Joe Martinez Natal v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS, AT AUSTIN NO. 3-90-141-CR JOE MARTINEZ NATAL, APPELLANT vs. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY, 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. CR-89-419, HONORABLE CARL C. ANDERSON, JUDGE This appeal is taken from a conviction for aggravated assault. After the jury found the appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment. The court found the enhancement of punishment allegations in the indictment as to two prior felony convictions to be "true," and assessed appellant's punishment at sixty (60) years' imprisonment. Appellant advances nine points of error. After considering each one, we will affirm the judgment of conviction. Our discussion will not necessarily follow the order in which the points are found in appellant's brief. In his second point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to strike the jury panel for the case on the ground that it did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. A violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution occurs where underrepresentation of a distinctive group in the community results from a systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 41 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975). Appellant urges that he established by the testimony of a county commissioner that the population of Hays County was 35 per cent Hispanic, and that only 18 per cent of the jury panel or venire were Hispanic. He asserts that he has a Spanish surname. Absent a showing of opportunity or method for the systematic exclusion of a distinctive racial or ethnic group, a disparity between ethnic composition of the county generally and that of the jury panel does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. May v. State, 738 S.W.2d 261, 269 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1988). Thus, a disproportionate representation in a single jury panel does not demonstrate the systematic exclusion of distinctive groups in violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 269. Here, as in May, the testimony shows that the panel was selected from a computerized list of registered voters. No opportunity or method for systematic exclusion was shown. In support of his contention, appellant cites only Seubert v. State, 787 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Cr. App. 1990), which is not on point. Seubert held that a defendant in a criminal case does not have a Sixth Amendment right to a petit jury representing a fair cross-section of the community. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Holland v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 803 (1990), carefully distinguished the difference between the fair cross-section requirement applied to a venire from which the petit jury is drawn and the makeup of the petit jury itself. Appellant argues that the evidence shows that the jury wheel was filled only with the names of registered voters, although article 35.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the use of the names of persons having valid driver's licenses. Article 35.07 deals only with a challenge to the array. It has nothing to do with the source of names to be placed in the jury wheel. Current voter registration lists from all precincts in the county must be used in the annual reconstitution of the jury. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 62.001(b) (Supp. 1991). The use of voter registration lists alone for jury duty has been approved, unless it results in the systematic exclusion of a cognizable group or class of qualified citizens. See United States v. Dangler, 422 F.2d 344, 345 (5th Cir. 1970); Granniel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 120 (Tex. Cr. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); Mead v. State, 759 S.W.2d 437, 445 (Tex. App. 1988, no pet.). Appellant apparently meant to rely upon another portion of the Government Code. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 62.001(c) (Supp. 1991). This provision authorizes as an additional source of names for jury duty the use of names of citizens holding valid Texas driver's licenses. Section 62.001(c) is not applicable in the instant case for two reasons. First, under the statute the use of such names is discretionary with the commissioners court and the district judges having jurisdiction in the county. The evidence reflects no approval by these authorities of the use of such names. Second, the statute was not shown to be applicable to Hays County. By its very terms the statute applies only to a county in which the municipality with the largest population is located in more than one county. Appellant further argues that the evidence shows a recognized pattern of avoidance of jury service by a refusal to register to vote. He then merely asserts that the practice is most prevalent among Hispanic citizens. Those who do not register to vote are not a cognizable group or class. Mead, 759 S.W.2d at 445; Phillips v. State, 654 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. App. 1983, no pet.). Appellant has failed to demonstrate purposeful and systematic exclusion of a