Christopher Lemar Robinson v. State

Opinion issued March 23, 2006 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas NO. 01-04-01148-CR CHRISTOPHER LEMARK ROBINSON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 179th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 950039 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Christopher Lemark Robinson, appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Appellant pleaded guilty to the charges without an agreed recommendation from the State. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report. Following the PSI hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to eight years in prison. In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred by not withdrawing his plea of guilty once it “became clear that there was substantial evidence of appellant’s innocence.” We conclude that the trial court was not required to withdraw appellant’s guilty plea sua sponte. We affirm. BackgroundAfter appellant pleaded guilty, the trial court prepared a PSI report, which included appellant’s statement that he was acting in self defense when he stabbed complainant. Appellant’s written statement in the PSI report states that complainant punched appellant and forced him to the ground and that appellant subsequently stabbed complainant with a knife to get complainant off him. Sua Sponte Withdrawal of Guilty Plea Appellant argues that because he made “implied denials of guilt,” the trial court “should have sua sponte withdrawn” his guilty plea. It is well-settled that a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right before the trial court takes the case under advisement or pronounces judgment. Jackson v. State, 590 S.W.2d 514, 515 ( Tex. Crim. App. 1979). However, when the defendant decides to withdraw his guilty plea after the trial court takes the case under advisement or pronounces judgment, withdrawal of the plea is within the sole discretion of the trial court. Jackson, 590 S.W.2d at 515. There is no requirement that a trial court withdraw a guilty plea sua sponte after the defendant waives his right to a jury trial and enters a guilty plea before the court, even if evidence subsequently arises that might reasonably and fairly raise an issue of fact as to the guilt of the defendant. Thomas v. State, 599 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (citing Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)); Brown v. State, 11 S.W.3d 360, 362–63 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). As the trier of fact, the trial court may find the defendant either not guilty or guilty as the facts require, without withdrawing the defendant’s plea. Thomas, 599 S.W.2d at 824; Brown, 11 S.W.3d at 362–63. In this case, the trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea and found sufficient evidence to support his guilt. The trial court then took the case under advisement. Appellant never asked the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea and never objected to his punishment. Moreover, the PSI report indicates that appellant opted to plead guilty to aggravated assault rather than to have a trial so that he might obtain deferred adjudication from the trial court. The PSI report shows, as follows: When asked about the self-defense issue and going to court, the defendant indicated a concern since the witnesses were with the victims and he was uncertain of the outcome of a trial based on their possible testimony. He did express remorse for the serious bodily injury he caused and is hopeful he will be given an opportunity to prove he can continue to be a responsible individual as he had done while on bond. After the trial court took appellant’s case under advisement, it was well within the court’s discretion to disbelieve appellant’s version of events and to find appellant guilty of the offense. See Jackson, 590 S.W.2d at 515; see also Brown, 11 S.W.3d at 363. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not withdrawing appellant’s guilty plea sua sponte. Appellant “concedes from the outset that his position [in this appeal] is contrary to this court’s previous holdings,” but asks that we nevertheless “reverse the stand presently dictated by recent precedent.” Appellant is thus urging us to overrule Jackson v. State, 590 S.W.2d at 515, and other Court of Criminal Appeals cases. As an intermediate appellate court, however, we cannot disregard binding precedent of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Southwick v. State, 701 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.). We overrule appellant’s sole issue. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Elsa Alcala Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Alcala. Do Not Publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).