Bruce Milner v. State

Opinion issued December 18, 2008 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas NO. 01-07-00501-CR BRUCE GLENN MILNER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 239th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 50811 MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted appellant, Bruce Glenn Milner, of the attempted murder of Debra Sanchez and assessed punishment at 70 years' imprisonment. (1) In two points of error, appellant argues that (1) the trial court improperly granted the challenge for cause of veniremember G. Jira and (2) double jeopardy prevented evidence of a previous murder conviction from being introduced at the attempted murder trial. We affirm. Background On August 14, 2005, Leza Maddalone, appellant's estranged common-law wife, and Debra Sanchez, Maddalone's mother, met at a Conoco station at 6:00 p.m. to exchange custody of Maddalone's and Milner's children. Appellant drove up to the Conoco while the group was preparing to move the children to Maddalone's SUV. Appellant verbally and physically attacked Maddalone, and Sanchez attempted to intervene. Appellant shot and killed Maddalone, and then began to shoot at Sanchez. As Sanchez attempted to run away, appellant shot Sanchez seven times, but did not kill her. Appellant has been convicted and sentenced for Maddalone's murder. (2) Since his murder conviction, appellant has submitted a habeas corpus appeal to this Court on double jeopardy grounds. See Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). This Court held that the murder trial did not place appellant in double jeopardy when he was later tried for the attempted murder of Sanchez. Id. at 357. In the attempted murder trial, evidence of appellant's act of shooting Maddalone during the shooting spree was presented to the jury over Milner's objection. Several witnesses testified about the shooting of Maddalone, and the State also presented evidence throughout the trial of Maddalone's shooting and subsequent death. Milner repeatedly objected to this evidence. Double Jeopardy In his first point of error, appellant argues that his conviction for attempted murder should be reversed because the evidence of the attempted murder of Sanchez was already presented at his trial for the murder of Maddalone. Appellant asserts that trying him for the offense of attempted murder at a separate trial when the same evidence was also used in the first murder trial placed him in double jeopardy. This Court has already addressed this issue in appellant's appeal of the denial of his writ of habeas corpus. See Milner, 263 S.W.3d at 357. Appellant made identical arguments in his previous appeal. See id. at 353. In cause number 49995, appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted for the murder of Maddalone. See id. at 357. In cause 50811, appellant was indicted tried and convicted for the attempted murder of Sanchez, a different individual. See id. Applying the Blockburger test, we held that the murder trial did not put appellant in double jeopardy when he was later tried for the attempted murder of a different person. See Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182 (1932). We held, "Because [appellant] was not prosecuted for the extraneous offense of the attempted murder of Sanchez in his trial for the murder of Maddalone, double jeopardy protection is not implicated under either the United States or Texas Constitutions and appellant's constitutional right guarantee against double jeopardy is therefore not violated." Milner, 263 S.W.3d at 358 (citing Ex parte Broxton, 888 S.W.2d 23, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). "The law of the case" principle "provides that an appellate court's resolution of a question of law in a previous appeal of the same case will govern the disposition of the same issues should there be another appeal." Ware v. State, 736 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Because this Court has already held in appellant's previous appeal that appellant's right against double jeopardy was not implicated, our previous holding controls on this issue in the present appeal. We overrule appellant's first point of error. Jury Selection In his second point of error, appellant argues that the trial court improperly granted the State's challenge for cause of veniremember G. Jiha. To show error in the trial court's grant of the State's challenge of Jiha for cause, an appellant is required to demonstrate that either (1) the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in sustaining the challenge or (2) the trial court abused its discretion in applying the correct legal standard. Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). If the trial court applied the correct legal standard, we examine the record as a whole to determine whether there is support for the trial court's decision, and, in doing so, we give great deference to the trial court. Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Satterwhite v. State, 858 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). We accord the trial court such deference because only the trial court is able to consider such factors as demeanor and tone of voice that are not apparent when reviewing the appellate record. Penry, 903 S.W.2d at 728 (citing Mooney v. State, 817 S.W.2d 693, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); see also Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (stating that the trial court "is in a unique position to measure the venireperson's sincerity, comprehension and demeanor"). During the voir dire examination on the charge of attempted murder, the trial court granted the State's challenge to veniremember Jiha for cause because he would require the state to prove premeditation in order to find Milner guilty of attempted murder. On four occasions during voir dire, the prosecution explained the distinctions between the words "premeditation" and "intent, either to a specific veniremember or to the assembled jury panel: What I'm going to focus on is with the specific intent to commit murder. And that means--to commit murder, you have to intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual. And also intent. It doesn't say in here that it has to be premeditated, that you have to sit there and think for hours and hours and premeditate and plan out and plot this--this