Felix A. Ruiz v. State

Opinion issued May 3, 2007 Opinion issued May 3, 2007 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas NOS. 01-06-00206-CR 01-06-00207-CR 01-06-00208-CR FELIX A. RUIZ, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 178th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 1045941, 1045942, & 1045943 MEMORANDUM OPINION Felix Ruiz pleaded guilty to the felony offense of possession with intent to deliver cocaine weighing more than four grams and less than two hundred grams, as well as two separate offenses of felon in possession of a firearm. In accordance with an agreed punishment recommendation from the State, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement for the cocaine offense and five years’ confinement for each of the weapons offenses. On appeal, Ruiz contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm. Background In February 2005, Harris County Deputy M. Nations received an anonymous tip that Ruiz was trafficking in narcotics and that he kept large amounts of cocaine in unit B-12 of a storage facility located at 9030 North Freeway in Houston. Nations and his undercover team set up surveillance at the storage facility the following day. Around 10:30 a.m., a vehicle stopped in front of unit B-12. The passenger, who was later identified as Ruiz, exited the vehicle and unlocked the door to the storage unit. He emerged a few minutes later with a black garbage bag and a small television set, which he placed in the back seat of the vehicle. The vehicle then drove away. Nations radioed to Uniformed Narcotics Deputy J. Savell that, based on what he had just observed, he suspected Ruiz might be transporting a large quantity of narcotics. He gave Savell the license plate number of the vehicle in which Ruiz was riding and asked Savell to stop the vehicle if he obtained probable cause. Savell conducted a vehicle registration check using his onboard computer and discovered that the vehicle’s registration was expired. He therefore stopped the vehicle. As he approached the vehicle, the driver, Vonda Jackson, rolled down her window, and Savell detected a strong odor of fresh marihuana from inside the vehicle. Savell informed Jackson that he had pulled her over because her registration was expired. Jackson responded that she had just left the registration office and produced a receipt for the renewed registration time-stamped earlier that morning.[1] Savell’s partner, Deputy R. Stech, noticed that the vehicle’s inspection sticker was also expired. Because they smelled marihuana, the deputies asked both Jackson and Ruiz to exit the vehicle. While Stech placed Ruiz in the back of a patrol car, Nations asked Jackson for consent to search her vehicle. She agreed. The deputies searched the vehicle and recovered eight grams of marihuana from a shoebox that they found inside the black garbage bag Ruiz had placed in the vehicle. They also found a large amount of currency concealed in a sock in the back seat. Savell radioed Nations to inform him that they had found marihuana in the vehicle. Nations arrived at the scene a few minutes later. He testified that Ruiz was already handcuffed and detained in the back seat of the patrol car when he arrived. Nations read Ruiz his Miranda[2] warnings and asked for permission to search the storage unit. He then removed Ruiz from the patrol car, took off his handcuffs, let him see a voluntary consent-to-search form, read it to him verbatim and further explained it, and asked Ruiz if he understood English. Ruiz indicated that he did, looked at the form, said he understood it, and signed it. Nations then re-handcuffed Ruiz and transported him to the storage facility. Jackson was free to leave and did not follow them to the storage facility. When they arrived at the facility, Ruiz gave Nations his keys to unit B-12. Deputies found 7.3 grams of cocaine; a large, heavy steel press used to compress cocaine into packages; an electronic scale; and a Beretta 9 millimeter pistol with magazines and ammunition inside the storage unit. Nations then asked Ruiz where he was living, and Ruiz responded that he was staying at an EconoLodge motel down the street. Nations asked Ruiz for consent to search his motel room and, after removing Ruiz from the patrol car and taking off his handcuffs, Nations again read Ruiz a voluntary consent-to-search form. Ruiz said he understood the form and signed it. Nations re-handcuffed Ruiz and transported him to the EconoLodge. Deputies found twenty-nine grams of cocaine, a scale with cocaine residue on it, a Colt 45, and three magazines with ammunition inside Ruiz’s room. Nations then asked Ruiz for permission to search his vehicle, which was parked at the EconoLodge, and Ruiz signed another voluntary consent-to-search form for his vehicle.[3] Nations recovered a large amount of currency and jewelry from the glove box. Ruiz testified that after he was placed in the patrol car at the scene of the traffic stop, an officer in civilian clothes arrived and informed him that police were going to search his storage unit. Officers then transported him to the storage facility. After they arrived, two men got into the patrol car on either side of him, showed him the consent form, and said, “If you don’t sign this, we going to f[@*!] you over and we going to f[@*!] over your fiancée. If you don’t sign this, we going to go in there and search the place anyway. If you sign it, we let her go and we just do you better.” Ruiz told the men that he was not going to sign the form, which prompted one of them to knock Ruiz’s hat off his head. Ruiz testified that he felt intimidated because he did not know who the men were. They did not identify themselves, and after he saw their weapons, he decided to sign both the consent to search the storage unit and the consent to search his motel room because he “feared for his life.”