after it had fled the parking lot after the shootings. At the parking lot, Le Blanc saw a body lying on the ground near a red Chevy Blazer and another body in the driver’s seat of a maroon Dodge Neon. He and another officer collected about 81 different items at the scene that were admitted into evidence, namely fired bullets, bullet fragments, and spent shell casings. Benjamin Belmarez, a passenger in the red Chevy Blazer, testified that Adolfo Rodriguez, the first complainant, was his cousin and the driver of the Blazer. On September 29, 2002, he and Rodriguez were driving along Richmond street trying to talk to girls, but, at around 2:00 a.m, police officers began closing off Richmond street, so Rodriguez drove into a parking lot in order to turn around. A small crowd of people were standing in front of the parking lot, and two people were pointing to the back of the parking lot. An unknown man, whom he later identified as Mark Perez, approached the driver’s side of the Blazer with a handgun. When Perez stopped at the driver’s side, Belmarez saw Perez shoot the handgun at another car located in the back of the parking lot. Belmarez did not believe that Perez was shooting at the Blazer, but Belmarez did not see where Perez was shooting. When Belmarez started hearing bullets come through the Blazer’s windshield, he turned his head toward the passenger window and saw another man “with a big rifle shooting toward the back” of parking lot. Belmarez described this man as a 22-to-25- year-old Hispanic male, with short hair, dark complexion, and wearing a green shirt. Belmarez did not see where the man with the rifle was shooting, but the man was not shooting at the Blazer, and bullets had been hitting the Blazer before he had started shooting. When Belmarez was shot in the shoulder, he called for emergency assistance. He checked on Rodriguez, but Rodriguez had also been shot, had apparently opened his car door, and had fallen to the ground. Rodriguez died five to ten minutes later. Belmarez further testified that the bullet that killed Rodriguez originated from the front of the Blazer and that he did not see anyone shooting at the Blazer. Houston Police Officer M. Kocurek testified that, at about 2:50 a.m., he was directing traffic at the intersection of Unity and Richmond streets when he noticed a green Ford Explorer traveling westbound at a high rate of speed approaching the intersection. The Explorer, with a flat tire and a pluming radiator, stopped at the intersection, and Colby Martin, the driver, told Kocurek that Mario and Sergio Rodriguez, two of his passengers, had been shot. Kocurek found no weapons in the car and saw that the two of the men had, in fact, been shot. Mario Rodriguez, a passenger along with Sergio Rodriguez and two other friends in the green Ford Explorer, testified that he and his friends tried to drive onto Richmond street to try to talk with girls. At around 2:00 a.m., police officers began closing Richmond street, so Martin drove into a parking lot on Fairdale street in order to turn around. As they drove into the parking lot, they passed a Lexus sports utility vehicle (SUV) driven by a young female. Both cars had their windows rolled down, and, as the Explorer slowly drove by the Lexus SUV, Mario said, “What’s up,” to the female. In response, a man in the passenger seat of the Lexus SUV began swearing at Mario. Mario then heard about 15 to 20 gunshots, and he was shot twice in his thigh. He later found eight bullets that had hit the Explorer. Martin drove out of the parking lot, stopped on Richmond street, and Mario told a police officer that he and his brother, Sergio, had been shot. Mario testified that he “had no idea that people were shooting” at the Explorer. Eugene Perez testified that he is the brother of Mark and Esteban “Steve” Perez. On September 28, 2002, at around 11:00 p.m., he, his two brothers, Arthur Jurado, Joseph “ChooChoo” Martinez, Angel “Peewee” Resendez, two girls named Veronica and Rachel, Johnny and Doug Gomez, Annalee Pena, and appellant went to T-Town, a club on Richmond street. Right before the bar closed, Martinez was thrown out of the club for hitting a bouncer, and one of Eugene’s brothers was thrown out for fighting. After leaving the club, everyone in the group, except Martinez, congregated at the parking lot at 6330 Fairdale to retrieve their cars. Eugene had driven Doug Gomez’s grey Chevrolet Impala to the parking lot, along with Veronica and Rachel, so once he arrived at the parking lot, Eugene retrieved the keys to his red S-10 truck from either Steve or Mark Perez, who had driven his truck to the club. Eugene and Steve then got into the S-10 truck, and Mark got into Pena’s Lexus SUV as a passenger. Resendez had driven to the club in a silver Pontiac Sunfire, along with appellant and Jessica, appellant’s girlfriend. Johnny and Doug Gomez were going to drive home in their Impala. As Eugene sat in Rachel’s car with Pena and Rachel, he “heard something going on,” and then “everyone got out of their cars.” He then saw Mark standing in the front of the parking lot and saw a green Ford Explorer parked next to Mark. Eugene believed that a fight was going to occur because he saw Johnny and Doug Gomez running toward Mark. Mark and Johnny “were chasing after the Explorer towards the back,” and Eugene saw that Johnny was carrying an assault