cognizable group in the jury selection process. We overrule point of error number two. In point of error number three, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he used "a metal object" in the commission of the offense as alleged in the indictment. The complaining witness, Benjamin Gaytan, was married to Patricia Salinas on October 30, 1986. At the time, Patricia already had a son from an earlier relationship with the appellant Natal. After the marriage, Patricia had a baby girl. Patricia claimed at trial that this child was also the appellant's child. After the appellant was released on parole from prison, he sought to resume his relationship with Patricia. Obvious tensions arose. Patricia separated from Gaytan and moved in with the appellant. After an altercation with the appellant on November 6, 1989, Patricia went to the hospital. Upon leaving the hospital, she had a conversation with Gaytan and asked him to pick her up the next morning when she completed her night shift at a local nursing home. The next morning Gaytan and the little girl arrived at the nursing home. Gaytan parked in the rear of the building and waited in the car with his seat belt buckled. When Patricia came out of the building, the evidence reflects that the appellant ran from some bushes, opened the car door and began to stab Gaytan. Gaytan related that the appellant stated: "Here is where I wanted to finish you off. You're the one I was going to kill." Later on direct examination, the record reflects: Q. Okay, Did he stab you once or more than once? A. I didn't count them, but it was approximately 12-15. Q. Okay. And were you able to see what he was stabbing you with? A. I saw something. It looked like a screwdriver or an icepick. A. Was it -- do you know whether or not it was definitely a metal object? A. Yes. Q. Okay. And what was the defendant doing with this metal object? A. He was hitting me with it or -- Q. Was he stabbing you with it? A. Stabbing, yeah. On the cross-examination of Gaytan; the record reflects: Q. So you didn't see what he stabbed you with? A. Yes. I did see something metal. I mean it was something made out of metal -- something metal. Q. Did it have a handle? A. I just saw the metal part of it. Q. What was he holding? A. It looked like a screwdriver or an icepick. I am not sure. But it was metal -- it was something made out of metal. Dr. John Whisenant testified that he treated Benjamin Gaytan in the emergency room of the Central Texas Medical Center on November 7, 1989, at about 8 a.m. He found Gaytan to be suffering from numerous puncture wounds around his face, neck, and chest. Dr. Whisenant described wounds above and below an eye, a wound to the nose which went through the right nostril into the nasal passage, and wounds to the armpit area, the side of the chest and to the back. The doctor related that the wounds were consistent with having been made by a screwdriver or some other metal-like object. Jurors are the triers of fact, the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Tex. Code Cr. P. Ann. art. 38.04 (1979). The jury is entitled to accept or reject all or any part of the testimony by the witnesses for the State and accused. Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987). Reconciliation of evidentiary conflicts is solely a function of the trier of fact. Bowden v. State, 628 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Cr. App. 1982). The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 n.12 (1979); Valdez v. State, 776 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex. Cr. App. 1989); Dickey v. State, 693 S.W.2d 386, 387 (Tex. Cr. App. 1984). The standard for review is the same in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex. Cr. App. 1986). We conclude, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, that any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the offense charged, including the allegation that the complaining witness was stabbed with a "metal object." We overrule point of error number three. In the initial point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, the testimony of Dr. John Whisenant. Appellant argues that the trial court had ordered the State to furnish him a list of State's witnesses at least seven days prior to trial; that the State had not complied with the order with regard to Dr. Whisenant; and that his objection on this basis should have been sustained. The State conceded to the trial court that Whisenant's name was not on the first subpoena list, but noted that in a pretrial conference the prosecutor gave appellant's counsel a copy of the medical records signed by Dr. Whisenant, and informed counsel that the doctor would be called as a State's witness. The State further noted that Dr. Whisenant's name was on the second subpoena list filed in the court during the week before the trial. Appellant's counsel disputed that he had been informed Whisenant would be a witness, but acknowledged he had received the medical records six days before trial. The State countered with the observation that seven days had elapsed before the witness was called to testify. The trial court overruled the objection and permitted the doctor to testify. The