Nathan J. Snowden v. Linda Garcia and Risse Owens

Opinion issued February 18, 2010 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas NO. 01-08-00687-CV NATHAN SNOWDEN, Appellant V. RISSIE OWENS AND LINDA GARCIA, Appellees On Appeal from the 412th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 48329 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Nathan Snowden appeals the trial court’s judgment dismissing his case with prejudice. Snowden filed suit against two employees of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles alleging that they violated his rights in denying him parole. Snowden prayed for a declaratory judgment, a court order, and a permanent injunction requiring the Board of Pardons and Paroles to follow certain procedures in evaluating his eligibility for parole in the future. The trial court dismissed Snowden’s claims with prejudice because he “failed to state a cause of action as a matter of law.” In two issues, Snowden challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his case and the fact that the trial court dismissed it with prejudice. We modify the trial court’s judgment to show dismissal without prejudice, and we affirm the judgment as modified. Background In 1991, Snowden was convicted of murder. He is currently incarcerated at the Darrington Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). In May 2008, Snowden filed suit, pro se, against Rissie Owens and Linda Garcia, employees of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. Snowden asserted claims under sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of title 42 of the United States Code. Specifically, Snowden alleged the following: Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 for violation of Plaintiff’s right by conspiring to, and arbitrarily and capriciously denying Plaintiff parole through the retroactive use of law, policies, guidelines and procedures that were not in effect when Plaintiff’s commitment offense was committed that makes it harder for Plaintiff to make parole, use of racial discrimination to deny Plaintiff parole, retaliation for Plaintiff’s legal activities, a failure to supervise and train, and a violation of Texas law in reviewing Plaintiff for parole. Snowden filed unsworn declarations of inability to pay costs and his previous filings. In his declaration of previous filings, Snowden disclosed that he had filed only one lawsuit during his incarceration, and he described the claims as: “unconstitutional parole policies, procedures, denial of due process in parole review, ex post facto application of parole law, unconstitutional parole guidelines.” Snowden also filed a motion for in camera inspection, in which he asked the trial court to order Owens and Garcia to file essentially all records regarding parole decisions since January 2004.[1] The appellate record does not disclose whether Owens and Garcia were served or responded.[2] On July 23, 2008, the trial court dismissed Snowden’s case with prejudice because he “failed to state a cause of action.” Standard of Review We generally review a trial court’s dismissal of an inmate’s suit under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code for abuse of discretion. See Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice—Institutional Div., 33 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). We will affirm a dismissal under any correct legal theory applicable to the case. See Birdo v. DeBose, 819 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex. App.—Waco 1991, no writ). Inmate Litigation Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs inmate litigation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.001–.014 (Vernon 2002). When an inmate files an unsworn declaration of inability to pay, the trial court has broad discretion to dismiss the suit as frivolous or malicious. Id. § 14.003(a)(2); Lentworth v. Trahan, 981 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.). In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, a trial court may consider whether (1) the claim’s realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Id. § 14.003(b)(1)–(4). An inmate seeking to proceed in forma pauperis must file a separate affidavit or declaration describing each suit the inmate has previously filed pro se, other than a suit under the Family Code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004 (Vernon 2002). The affidavit or declaration must (a) describe the operative facts for which relief was sought; (b) list the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was brought; (c) identify each party named in the suit; and (d) state the result of the suit, including whether the suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious. Id. § 14.004(a)(2). These requirements were enacted to allow the trial court to determine whether an inmate’s present claim is similar to a previously-filed claim. See Clark v. J.W. Estelle Unit, 23 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (stating that “[t]he purpose of section 14.004 is to curb the constant, often duplicative, inmate litigation, by requiring the inmate to notify the trial court of previous litigation and the outcome”). In addition, the affidavit or declaration relating to previous filings must be accompanied by a certified copy of the inmate’s trust account statement. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.004(c), 14.006(f) (Vernon 2002). Dismissal In his first issue, Snowden argues that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his suit for failure to state a claim. Under Chapter 14, dismissal of Snowden’s suit was not an abuse of discretion because it was substantially similar to a previous claim and because Snowden did not file a copy of his inmate trust account statement. Substantially Similar to Previous Claim Snowden’s declaration of previous filings showed one prior lawsuit for “unconstitutional parole policies, procedures, denial of due process in parole review, ex post facto application of parole law, unconstitutional parole guidelines.” These are the same kinds of claims that he raised in this case. Snowden did not describe the operative facts or the outcome of the previous litigation. In Clark, this Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim because Clark’s affidavit of previous filings did not state the operative facts for which he sought relief in prior suits and, thus, did not satisfy the requirements of section 14.004. Clark, 23 S.W.3d at 422. “As such, we must assume the suit is substantially similar to a previously filed suit by the inmate, and is, therefore, frivolous.” Id. Similarly, Snowden’s declaration of previous filings did not satisfy the requirements of section 14.004, because it did not state the operative facts or outcome of his prior suit. Moreover, it described claims similar to those brought in this suit. Dismissing Snowden’s case under these circumstances was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. See id. No Trust Account Statement In addition, Snowden did not file the inmate trust account statement required by Section 14.004(c). “Chapter 14 does not provide an inmate with the right to file a suit without the trust account statement, no matter the reason that the inmate has not provided it.” Jedkins v. Varghese, No. 14-08-00895-CV, 2009 WL 5149877, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 31, 2009, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Thus, we hold that Snowden’s suit was subject to dismissal for noncompliance with the statutory requirements for inmate suits filed in forma pauperis.[3] See Williams v. Brown, 33 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Jedkins, 2009 WL 5149877, at *2; Mullins v. Schumacher, No. 09-03-497-CV, 2004 WL 1299991, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 10, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Snowden’s case.[4] We overrule Snowden’s first issue. Dismissal with Prejudice In his second issue, Snowden contends that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his case with prejudice. A dismissal with prejudice constitutes an adjudication on the merits and operates as if the case had been fully tried and decided. Ritchey v. Vasquez, 986 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex. 1999); Williams, 33 S.W.3d at 412; Lentworth, 981 S.W.2d at 722; Jedkins, 2009 WL 5149877, at *3. In Lentworth, this Court said: Dismissal is properly made with prejudice in the following situations: (1) as a sanction for abuse of discovery, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 215; (2) on the failure of a plaintiff to amend deficient pleadings when given that opportunity, see Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi, 564 S.W.2d 816, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.); (3) for the violation of a pretrial order, see Koslow’s v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. 1990); and (4) on agreement of the parties, see generally Golodetz Trading Corp. v. Curland, 886 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (allowing that parties could agree to dismiss suit with prejudice). Lentworth, 981 S.W.2d at 722–23. None of these factors is present in this case, and the proper order is dismissal without prejudice. See Williams, 33 S.W.3d at 412 (reforming judgment dismissing case based on failure to comply with Chapter 14 to show dismissal without prejudice); Lentworth, 981 S.W.2d at 723 (reforming judgment dismissing case with no arguable basis in law to show dismissal without prejudice); Mullins, 2004 WL 1299991, at *3 (reforming judgment dismissing case for failure to file inmate trust account statement to show dismissal without prejudice); contra Cain v. Tx. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 104 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (affirming dismissal with prejudice because case had no arguable basis in law). Conclusion We modify the trial court’s judgment to state that Snowden’s case is dismissed without prejudice. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. Michael Massengale Justice Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Sharp, and Massengale. [1] Snowden requested the trial court order the defendants to file “a copy of the Plaintiff’s parole file and any other records concerning Plaintiff and parole held by the Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,” “all records concerning denial or release on parole of all prisoners by race in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice from January 2004 to present,” “all their records showing how they voted for prisoners in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice concerning denial or granting release on parole by race,” “all the records of all the Parole Board members and commissioners concerning the granting or denial of release by race since January 2004 to present.” [2] The appellate record shows no responses or motions filed by Owens or Garcia in the trial court. Similarly, Owens and Garcia filed no brief in our Court. [3] In his brief, Snowden argues, “In the instant case, the Appellant correctly named all defendants and complied with all the rules governing the filing of in forma pauperis suits in state court.” The appellate record does not substantiate this statement. [4] Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Snowden’s case, we need not address whether Snowden’s claims have an arguable basis in law.