[4] Ruiz testified that he was not handcuffed and that no one read him his Miranda warnings before asking him to sign the consent forms. Ruiz’s girlfriend, Jackson, corroborated his testimony. She testified that her car did not smell of marihuana, and that she did not give officers permission to search her vehicle. After the traffic stop, she followed Ruiz and the officers to the storage facility. She parked behind the patrol car and saw two undercover officers get into the patrol car on either side of Ruiz. The officers talked to Ruiz for ten to fifteen minutes. She saw Ruiz shake his head “no” and then saw an officer knock Ruiz’s hat off his head. After that, the officers exited the car and began searching Ruiz’s storage unit. Ruiz moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his storage unit, motel room, vehicle, and Jackson’s vehicle. After hearing evidence and reading the parties’ memoranda of law, the trial court denied Ruiz’s motion to suppress. The court found that the traffic stop was valid, that Ruiz was read his Miranda warnings, and that he voluntarily consented to the various searches. The trial court then accepted Ruiz’s guilty pleas and assessed punishment. Motion to Suppress Standard of Review In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply the bifurcated standard of review articulated in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We defer to a trial court’s determination of historical facts, and review de novo the trial court’s application of the law of search and seizure. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88–89). If the issue involves the credibility of a witness, we give greater deference to a trial court’s ruling, as a trial court is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses before it. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87–89. The trial court may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If the trial court is called upon to apply the law to the facts, and the ultimate resolution of the issue does not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor of a witness, we review that issue de novo. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. Reasonableness of the Seizure Ruiz contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his warrantless arrest, and the warrantless searches conducted subsequent thereto, violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution.[5] In particular, Ruiz asserts that he was placed under arrest the moment officers removed him from Jackson’s vehicle and locked him into the back of the patrol car. He reasons that deputies did not have probable cause to arrest him after they merely smelled marihuana, and that the consents to search are therefore tainted by the illegal arrest. Alternatively, Ruiz posits that, if he was detained rather than arrested, then the length of the detention exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry[6] stop, and the evidence seized from the illegal detention must be suppressed. Ruiz does not challenge the validity of the initial traffic stop. Both state and federal courts recognize three categories of interaction between police and citizens: encounters, investigative detentions, and arrests. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–502, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324–26 (1983); Francis v. State, 896 S.W.2d 406, 408–09 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 922 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). All three categories involve attendant rights and responsibilities. Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 838 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d). Moreover, “because there is a continuum of human interaction, what may begin as a consensual encounter can readily become an investigative detention, which may evolve into an arrest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An encounter is a friendly exchange of pleasantries or mutually useful information. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (1968); Francis, 922 S.W.2d at 178. The Fourth Amendment is not implicated in an encounter because a police officer is not required to possess any particular level of suspicion and a citizen is free to disregard the questions and walk away. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980); Francis, 922 S.W.2d at 178. Unlike an encounter, an investigative detention and an arrest are seizures. See Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution occurs when a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave, and that person has yielded to the officer’s show of authority or has been physically forced to yield. Josey, 981 S.W.2d at 838. An arrest and an investigative detention are distinguishable by the nature of the detention involved and the constitutional parameters that are applied to determine their legality. See Johnson, 912 S.W.2d at 235. An investigative detention or stop is a brief detention of a person reasonably suspected of criminal activity to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923 (1972); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880; Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). An arrest occurs when a person’s liberty of movement is restricted or restrained. See Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). “A person is arrested when he has been actually placed under restraint or taken into custody by an officer or person executing a warrant of arrest, or by an officer or person arresting without a warrant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 15.22 (Vernon 2005). To justify an investigative stop, the officer must have specific articulable facts that, in light of his experience and personal knowledge, together with inferences from those facts, would reasonably warrant the intrusion on the freedom of the citizen detained. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880; Comer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The officer must reasonably suspect that some unusual activity is occurring or has occurred, that the detained person is connected with the activity, and that the unusual activity is related to the commission of a crime. See Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). To effectuate a full custodial arrest, an officer must have probable cause to believe the person arrested has committed or is committing an offense. See Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 411. Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been or is being committed. See id. at 413. The determination of probable cause hinges on “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act.” Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (opinion on reh’g) (internal citation omitted). Probable cause requires more than mere suspicion but far less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. The rule of probable cause seeks to accommodate the sometimes opposing interests of (1) safeguarding citizens from rash and unreasonable police conduct and (2) giving fair leeway to legitimate law enforcement efforts. See id. at 345–46. The standard for distinguishing between an investigative detention and an arrest is not always clear, however, because both are seizures. Josey, 981 S.W.2d at 839; see also Akins v. State, 202 S.W.3d 879, 885 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Distinguishing between the two types of seizures can be difficult, particularly because the distinction rests on a fact-specific inquiry rather than clearly delineated criteria.”). Texas courts, nevertheless, recognize certain parameters that define the reasonableness of an investigative detention. First, an investigative detention must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Second, “[a]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. The investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Id. at 245 (internal citation omitted). Third, an investigative detention requires an actual investigation. See Burkes v. State, 830 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). “Thus, where no investigation is undertaken the detention cannot be considered investigatory and rises to the level of an arrest.” Id. Finally, a reviewing court may consider the attending officer’s testimony as to whether a person is under arrest, but the testimony is not controlling. See Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 412. In any case, a reviewing court considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a stop is a brief investigative detention or an arrest. See Francis, 896 S.W.2d at 411. In viewing the totality of the circumstances, we look to the beginning of the officer’s intrusion and evaluate the reasonableness of each incremental level of intrusion based on information the officer possessed at that time. See id. Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that Ruiz was detained, rather than arrested, when Deputy Stech removed him from Jackson’s vehicle and placed him in the back of the patrol car. At the time Stech did so, police had initiated a valid traffic stop of the vehicle in which Ruiz was riding, and had detected a strong odor of marihuana emanating from the vehicle. At that point, deputies formed a reasonable suspicion that marihuana might be present in the vehicle, and they therefore detained Ruiz in the back of the patrol car so that they could investigate whether marihuana was in fact present in the vehicle. We hold that these actions fell within the parameters of a reasonable investigative detention. See Josey, 981 S.W.2d at 839–41 (holding that officer acted within parameters of reasonable investigative detention when he stopped vehicle in which appellant was riding for traffic offense, discovered plastic bag of money packaged in manner common to drug transactions while conducting inventory search, and therefore handcuffed appellant and placed him on other side of patrol car while he determined whether narcotics were present in vehicle); Francis, 896 S.W.2d at 411–12 (holding that officer’s actions were consistent with execution of valid investigative detention when officer placed appellant in back of patrol car and transported him short distance to scene of alleged burglary so he could be identified by victims).