rifle. Johnny ran in front of Eugene and shot toward the back of the parking lot a couple times before Eugene ducked down. He heard about 30 to 40 shots, and he then saw Steve take the assault rifle away from Johnny and carry it into Eugene’s truck while Steve got into the truck. Eugene drove Steve to their house. Eugene further testified that, although he believed that appellant had used an assault rifle, he did not see appellant with an assault rifle, did not know if appellant had been carrying a weapon, and did not see appellant in the back of the parking lot. However, later, at the Perez’s house, Eugene heard appellant “say that [appellant] had shot his gun when John Gomez shot his” and also heard appellant and others say that “they might have shot the wrong people.” Eugene stated that he told police officers that appellant said that [appellant] had “dumped on people,” which Eugene explained meant “shoot.” Eugene also stated that the target of the shooting was the green Ford Explorer that had driven by Pena’s Lexus SUV. When the State offered three surveillance tapes of the shootings into evidence, Eugene identified, on videotape, Johnny carrying an assault rifle, Steve taking the rifle away from Johnny, and Mark running where “the dudes in that Explorer had took off.” Although he did not see appellant in the back of the parking lot, Eugene, after viewing the surveillance tape, identified appellant as the man who had walked up to the passenger side of Eugene’s S-10 truck, had reached into the window, and had walked around the truck, holding an assault rifle. Eugene stated, however, that appellant did not get the rifle from Eugene’s truck. Eugene explained that he and his friends were a “close-knit group” and that “if anyone got in a fight, you know, as long as no one jumped in, you know, no one would jump in unless one of their friends or whatever would get in, then yes, we would defend ‘em.” Arthur Jurado testified that, at the T-Town club, appellant had started a fight by punching Pena’s ex-boyfriend in the face, and everyone was thrown out of the club. Afterward, when Jurado joined the rest of the group at the parking lot, he saw Mark, who was a passenger in Pena’s Lexus SUV, get into a conversation with the occupants of the green Ford Explorer. Jurado saw Mark get out of the Lexus SUV, throw his hands up, and yell at the Explorer’s occupants. Still yelling, Mark then headed toward the back of the parking lot, where the Explorer had driven. Jurado thought a fight was going to occur, so he and Steve walked toward Mark, who was holding a .40 caliber handgun. When Johnny, who was standing in front of a red Chevy Blazer, started firing an assault rifle, Mark started firing the handgun. Jurado then saw Steve take the assault rifle away from Johnny and both men run back toward their cars. He also saw appellant running back toward the group’s cars, carrying a black rifle. Jurado further testified that he had seen appellant, three or four days earlier at the Perez’s house, with the same rifle, “showing it off.” He did not see appellant shoot the rifle, but appellant, on the following day, told him that “he had messed up.” Annalee Pena testified that, when she and Mark were leaving the parking lot, the occupants of the Explorer tried to talk to her, and Mark, who was reclining in the passenger seat, became mad and exchanged words with the Explorer’s occupants. When Mark left her Lexus SUV, he did not have a weapon, but she saw Johnny with a rifle. Mark and Johnny then started toward the back of the parking lot, and Pena heard shots within seconds. She did not know where appellant was when they were at the parking lot, and she did not see him with a gun. Pena acknowledged that, in her first statement to police officers, she had not mentioned the shooting at all because she had been scared. However, in her second statement to police officers, Pena stated that Johnny and appellant had each carried “large, long guns,” but she was “not positive if it was [appellant].” She also explained that the Perez brothers told her that appellant also had a rifle. Carlos Hernandez, a passenger in the maroon Dodge Neon in which the second complainant, Isai Mares, was shot and killed, testified that, when Mares drove into the parking lot, Hernandez heard what he thought were firecrackers. However, he then saw two people in the middle of the parking lot shooting at a green Ford Explorer as the Explorer passed Mares’s car. One person had “an A.K. and the other had a rifle.” Mares tried to drive out of the parking lot, but a bullet struck Hernandez in the shoulder and head, and Mares was bleeding from his ear and showed “no signs of life.” Houston Police Sergeant P. Motard, a homicide detective, testified that two different kinds of shell casings were found at the scene: rifle-type casings and pistol casings. When he spoke with Mark, Mark identified himself as the shooter of a .40 caliber handgun at the scene and identified Johnny and appellant as each having a rifle. Mark stated that their target had been the green Ford Explorer. Furthermore, he confirmed that three different weapons had been used at the scene: one handgun and two rifles. In a sworn statement, Johnny also admitted that he had shot his rifle at the scene on the night of the incident. Angel Resendez testified that he picked up appellant and appellant’s