crime. It just says with specific intent to commit murder you do this. Premeditation is not an element in the indictment that has to be proven. Well, by premeditation I'm talking about planning, preparing, thinking about premeditating the crime. Intent is something that can be formed instantly. You can instantly form intent to kill somebody. Premeditation is planning out, plotting, you know, doing all this--all this thought beforehand. Okay. Let me see if I can clarify this a little bit. What if--okay. Say someone--I'm trying to think of an example. Let's talk about theft. You go into the store. You have no intention of taking anything. You're in the store and then all of a sudden you decide that you change your intent. You decide to take something. I mean, it's not something that's thought of before you go there . But it's something that when you're there, you change your thinking. After the State made four attempts to explain the distinctions between the words "premeditation" and "intent," the following exchange took place between the State and veniremember Jiha: [The State]: And you would require the State to prove premeditation as well? [G. Jiha]: Yes, ma'am. After the voir dire examination was completed, the State moved to strike Jiha for cause and the trial court granted the request. A challenge for cause may be made by the State if the veniremember states that "he has a bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which the State is entitled to rely for conviction or punishment." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.16(b)(3) (Vernon 2006). A bias or prejudice includes requiring the State to prove more than the elements of the crime required to obtain a conviction. Crane v. State, 786 S.W.2d 338, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that "premeditation is not an element of murder and a veniremember who would require such proof is properly excused." Crane, 786 S.W.2d at 345 (citing Livingston v. State, 739 S.W.2d 311, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). (3) This reasoning applies in the present case because appellant was accused of attempted murder, which requires the "specific intent to commit [the offense of murder]" but does not require premeditation. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.01(a) (Vernon 2003). (4) Jiha answered in the affirmative when the State asked if he would require the State to prove premeditation. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court applied the correct legal standard in granting the State's challenge of Jiha for cause. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the correct legal standard. "The proponent of a challenge for cause has the burden of establishing his challenge is proper. . . . [He] does not meet his burden until he has shown that the venireman understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well enough to follow it." Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Although some veniremembers may initially have been confused as to the difference between premeditation and intent, the State repeatedly explained the difference, and Jiha never indicated that he did not understand the difference. Therefore, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the State carried its burden of showing Jiha's prejudice. We give deference to the trial court and will not overrule the trial court's decision absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Penry, 903 S.W.2d at 728. Appellant argues, however, that the State did not properly determine whether Jiha was requiring a certain type of evidence because of his own personal belief of what constituted guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a veniremember who requires a certain type of evidence, or more than a given type of evidence, to render a guilty verdict cannot be challenged for cause if the proof the veniremember would require is predicated on his understanding of what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that a veniremember who "refuses to render a guilty verdict on the basis of only one eyewitness is not challengeable for cause on that account so long as his refusal is predicated on his reasonable understanding of what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt"). These cases, however, discuss the type or amount of evidence necessary to meet the veniremember's personal threshold of reasonable doubt, not the statutory elements the veniremember would require the State to prove. See id. In this situation, veniremember Jiha would have required the State to prove a separate criminal element that was not part of this state's murder statute, and he would have required this proof even after the State had thoroughly explained the difference between premeditation, which is not an element of murder, and intent. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's challenge for cause of veniremember Jiha. See Crane, 786 S.W.2d at 345. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we do not need to address appellant's arguments that he suffered harm from the trial court's ruling. Id. We overrule appellant's second point of error. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Evelyn V. Keyes Justice Panel consists of Justices Taft, Keyes, and Alcala. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4(b). 1. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (Vernon 2003) ("A person commits [the offense of murder] if he (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; [or] (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual."); see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.01(a) (Vernon 2003) ("A person commits [the offense of criminal attempt] if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended."). 2. This Court affirmed appellant's conviction on February 28, 2008. See Milner v. State, No. 01-06-01024-CR, 2008 WL 525615 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Feb 28, 2008, no pet.). 3. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (Vernon 2003) (defining murder as "a person commits an offense if he (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; [or] (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.") 4. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.01(a) (Vernon 2003) (defining criminal attempt as "a person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.")