[7] After detaining Ruiz, deputies searched the vehicle and found eight grams of marihuana inside the black garbage bag that Deputy Nations had watched Ruiz place in the vehicle. This discovery gave Nations probable cause to arrest Ruiz without first securing a warrant. Warrantless arrests are authorized only in limited circumstances and are governed primarily by Chapter Fourteen of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413. Article 14.01(b) authorizes a warrantless arrest for an offense committed in the officer’s presence or within his view. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005). This statutory provision requires the legal equivalent of probable cause. Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413; Josey, 981 S.W.2d at 841. To determine whether there was probable cause for a warrantless arrest, we look to the totality of the circumstances. Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413. The State bears the burden of proving the existence of probable cause. Id. “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a particular person has committed or is committing an offense.” Id.; see Beverly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 103, 104–05 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Here, police had probable cause to believe that Ruiz had committed an offense—namely, possession of marihuana—in their presence. The black garbage bag containing marihuana that deputies recovered from the vehicle was the same bag that they had seen Ruiz remove from his storage unit and place in the back seat of the vehicle. Thus, because deputies had probable cause to believe that Ruiz had committed an offense in their presence, they were justified in arresting him without a warrant under article 14.01(b). See Josey, 981 S.W.2d at 841–42 (holding officers were justified in making warrantless arrest under article 14.01(b) after they detained appellant and discovered cocaine behind dashboard of his car).[8] Given the legality of the arrest, we reject Ruiz’s contention that the consents to search were tainted by an illegal arrest. Voluntariness of the Consents to Search Even though Ruiz was legally arrested, his consents to search still must have been freely and voluntarily given. De Jesus v. State, 917 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d). Ruiz contends that they were not, as evidenced by his testimony that he signed the consents only because he feared for his life, and Jackson’s corroborating testimony that officers spoke forcefully to Ruiz and knocked his hat off his head. A voluntary consensual search is an exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a suspect freely and voluntarily gave his consent. State v. Ibarra, 953 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We defer to the trial court for fact findings, and review de novo the legal question of whether consent was voluntary. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856. Consent must not be the product of duress or coercion, express or implied. Reasor, 12 S.W.3d at 817 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2059 (1973)). It must be positive and unequivocal, not merely acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968)). The fact that a defendant is in custody does not, however, dictate that his consent is per se involuntary. See Reasor, 12 S.W.3d at 817–18. Whether consent is voluntary is determined from the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 818; see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996). Among the factors to be considered in determining voluntariness include the youth, intelligence, or education of the person; the constitutional advice (e.g., Miranda warnings) given to the person; the length of the detention; the repetitiveness of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment. Reasor, 12 S.W.3d at 818; Arroyo v. State, 881 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.). Here, Deputy Nations testified that, before he asked Ruiz for permission to search the storage unit, he read Ruiz his Miranda warnings. Nations then removed Ruiz from the patrol car, took off his handcuffs, let him see the consent form, read it to him verbatim and further explained it, and asked Ruiz if he understood English. Ruiz indicated that he did, looked at the form, said he understood it, and signed it. Nations testified that he followed an identical procedure for the consent form to search the motel room. He testified that he did not coerce Ruiz to sign either form.[9] The consent forms describe the locations to be searched, identify Deputy Nations as the person to whom consent has been given, and state in pertinent part: “I, Felix Antonio Ruiz, having been informed by the below officers of my constitutional right not to have a search made of my premises . . . without a search warrant and of my right to voluntarily consent to such a search, hereby authorize . . . a complete search . . . . This consent is being given . . . freely and voluntarily and with out [sic] threats or promises of any kind and is given with my full and free consent.” Ruiz gave a different version of events. He testified that two men got into the patrol car on either side of him, threatened him and Jackson, and knocked the hat off his head when he told them that he was not going to sign the consent forms. He further testified that he felt intimidated because he did not know who the men were. They did not identify themselves, and after he saw their weapons, he decided to sign both the consent to search the storage unit and the consent to search his motel room because he “feared for his life.”