Gobin Ramroop v. State

Opinion issued February 25, 2010 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas NO. 01-09-00256-CR __________ GOBIN RAMROOP, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 164,811 MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury found appellant, Gobin Ramroop, guilty of the offense of harassment, and the trial court assessed his punishment at 180 days confinement. In two issues, appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm. Factual BackgroundValerie Immore, the complainant, and the owner and operator of two yoga studios, testified that on January 10, 2008, she received a telephone call from appellant, who identified himself as “Govinda Vishnu.” He told the complainant that he was looking for an opportunity to offer yoga classes and train yoga teachers. The complainant, who was looking for assistance in teaching yoga classes, set up a meeting with appellant at one of her yoga studios. At the end of this initial meeting, which lasted several hours, appellant touched the complainant in a manner that made her uncomfortable. However, the complainant remained interested in working with him and learning from him about certain aspects of yoga. Accordingly, the complainant spoke with appellant by telephone two days later and told him that, although she was interested in the possibility of becoming appellant’s yoga student and allowing him to conduct yoga workshops, she wanted to ensure that he understood that she was not “romantically” interested in him. During their next telephone conversation, appellant began insisting that the complainant gather all of her teachers and students together, and he became “very frustrated” when she refused. During subsequent telephone conversations in late January 2008, appellant continued to insist that he meet all of the teachers and students at the yoga studio. In the first week of February 2008, the complainant went on a trip and, when she returned, appellant “reprimanded” her for not meeting with him, assembling her teachers and students for him, and staying in contact with him. He became “very irritated” with the complainant and began telling her that she was teaching yoga incorrectly and that he would correct her teaching style. The complainant subsequently agreed to let appellant observe her yoga classes, and, the first time that he observed her class, he told the students that the complainant had been teaching yoga “incorrectly.” When he attended another class later that week at the studio, at which the complainant was not present, appellant further criticized the complainant’s teaching and solicited the students for a separate class that he intended to teach. Appellant then called the complainant on the telephone, and the complainant, who had learned what had happened, told appellant not to criticize her in front of her students. After confronting appellant with this information, the conversation with appellant became “very heated and ugly” and there was “a lot of hang up and call back.” The complainant described appellant as “very upset and angry.” Finally, the complainant told appellant that she was “done with all of this” and told him goodbye. Nevertheless, appellant called the complainant back, and she again told him that she did not want to talk to him anymore. Appellant then told the complainant, “No woman can use this authority on me; You have no authority over me.” After this discussion, appellant made repeated telephone calls to the complainant, which she did not answer initially. However, on the fifth telephone call, the complainant answered. Appellant continued to engage in conversation that was “real ugly,” and the complainant felt “frazzled” and “unraveled” and hung up the telephone. The complainant subsequently began receiving “hate mail” from appellant in which appellant expressed that he “hated” her and stated, “How dare you try to reprimand me. You have no authority over me.” At about the same time that she received this hate mail, appellant sent the complainant flowers and a letter for Valentine’s day with a card that said, “I love you.” The complainant called the florist and learned that, when appellant had ordered the flowers, he had told the florist that he and the complainant were “so in love.” The complainant then wrote a “cease and desist letter” in which she instructed appellant to no longer contact her. Yet, appellant “called many times throughout the weekend.” The complainant did not answer these telephone calls, but appellant left “several messages.” On Sunday morning of that same weekend, the complainant answered the telephone “by mistake,” and appellant told the complainant that he would be at the studio the following morning “to observe classes,” “as if nothing had happened.” Upon the complainant’s questioning, appellant admitted to sending the hate mail, but he explained that he had just been angry. The complainant again told appellant not to contact her or send her letters, but appellant continued to insist that he and the complainant had “business to do” together. Thereafter, the complainant again refused to take appellant’s telephone calls or accept his letters, but appellant sent the complainant legal documents threatening to sue her. Appellant also sent a threatening letter to the complainant’s home, which prompted the complainant to contact the Pearland Police Department for assistance. She also began to look through documents that appellant had sent her, and she learned that appellant’s legal name was different than the name that he had given her. The complainant continued to receive letters from appellant, and although she also blocked appellant’s telephone number from her cellular telephone, she continued to get multiple “unavailable” and “anonymous” telephone calls. The complainant considered appellant’s telephone calls, which were placed at “all hours,” to be alarming. She also felt that she, her business, her students, and her family were being threatened by appellant’s contacts. In fact, she had received telephone calls from appellant after she had sent to him the cease and desist letter, and she was frightened by appellant’s telephone calls. The State introduced into evidence multiple letters that appellant had sent to the complainant. In one letter, which appellant had sent to the complainant shortly before a court hearing in which the complainant had sought a restraining order, appellant made numerous disturbing statements, including, “You love me and you know it” and “You have something I want. Keep it safe.” In other letters, appellant stated, “You do not have the authority to admonish me”; “If you should ever talk to me like this one more time, I will do something about it”; “You are not competent neither are you qualified to teach yoga”; “you are making me dislike you”; and “I don’t trust you.” The State also introduced into evidence the complainant’s cease and desist letter, in which she warned appellant to stop calling her and referred to a prior telephone message left by appellant in which he threatened her business. Pearland Police Detective C. Arnold testified that when he met with appellant in the course of his investigation into the matter, appellant told Arnold that he was in “a relationship more than a business relationship” with the complainant and admitted that he had persisted in contacting the complainant via telephone and mail after receiving her cease and desist letter and after she had told him to leave her alone. Appellant continued to attempt to contact the complainant because “he was in love with her.” Arnold concluded that the complainant was in danger. Arnold also testified that he had become aware of other situations involving appellant similar to that between appellant and the complainant. Appellant, who represented himself in the trial court, testified that the complainant had given him a business card, which he believed gave him permission to call her, and he had spent significant time in preparing to teach with the complainant. Appellant asserted that he wrote nothing threatening in his letters to the complainant, and although he admitted to calling the complainant five times in one week, he denied calling the complainant at her home. Appellant also denied knowing where the complainant lived or the location of her studio. On cross-examination, appellant agreed that he did not cease all contact with the complainant after receiving her cease and desist letter, but explained that he believed that he “had absolute freedom to talk and write.” Appellant admitted that after the complainant told him not to call anymore, he called her anyway, but he asserted that she asked for “some time” to think. Standard of Review We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788–89 (1979)). In doing so, we give deference to the responsibility of the fact-finder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Id. However, our duty requires us to “ensure that the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed” the criminal offense of which he is accused. Id. In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, both for and against the finding, and set aside the verdict if the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury’s determination, i.e., that the verdict seems “clearly wrong and manifestly unjust,” or the proof of guilt, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We note that a jury is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and we afford “due deference” to the jury’s determinations. Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Although we should always be “mindful” that a jury is in the best position to pass on the facts and that we should not order a new trial “simply because [we] disagree[ ] with the verdict,” it is “the very nature of a factual-sufficiency review that . . . authorizes an appellate court, albeit to a very limited degree, to act in the capacity of a so-called ‘thirteenth juror.’” Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414, 416–17. Thus, when an appellate court can “say, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of the (albeit legally sufficient) evidence contradicts the jury’s verdict[,] . . . it is justified in exercising its appellate fact jurisdiction to order a new trial.” Id. at 417. Legal and Factual Sufficiency In his two issues, appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction because the record “is very vague concerning telephone calls” made to the complainant and there is no evidence regarding the dates, number times, or content of the telephone calls or the identity of the callers. Appellant asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that he had the required criminal intent or that he was responsible for making the complainant’s telephone ring repeatedly, which is the provision of the harassment statute under which he was convicted. “A person commits the offense of harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another, he . . . causes the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or makes repeated telephone communications anonymously or in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(a)(4) (Vernon 2003). The mere act of “making repeated telephone calls is not, by its nature, criminal, nor is it a criminal act merely because of the circumstances during which it is conducted.” Blount v. State, 961 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d). Rather, the making of repeated telephone calls is a criminal act if “the actor wants to cause