girlfriend, Jessica, at appellant’s house and drove to the T-Town club in his car. After a fight between Mark and an unknown person, his group of friends, including appellant, was kicked out of the club. Resendez, appellant, and Jessica then drove to the parking lot. As Resendez was getting ready to leave the parking lot in his car, he saw Mark running toward the back of the parking lot because “somebody said something to Mark’s girlfriend.” Resendez got out his car because he thought that they were going to fight. He explained that “if one of us fights all of us fight.” He told appellant that “we’re going to fight” and “let’s go fight.” Resendez, without appellant, ran toward the back of the parking lot, where Mark and Steve were running. He heard shots in front of him and then saw Johnny shooting a “S.K.S. or A.K.” and saw Mark shooting a .40 Glock. He did not see anyone else shooting, and he did not remember seeing appellant in the parking lot with a rifle. However, when Resendez ran back to his car, he saw that appellant was right behind him carrying a rifle, either an “A.K. or S.K.S.,” that was different from Johnny’s rifle. Appellant got into the back seat with the rifle, and “[b]ecause [Resendez] never [has] guns in [his] car,” Resendez asked appellant, “[w]hat the fuck was that[?]” In response, appellant said, “I’m sorry.” When Resendez took appellant back to appellant’s house, appellant took the rifle with him. However, Resendez did not know from where appellant retrieved the rifle. Although Resendez testified that he had not seen appellant running toward the back of the parking lot, he, in a previous statement to police officers, stated that he had, in fact, seen appellant running toward the back of the parking lot with a gun. Moreover, after a lunch break at trial, Resendez further testified that he had seen appellant running toward the back of the parking lot while carrying a rifle. Resendez explained that he had lied earlier because he did not want to get appellant into trouble, and he changed his testimony because he was afraid that perjury charges would be filed against him. Resendez, however, did not see appellant shoot the rifle that night. Doug Gomez testified that he saw Johnny fire an assault rifle and that he finally got Johnny to stop firing. Someone took the rifle away from Johnny, but Doug did not see who that person was. When he and Johnny were “running back,” Doug heard gunshots coming from behind. He did not see appellant firing the rifle, but he “figured [appellant was shooting because [appellant was] the only one back there with a rifle.” Doug did see appellant run with an assault rifle toward Resendez’s car. Doctor H. Narula, a Harris County assistant medical examiner, testified that he performed autopsies on both Rodriguez and Mares. The cause of Rodriguez’s death was gunshot wounds to the head and back, and the cause of Mares’s death was a gunshot wound to the face and neck, both of which were consistent with the use of a firearm. Furthermore, in Narula’s opinion, the gunshot wounds to both complainants were caused “more consistently” by a rifle than by a handgun. Darrell Stein, a Houston Police Department firearms examiner, testified that two different calibers of shell casings were found at the scene: (1) .40 Smith and Wesson caliber, which is a handgun caliber, and (2) 7.62-by-39 millimeter Russian caliber, an assault rifle caliber. He did not have a “source weapon” that had fired any of the spent shell casing that he had examined. However, he testified that the evidence was more consistent with the complainants being shot with a rifle, as opposed to a handgun. Furthermore, 58 of the shell casings came from two different rifles, and both complainants were shot with two different rifles. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his first and second points of error, appellant argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction as a party because the State presented no evidence to show that appellant “entered into an agreement” to intentionally or knowingly cause the death of two people during the same transaction and that the evidence only supports a finding that appellant acted, if he did, “independently in causing the death of Isai Mares.” We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine if any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In a legal sufficiency review, we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. Id. Furthermore, when the trial court’s charge authorizes the jury to convict on more than one theory, the verdict of guilty will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any one of the theories. Guevara v. State, No. 0424-03, 2004 WL 2347793, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2004); see Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In our review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence neutrally, not in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we will set aside the verdict “only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met.” Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Although our analysis considers all the evidence presented at trial, the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Unless the available record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, an appellate court must defer to the jury’s determination concerning what weight to give contradictory testimonial evidence because this resolution often turns on an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, and the jurors were in attendance when the testimony was delivered. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8. A person commits the offense of capital murder if the person murders more than one person during the same criminal transaction. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). Under the law of parties, a person is “criminally responsible as a party to an offense” if the offense committed “by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.” Id. § 7.01(a) (Vernon 2003). Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense. Id. § 7.01(b) (Vernon 2003). A person is “criminally responsible” for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). To establish guilt under the law of parties, the evidence must show that, at the time of the offense, the parties were acting together, each contributing some part towards the execution of their common purpose. See Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Ahrens v. State, 43 S.W.3d 630, 633-34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). In determining whether a defendant participated in an offense as a party, the fact finder may examine the events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant that show an understanding and common design to commit the offense. Ransom, 920 S.W.2d at 302; Ahrens, 43 S.W.3d at 633-34. Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative effect of all the incriminating facts are sufficient to support the conviction. Guevara, 2004 WL 2347793, at *3; see Alexander v. State, 740 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Intent may also be inferred from circumstantial events, such as acts, words, and the conduct of the defendant. Guevara, 2004 WL 2347793, at *3; Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). We note that proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant actually fired the fatal shots is not necessary to support a capital murder conviction where the jury was charged on the law of parties. Rabbini, 847 S.W.2d at 558. Legal Sufficiency Appellant asserts that (1) Adolfo Rodriguez’s murder “was clearly committed individually by Johnny Gomez without any assistance or agreement before the shooting by the appellant”; (2) “there was no evidence of any communication between Mark Perez and Johnny Gomez and the appellant, [] regarding using deadly weapons or agreement to kill two people”; (3) “[o]bviously, if Johnny Gomez committed one of the killings individually, then [appellant], as a matter of law cannot be held guilty of the offense of capital murder of killing two individuals as a party to the offense as the facts that Adolfo Rodriguez was killed before [appellant], if he did, participated in any offense”; and (4) “[appellant], [] if he shot at all, did not shoot at the same vehicle that Johnny Gomez did and clearly did not kill Adolfo Rodriguez.” Appellant further asserts that “[t]he evidence clearly shows that [appellant] was acting independently, if he did, when shooting into a crowded parking lot.” Thus, appellant concludes that “[i]f the evidence that [appellant] was the shooter and it was his rifle that cause[d] the death of Isai Mares, then what appellant would be guilty of would be intentionally and knowingly caus[ing] the death of an individual by committing an act clearly dangerous to human life,” and he cannot be guilty of “intentionally and knowingly caus[ing] the death of two individuals during the same transaction.” However, the evidence shows that, at the time of the offense, appellant, along with Mark Perez and Johnny Gomez, contributed in shooting at the occupants of the green Ford Explorer, killing the complainants in the process. The evidence reveals that appellant was more than merely present when the complainants were killed and that he was an active participant in the shootings at the parking lot. Eugene Perez, at trial, and Mark Perez, in his statement to Sergeant Motard, expressly stated that the “target” of the group that night was the green Ford Explorer. Arthur Jurado, Annalee Pena, and Angel Resendez testified that they all knew that a fight was going to occur after Mark Perez exchanged words with the Explorer’s occupants. Resendez, who was in his car with appellant, testified that, when he saw Mark Perez go toward the back of the parking lot where the green Ford Explorer had driven, he told appellant that “we’re going to fight” and “let’s go fight.” Resendez saw appellant, who was carrying a rifle, run toward the back of the parking where Mark Perez and Johnny Gomez were running. Moreover, Resendez saw that appellant was still carrying the rifle when appellant returned to Resendez’s car. Eugene Perez testified that, at the Perez’s house after the shootings, he heard appellant say “that [appellant] had shot his gun when John Gomez shot his” and that appellant had “dumped on people.” (Emphasis added.) Eugene also heard appellant, along with others, say that “they might have shot the wrong people.” (Emphasis added.) Jurado saw appellant running back toward their friends’ cars carrying a black rifle, and he had previously seen appellant at the Perez’s house with the same rifle three or four days prior to the