[10] Ruiz testified that he was not handcuffed and that no one read him his Miranda warnings before asking him to sign the consent forms. He acknowledged, however, that he read the consent forms and knew what they were. Ruiz’s girlfriend, Jackson, corroborated his testimony that officers threatened him by knocking the hat off his head. Testimony by law enforcement officers that no coercion was involved in obtaining consent is evidence of the consent’s voluntary nature. Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Although Ruiz and Jackson gave testimony that conflicted with Deputy Nations’s statements, the trial court, as fact-finder, was free to disbelieve their testimony. Id.; see also Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“The trial judge is the sole fact finder at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search, and may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of a witness’ testimony.”); Graham v. State, 201 S.W.3d 323, 330 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“[T]he trial court was free to believe each officer’s testimony [that consent was voluntary] and disbelieve appellant’s testimony [that consent was involuntary].”); De Jesus, 917 S.W.2d at 462 (same). Affording proper deference to the trial court’s resolution of factual conflicts, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding that Ruiz freely and voluntarily consented to the searches of his storage unit and motel room. See Allridge, 850 S.W.2d at 492–93 (holding that there was sufficient testimony to support trial court’s implied decision that appellant was not coerced into giving consent where officer testified that he read appellant his Miranda warnings and appellant voluntarily signed consent form, even though appellant and his brother gave conflicting testimony that officer “used his foot to force appellant’s head to the floor, and subsequently ‘jerked’ appellant off the floor” when appellant initially refused to sign consent form). We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Ruiz’s motion to suppress on the ground that his consents to search were involuntary. Conclusion We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Ruiz’s motion to suppress and therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. Jane Bland Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Bland. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). [1] The court remarked at the suppression hearing that Savell’s onboard computer may not have received updated information regarding the renewed registration, since less than an hour had elapsed between the time of the stop and the time Jackson renewed her registration. [2] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 2 (Vernon 2005). [3] All three consent forms were admitted into evidence without objection from Ruiz. [4] Ruiz testified that he signed the consent form to search his vehicle “with no problem.” [5] We address Ruiz’s Fourth Amendment and article I, section 9 arguments together because he failed to separately argue and brief those contentions. See Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Arnold v. State, 873 S.W.2d 27, 29 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Joseph v. State, 3 S.W.3d 627, 634 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). [6] See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). [7] We note that there was conflicting testimony regarding whether Deputy Stech handcuffed Ruiz before placing him in the back of the patrol car. Deputy Nations testified that Ruiz was handcuffed and detained when he arrived on the scene; Ruiz testified that he was never handcuffed. Even if Ruiz was handcuffed, that fact alone does not convert an otherwise valid investigative detention into an arrest. See In re J.D.B., 209 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“[H]andcuffing is not always the equivalent of an arrest. Handcuffing a suspect during a temporary investigative detention can be reasonable under the circumstances and not amount to an arrest.” (citing Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997))); Akins v. State, 202 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d) (“[T]here is no bright-line rule that handcuffing a suspect always constitutes an arrest.”); Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 839–41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding that appellant was detained, rather than arrested, when police handcuffed him and placed him on other side of patrol car while they investigated whether narcotics were present in vehicle in which appellant was riding). [8] Ruiz relies on State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), to contend that the smell of marihuana is insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest. In Steelman, however, police arrested an individual at a residence occupied by a number of people, without facts specifically linking the individual arrested to the marihuana. See id. at 104, 109 (noting that “the officers in this case had no idea who [inside the house] was smoking or possessing marijuana, and they certainly had no particular reason to believe that [appellant] was smoking or possessing marijuana”). In contrast, here police had observed Ruiz remove the black garbage bag from the storage unit. Thus, facts other than the mere odor of marihuana linked Ruiz to possession of it. [9] Ruiz does not challenge the voluntariness of his consent to search his vehicle. [10] Ruiz testified that he signed the consent to search his vehicle “with no problem.”