Ernest Pleasant v. State

Issued April 3, 2008 Issued April 3, 2008 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas NO. 01-07-00049-CR ERNEST PLEASANT, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 180th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 957198 MEMORANDUM OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING Appellant, Ernest Pleasant, has filed a motion for rehearing, which we DENY. However, we withdraw our opinion of February 7, 2008, and issue this opinion in its stead. Our judgment of February 7, 2008, remains unchanged. Appellant, Ernest Pleasant, pleaded nolo contendere to the felony offense of indecency with a child. Pursuant to Pleasant’s plea agreement with the State, the trial court deferred adjudication of his guilt and placed Pleasant on community supervision for five years. After a hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt, the trial court found Pleasant guilty and sentenced him to six years’ confinement and a fine of $500. In his first four issues, Pleasant contends that the State and the trial court violated the plea bargain agreement. Pleasant specifically asserts the defenses of specific performance and estoppel. In his last issue, Pleasant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that he was financially able to pay the court ordered fines, fees, and court costs. We dismiss the first four points of error for lack of jurisdiction. As to his fifth issue, we conclude that Pleasant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in adjudicating his guilt. We therefore affirm. Background Pleasant’s plea agreement included standard sex-offender conditions of community supervision, among them, a requirement that he participate in sex offender treatment and comply with “all program rules, regulations, and guidelines until successfully discharged or released.” On each reporting date, Pleasant was required to submit written verification of his enrollment, attendance, and/or successful completion of the program to his community supervision officer. Pleasant was also required to pay $85 each month in fines and fees, and one-time fines and fees totaling $87.50. Pleasant attended sex-offender treatment but did not fully complete the treatment program because he refused to take responsibility for his actions and admit his guilt. His supervision officers, as well as the treatment directors, explained to Pleasant that in order to successfully complete the sex offender treatment required as a condition of his probation, he must admit his guilt. Because Pleasant continued to maintain his innocence and refused to admit any wrongdoing, he was discharged from the treatment program. In May 2006, the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt. In response to the motion, the trial court amended the conditions of Pleasant’s community supervision to include sixty days in the Harris County jail. After he was released, the trial court referred Pleasant to a different treatment program. At the initial interview, Pleasant again refused to admit his guilt, and the program director discharged him from the program. In November 2006, the State filed another motion to adjudicate guilt. In the motion, the State alleged that Pleasant had violated the conditions of his community supervision in several ways, including: (1) failure to pay several fines, fees, and costs; (2) failure to submit to and complete an alcohol/drug evaluation; and (3) failure to participate in and complete sex offender treatment. After a hearing on January 2, 2007, the trial court found true the allegations in the State’s motion and sentenced Pleasant to six years’ confinement and a $500 fine. Analysis A. Violation of Plea Bargain In his first four issues, Pleasant contends that the trial court and the State violated his plea bargain agreement. He asserts that he pleaded nolo contendere because he understood it to mean that he was not admitting guilt. Because he did not plead guilty, Pleasant contends it is a violation of his plea to adjudicate his guilt for failure to complete a sex offender treatment program which requires him to admit to the offense. He further contends that he should be entitled to specific performance of his contract with the trial court and that the trial court and the State should be estopped from sentencing him to prison because they accepted his plea of no contest while knowing that he would be required to admit his guilt in order to complete his sex offender treatment program. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction. See Ellerbe v. State, 80 S.W.3d 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). Like the defendant in Ellerbe, Pleasant’s argument is “based on a false premise: that his plea of nolo contendere somehow relieved him of taking responsibility for his actions and of submitting to sex-offender counseling and participating fully in the treatment program.” Id. at 723. The legal effect of a plea of nolo contendere is “the same as that of a plea of guilty . . . .” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.02(5) (Vernon 2006). As the Ellerbe court noted, “[a] plea of nolo contedere does not relieve a defendant from having to admit to the commission of an offense so as to fully participate in a treatment program as a condition of community supervision.” Ellerbe, 80 S.W.3d at 723. Pleasant argues that his case is distinguishable from Ellerbe because the defendant in Ellerbe, in addition to refusing to admit his guilt, also resisted treatment and failed to participate fully in the program, whereas Pleasant’s only failure was his refusal to admit responsibility. Id. at 722. However, the defendant in Ellerbe similarly contended that a court should not revoke community supervision based on a failure to admit guilt, and our court rejected the argument. As in Ellerbe, Pleasant is essentially left with arguing that his original plea was involuntary: he “would never have pled no contest” had he known that he would have to admit his guilt as a condition of community supervision. Id. at 723. This Court may not consider any complaint concerning the original plea, because such a complaint must be raised when deferred adjudication community supervision is first imposed. Id.; Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Pleasant’s claims of specific performance and estoppel fail on the same grounds. Pleasant received specific performance of his plea agreement. The trial court revoked Pleasant’s community supervision only when Pleasant violated the plea agreement by failing to complete his required sex offender treatment program. Pleasant is, therefore, not entitled to specific performance, when he did not fulfill his duties under the agreement. Pleasant further contends that because the trial court and the State were aware that Pleasant would be required to admit his guilt despite his plea of no contest, they are estopped from adjudicating his guilt. However, as Ellerbe had already been decided, Pleasant or Pleasant’s counsel should also have been aware that a no-contest plea does not relieve him of taking responsibility for his actions, in order to successfully complete sex offender treatment. We therefore dismiss Pleasant’s first four issues for lack of jurisdiction. B. Revocation based on failure to pay fines and fees An adjudication proceeding is neither a criminal nor a civil trial, but rather an administrative hearing. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Canseco v. State, 199 S.W.3d 437, 438 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d); Greer v. State, 999 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). “At a revocation hearing, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated a condition of his community supervision.” Cobb, 851 S.W.2d at 873; Canseco, 199 S.W.3d at 438; Greer, 999 S.W.2d at 486. Proof of a single violation is sufficient to support a revocation. Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Canseco, 199 S.W.3d at 439; Greer, 999 S.W.2d at 486. A trial court’s judgment should be affirmed if an appellant does not challenge all of the grounds on which the trial court revoked community supervision. See Baxter v. State, 936 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 960 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (affirming revocation when only one of two grounds was challenged). Pleasant challenges only the finding that he was financially able to pay the fines, fees, and costs required by his plea agreement. The trial court found true all the allegations in the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt, in which the State also alleged that Pleasant failed to participate in and complete alcohol and drug treatment, as well as sex offender treatment. He does not challenge these rulings on appeal. The record contains sufficient evidence to support a revocation. At the hearing, Pleasant admitted that he had not completed sex offender treatment. In addition, the treatment directors testified that they had discharged Pleasant early from the program for his failure to admit guilt. Because any single unchallenged ground will support revocation, we hold that Pleasant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision. See Moses, 590 S.W.2d at 470; Canseco, 199 S.W.3d at 439; Greer, 999 S.W.2d at 486; Baxter, 936 S.W.2d at 472. Conclusion We dismiss Pleasant’s first four issues for lack of jurisdiction. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Pleasant’s community supervision and therefore affirm the judgment. Jane Bland Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Bland. Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.