names of witnesses should be disclosed upon proper motion of the defendant if they will be used by the State at any stage of the trial. Richardson v. State, 744 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987); Hightower v. State, 629 S.W.2d 920, 925 (Tex. Cr. App. 1981). If a witness, whose name is not on a witness list furnished the defendant, is permitted to testify, the standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the witness to testify. Bridge v. State, 726 S.W.2d 558, 566-67 (Tex. Cr. App. 1986). Factors to be considered in determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred include whether the prosecutor in bad faith failed to disclose, ahead of time, the name of the witness, and whether the defendant could have reasonably anticipated that the witness would testify despite the absence of his name on any witness list. Richardson, 744 S.W.2d at 77; Bridge, 726 S.W.2d at 567; see also Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 15 (Tex. Cr. App. 1989). In the instant case there was no showing of any bad faith on the part of the prosecutor and ample evidence to show that the appellant could have reasonably anticipated the calling of Dr. Whisenant as a witness. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. We overule the first point of error. In his eighth point of error, appellant urges that the trial court erred in denying a motion for a mistrial when, during trial, it was disclosed that the complaining witness had been treated by a second medical doctor on the day of the alleged offense and that this doctor might have provided testimony beneficial to the defense regarding the nature and cause of the injury to the complaining witness. Dr. Whisenant's testimony revealed that after treatment in the emergency room of the Central Texas Medical Center, he had sent the complaining witness to the office of a Dr. Tomaneng for further treatment of the most serious injury, a wound to the nose and nose cavity. At this point in the trial, appellant moved for a mistrial because the State had failed to reveal the Tomameng report in violation of the court's order to disclose exculpatory evidence. The State responded that it did not possess any such report and that the evidence was not exculpatory. The court overruled the mistrial motion. Appellant did not move for a continuance or request a subpoena for Dr. Tomaneng. Appellant merely states what occurred. He does not present argument or cite any authority. In such a case, nothing is presented for review. See Beaubrum v. State, 735 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. App. 1987, pet. ref'd). See also Foster v. State, 779 S.W.2d 845, 864 (Tex. Cr. App. 1989). Point of error number eight is overruled. In point of error number seven, appellant contends that the trial court erred "by permitting the State to discuss before the jury, after objection by appellant, the affidavit of non-prosecution signed by Patricia Gaytan." Appellant fails to set forth the facts pertinent to such point and makes no reference to the pages where the same may be found in the record. He cites no authorities. Appellant has not complied with the requisites of argument in an appellate brief. See Tex. R. App. P. Ann. 74(f) (Pamph. 1991). The only argument presented under this point relates to the State's failure to comply with a granted motion for exculpatory evidence and to deliver the affidavit to appellant until after the trial had commenced. Appellant claims the State's action damaged his ability to prepare adequately for trial. This argument is at odds with the stated point of error. We overrule the seventh point of error. Appellant, in his sixth point of error, contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the admission into evidence of a police investigatory statement signed by Patricia Gaytan. Appellant makes only a general statement in support of such contention, claiming a denial of due process in violation of the federal and state constitutions. He does not refer to the page number of the record on which his objection may be found or on which the statement was admitted into evidence. Appellant does not tell us the nature of his objection or identify the statement's exhibit number. He cites no case law. He has not complied with the briefing rules. See Tex. R. App. P. Ann. 74(f) (Pamph. 1991). It appears the contention may well relate to the State's impeachment of its own witness. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. Ann. 607 (Pamph. 1991); Bell v. State, 768 S.W.2d 790, 803 (Tex. App. 1989, pet. ref'd). Neither party briefs the contention along these lines, and nothing is presented for review. We overrule the sixth point of error. Appellant, in his fifth point of error, contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion in arrest of judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. Ann. 33, 34 (Pamph. 