the result of harassing or annoying his victim.” Id. A defendant is “criminally responsible for the crime of telephone harassment only when he intended, that is, consciously desired, the result of his actions.” Id. The defendant’s intent “may be inferred from circumstantial evidence,” including evidence of the defendant’s “words, actions, and conduct.” Id. The complainant testified that, after discussing the possibility of a business relationship with appellant, appellant’s behavior changed and he became very frustrated and irritated, he reprimanded and criticized her, and he solicited her students. After she confronted appellant during a telephone conversation, the conversation became “very heated and ugly,” and there was then “a lot of hang up and call back.” Because appellant was “very upset and angry,” the complainant finally told appellant that she was “done,” and she ended the conversation. Appellant then called her back, and although she again told him not to contact her further, he told her that she had no “authority” to stop his calls, in part because she was a woman. Appellant subsequently continued to make telephone calls to the complainant. She did not answer the first four of this series of telephone calls, but answered the fifth telephone call, in which appellant engaged in a “real ugly” conversation, and the complainant, feeling “frazzled” and “unraveled,” hung up her telephone. Appellant then sent to the complainant correspondence expressing both love and hate for her. Sufficiently disturbed by appellant’s behavior, she wrote to him a “cease and desist letter” instructing him to stop all contact with her. Yet, appellant “called many times throughout the weekend” and left “several messages.” The complainant, who was purposefully avoiding answering her telephone, mistakenly answered it on one occasion, and appellant, who was the caller, told her that he would be at her studio the next morning to observe. The complainant again told appellant to stop all contact, but he subsequently sent the complainant threatening correspondence, which prompted her to seek assistance from the Pearland Police Department. The complainant also blocked appellant’s telephone number on her cellular telephone, but she continued to receive several “unavailable” and anonymous telephone calls at “all hours.” She explained that she felt alarmed, frightened, and threatened by appellant’s repeated telephone calls. The State introduced into evidence several disturbing letters sent by appellant to the complainant as well as the complainant’s cease and desist letter, in which she referenced appellant’s threatening telephone calls and messages. Officer Arnold, who interviewed appellant, testified that appellant admitted to him that he had contacted the complainant by telephone after she had told him to stop and after having received the cease and desist letter because “he was in love.” Arnold opined that appellant was a danger to the complainant. Although appellant testified that he had not threatened the complainant, his testimony was rife with inconsistencies. On cross-examination, appellant conceded that he had contacted the complainant, including contact by telephone, after receiving her cease and desist letter, explaining that he believed he “had absolute freedom to talk and write.” The testimony of the complainant, Officer Arnold, and appellant, along with the documentary evidence, support the jury’s findings that, on the date charged, appellant made repeated telephone calls to the complainant with the required criminal intent. The complainant’s testimony reveals that it was appellant who repeatedly called her because he left messages, which were threatening. The complainant also testified that at one point she received a series of five telephone calls, and, when she answered the fifth call, it was appellant who identified himself as the caller. The complainant was alarmed and threatened by appellant’s repeated telephone calls and contacts. Although appellant denied intending to threaten or harass the complainant in making the telephone calls, the jury was free to reject appellant’s testimony and find that he lacked credibility. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. The State also presented the jury with a significant amount of documentary evidence from which the jury could have inferred appellant’s intent to harass and threaten the complainant. See Blount, 961 S.W.2d at 284. The jury could have reasonably concluded that the contents of the documentary evidence established that appellant presented a danger to the complainant. Although the State did not present evidence of the exact time and number of each one of the telephone calls made by appellant to the complainant, the State provided evidence of the time frame of the calls as occurring throughout February 2008. The complainant also testified as to the content of the alarming telephone calls. In sum, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. Moreover, viewing all of the evidence in a neutral light, both for and against the finding, we conclude that the evidence is not so obviously weak as to make the jury’s verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, nor is the proof of guilt against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The jury was free to reject appellant’s testimony that his telephone contacts with the complainant were made in conjunction with a legitimate business relationship and instead reasonably find that appellant intended to harass and alarm the complainant with his repeated telephone calls. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Terry Jennings Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Hanks, and Bland. Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).