shootings. Jurado further testified that, the day after the shootings, appellant told him that “[appellant] had messed up.” Doug Gomez saw appellant running with an assault rifle toward Resendez’s car, and, although he did not see appellant fire the rifle, Gomez “figured [appellant] was shooting because [appellant was] the only one back there with a rifle.” Pena testified that she told police officers in her second statement that appellant was carrying “large, long gun[s]” but was not positive whether the man was, in fact, appellant. Darrell Stein, a firearms expert, testified that the complainants were shot with rifles, not a handgun, and that both complainants were shot with a different rifle. Dr. Narula testified that the complainants’ gunshot wounds were more consistent with shots from a rifle, as opposed to a handgun. Sergeant Motard testified that Mark Perez confirmed that two rifles and one handgun were used at the scene. Carlos Hernandez testified that the men shooting at the green Ford Explorer each had an assault rifle. Finally, Eugene Perez testified that he and his friends were a “close-knit group” and that “if anyone got in a fight, you know, as long as no one jumped in, you know, no one would jump in unless one of their friends or whatever would get in, then yes, we would defend ‘em,” and Resendez stated that “if one of us fights all of us fight.” Considering this evidence, a rational fact finder could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant acted with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense of capital murder and that appellant encouraged, aided, or attempted to aid Mark Perez and Johnny Gomez in the commission of the offense. Thus, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for capital murder under the law of parties. We overrule appellant’s first point of error. Factual Sufficiency Appellant also argues that his assertions made under his legal sufficiency point of error show that “there was absolutely no evidence” to support the finding that appellant committed “the offense of capital murder as a party wherein he would have had to have made an agreement with either Mark Perez or Johnny Gomez to commit the killing of two different people during the same transaction.” Appellant notes that Benjamin Belmarez did not see anyone shooting at the red Chevy Blazer and that Eugene Perez did not see appellant with an assault rifle while at the parking lot and did not know whether appellant had even been carrying a weapon. Also, Annalee Pena was not positive as to whether appellant had been carrying a rifle on the night of the shootings. Moreover, Angel Resendez and Doug Gomez did not see appellant fire the rifle that they saw appellant carrying. Darrell Stein did not have a “source weapon” that had fired any of the spent shell casings that he had examined. However, there is ample evidence to support the jury’s determination that appellant was guilty of the offense of capital murder as a party. Angel Resendez testified that he told appellant that “we’re going to fight” and “let’s go fight, ” that he saw appellant, while carrying a rifle, run toward the back of the parking lot, and that appellant was carrying the same rifle when appellant returned to Resendez’s car. Eugene Perez, at the Perez’s house after the shootings, heard appellant say “that [appellant] had shot his gun when John Gomez shot his,” that appellant had “dumped on people,” and that “they might have shot the wrong people.” (Emphasis added.) Arthur Jurado saw appellant running back toward their friends’ cars carrying a black rifle and that, the day after the shootings, appellant told him that “[appellant] had messed up.” Doug Gomez saw appellant running with an assault rifle. Furthermore, Darrell Stein stated his opinion that the complainants were shot with rifles, not a handgun, and that both complainants were shot with a different rifle. Sergeant Motard testified that Mark Perez confirmed that two rifles and one handgun were used at the scene, and Carlos Hernandez testified that the men shooting at the green Ford Explorer each had an assault rifle. Finally, Eugene Perez testified that he and his friends were a “close-knit group” and that his friends and brothers possessed a group mentality concerning fighting by testifying that “if one of us fights all of us fight.” As the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given their testimony, the jury was free to believe or disbelieve all or any part of the State’s witnesses’ testimony. McKinny v. State, 76 S.W.3d 463, 468-69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Where conflicting testimony is given, as in this case, it is the exclusive province of the jury to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Viewing all of this evidence neutrally, we conclude that the evidence was not so weak that the verdict was clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and that the contrary evidence was not so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding that appellant, with the intent to promote or assist Mark Perez and Johnny Gomez in committing the offense of capital murder, encouraged, aided, or attempted to aid Mark Perez and Johnny Gomez in murdering Adolfo Rodriguez and Isai Mares in the same criminal transaction. We overrule appellant’s second point of error. Instructions in the Jury Charge In his third and fourth points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury in the charge on the law of parties and transferred intent over his objections. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 7.01, 7.02 (Vernon 2003). Law of Parties Appellant asserts that the State has “failed to show any evidence sufficient to charge the jury on parties that appellant encouraged the commission of the offense (capital murder) by words or other agreement” and that “[t]he evidence clearly supports the proposition, if you believe [appellant] was a shooter, then he participated in an offense individually and should not be held accountable or responsible for the acts and conduct of Mark Perez and/or Johnny Gomez.” In the instant case, the application paragraph of the court’s charge authorized the jury to convict appellant for the offense of capital murder if it found that appellant was the primary actor or was a party to the offense of capital murder. A jury charge on the law of parties is appropriate when the evidence indicates that a defendant encouraged, directed, or aided another in the commission of the offense. Bryant v. State, 982 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d). In determining whether a charge on the law of parties is proper, the trial court may examine the events occurring before, during, or after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to commit the offense. Ransom, 920 S.W.2d at 302; Ahrens, 43 S.W.3d at 634. In McCuin v. State, 505 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), the following standard was articulated concerning when an instruction on the law of parties should be submitted to the jury: Where the evidence introduced upon the trial of the cause shows the active participation in the offense by two or more persons, the trial court should first remove from consideration the acts and conduct of the non-defendant actor. Then, if the evidence of the conduct of the defendant then on trial would be sufficient, in and of itself, to sustain the conviction, no submission of the law of principals [now, parties] is required. On the other hand, if the evidence introduced upon the trial of the cause shows, or raises an issue, that the conduct of the defendant then upon trial is not sufficient, in and of itself, to sustain a conviction, the State’s case rests upon the law of principals [parties] and is dependent, at least in part, upon the conduct of another. In such a case, the law of principals [parties] must be submitted and made applicable to the facts of the case. Id. at 830. This standard was reaffirmed in Brown v. State, 716 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). See also Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 544-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A trial court’s charge to a jury must distinctly set forth “the law applicable to the case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). Here, as noted above, sufficient evidence was produced during the course of the trial which would warrant a charge on the law of parties. As demonstrated by appellant’s actions at the parking lot and by his words spoken to Resendez and Eugene Perez after the shootings, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that appellant encouraged, aided, or attempted to aid Johnny Gomez and Mark Perez in committing the offense of capital murder. Again, Resendez saw appellant running with a gun toward the back of the parking lot in the direction of the green Ford Explorer after Resendez told appellant “let’s go fight.” Numerous other witnesses testified that appellant was carrying a rifle at the parking lot. Furthermore, Resendez and Eugene Perez testified that appellant made several statements indicating that he had shot at “people” in the parking lot. This evidence shows “an understanding and common design” to commit the offense of capital murder. See Ransom, 920 S.W.2d at 302; Ahrens, 43 S.W.3d at 634. The law of parties was applicable to this case, and we hold that the trial court did not err in charging the jury on the law of parties. We overrule appellant’s third point of error. Transferred Intent Appellant argues that the trial erred in including an instruction concerning transferred intent in its charge to the jury. An appellant’s brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). Regarding the trial court’s inclusion of an instruction concerning transferred intent in the charge, in his brief, appellant does not explain how the trial court erred in including such an instruction. Furthermore, appellant provides no legal authority in support of his contention that the trial court erred. See Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also Foster v. State, 101 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). It is not the appellate court’s “task to speculate as to the nature of an appellant’s legal theory.” Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210. Thus, regarding the trial court’s inclusion of a transferred-intent instruction, we hold that appellant has not presented any error for our review. See Foster, 101 S.W.3d at 499. We overrule appellant’s fourth point of error. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Terry Jennings Justice Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Bland. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).