1991). In the point of error itself, appellant states the motion "was premised on the grounds that because of inclusion of a juror who was not truthful during voir dire and at the hearing on appellant's motion in arrest of judgment, the jury was illegally composed." Rule 33 provides: (a) Definition. A motion in arrest of judgment is an oral or written suggestion to the trial court by an accused that judgment was not rendered against him in accordance with law for reasons stated in the motion. (b) Grounds. A motion may state a reason that is a ground provided for an exception to substance of an indictment or information or that in relation to the indictment or information a verdict is defective in substance, or any other reason that renders the judgment invalid. (Emphasis supplied.) Rule 34(a) provides: (a) Time to Make. A motion in arrest of judgment, if made, may be made prior to, or shall be made within thirty days after, date sentence is imposed or suspended in open court. (Emphasis supplied.) Sentence was imposed on March 29, 1990. The record shows that on May 3, 1990, appellant's counsel telephoned the trial judge requesting a hearing on his motion in arrest of judgment. A hearing was set for June 11, 1990. At such hearing it was discovered that no oral or written motion or suggestion had been timely made stating reasons to arrest the judgment. Appellant did not comply with Rules 33 and 34. The trial court, upon the request of the appellant and at the suggestion of the State, agreed to conduct an evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court overruled the motion. The Rules make no provision for late filing or amendment of a motion in arrest of judgment, even with leave of court. See and cf. Port v. State, 798 S.W.2d 839, 846-47 (Tex. App. 1990, pet. ref'd); see also Drew v. State, 743 S.W.2d 207, 222-23 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987). The right to move for or to amend a motion in arrest of judgment is purely statutory. The remedy must be pursued in the manner prescribed by the statute or rule. Drew, 743 S.W.2d at 223. Further, if the trial court conducts a hearing on an untimely presented motion in arrest of judgment, the evidentiary hearing will not be considered on appeal. See Hadnot v. State, 310 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Cr. App. 1958); McNatt v. State, 91 S.W.2d 1068, 1070 (Tex. Cr. App. 1936); cf. Schneider v. State, 594 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980); Groh v. State, 725 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex. App. 1986, pet. ref'd). We find nothing in Rule 33 or 34 that calls for an interpretation different from cases decided under former statutes. Even if the evidentiary hearing could be considered, it is clear the trial court as trier of fact did not abuse its discretion. The evidence did not support appellant's contentions. Point of error number five is overruled. The fourth point of error advances the contention that the "commitment" (1) found in the record is fatally defective in that it reflects appellant entered a plea of guilty when in fact he entered a plea of not guilty. The judgment and sentence reflect the proper plea. It is only the commitment that contains the complained-of error. The State acknowledges the clerical error and requests reformation. This Court has the power to correct and reform the commitment of the court below to make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so, and to make any appropriate order "as the law and the nature of the case may require." See Tex. R. App. P. Ann. 80(b) and (c) (Pamph. 1991). See also Lujan v. State, 664 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. App. 1983, no pet.). The commitment issued by the clerk is reformed to reflect that the appellant entered a plea of not guilty. We overrule point of error number four. In his ninth point of error, appellant complains the trial court erred in permitting the substitution of evidence in the appellate record without giving him notice and affording him a hearing. The record shows that after the assault, the complaining witness freed himself from the car seat belt. He obtained the hand gun he had been carrying, and fired it into the air or in the direction in which the appellant had fled. The police recovered the gun. It was introduced into evidence as State's exhibit number 2. The trial judge was a visiting judge. Sometime after the trial, the State filed a written motion requesting to substitute a photograph of the gun in question for State's exhibit number 2, and to withdraw the gun so that it could be returned to the complaining witness. The motion was presented ex parte to the "regular" judge of the court, who granted the motion. The State agrees the ex parte procedure was improper, but urges that the gun does not relate to any issue on appeal. The ex parte procedure was improper. Appellant should have been given notice and afforded an opportunity to be heard on the motion. The gun does not appear to relate to any other issue on appeal. Appellant fails to point out just how he is harmed on appeal by having a photograph in the record rather than the actual weapon. We will overrule the ninth point of error. The judgment is affirmed. John F. Onion, Jr. Justice [Before Justices Powers, Aboussie and Onion*] Affirmed Filed: July 24, 1991 [Do Not Publish] * Before John F. Onion, Jr., Presiding Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(b) (1988). 1. See Tex. Code Cr. P. Ann. art. 42.09(3) (Supp. 1991).