Walter G. Grossman and Georgia S. Grossman, Individually and as Representatives and Next Friends of Sidney Joseph Grossman, a Minor, and Representatives and Heirs at Law of the Estate of Samuel David Grossman, & Beverly G. Reeves, Attorney v. Ciba Pharmaceutical Company, a Division of Ciba-Geigy Corporation, W. Wayne Grant, M.D., Allen Sonstein, M.D. and J. Douglas Hudson, M.D.

grossman v ciba IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS, AT AUSTIN NO. 3-91-207-CV WALTER G. GROSSMAN AND GEORGIA S. GROSSMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES AND NEXT FRIENDS OF SIDNEY JOSEPH GROSSMAN, A MINOR, AND AS REPRESENTATIVES AND HEIRS AT LAW OF THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL DAVID GROSSMAN, DECEASED AND BEVERLY G. REEVES, ATTORNEY, APPELLANTS vs. CIBA PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY, A DIVISION OF CIBA-GEIGY CORPORATION, W. WAYNE GRANT, M.D., ALLEN SONSTEIN, M.D. AND J. DOUGLAS HUDSON, M.D., APPELLEES FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 261ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 454,281, HONORABLE PAUL R. DAVIS, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING The Grossmans appeal the trial court's judgment, asserting in five points of error that the court erred by refusing to strike two jury panel members for cause, thereby forcing the Grossmans to exercise two peremptory challenges and then accept an objectionable juror when they had no strikes remaining. The Guardian Ad Litem for Sidney Grossman ("the Guardian") appeals the amount of compensation awarded her and the allocation of her fee. Appellees complain by cross-point that no fees should have been assessed against them as the prevailing parties at trial. We will affirm the trial court's judgment. The Grossmans brought a wrongful death and survival action against appellees based upon alleged negligence, breach of warranty, and other acts that resulted in the death of Samuel Grossman. During the voir dire, the Grossmans challenged two members of the jury panel on the ground that they were biased and therefore must be excused for cause. The trial court overruled the challenges and permitted the two members to remain on the panel. During voir dire, Mary Weir Ziegler volunteered that a few months earlier her husband had received a monetary award from Ciba Pharmaceutical Company, a defendant in the lawsuit, but that this fact had no bearing on her or her jury service. She admitted she might "lean" toward the medical profession since both she and her husband were biochemists and he worked with doctors. She explained that she "could be fair about it" and that she revealed this information merely to be honest about her background. She answered "probably" when asked whether she would "tend to perhaps give" Ciba's experts more credibility. By this she meant that she had no prejudice against drug manufacturers and that "chemical" was not a bad word in her mind. She insisted that her husband's connection with Ciba and the drug industry would not affect her, that she could be a fair juror, and that she could decide the case based upon the evidence at trial. Ziegler stressed that as a juror she would attempt to balance her personal feelings, which as a parent included sympathies for the Grossmans. The parties also questioned Ziegler about her views concerning a bystander's right to recover damages. She disagreed that the law should impose liability for emotional harm suffered by anyone who viewed an accident. The court informed her that Texas law does not allow such a wide-ranging theory of recovery. She candidly expressed independent opinions on theories of liability and on damages and stated that she would need psychiatric evidence in order to award damages for emotional distress. Her answers reflected some confusion as to the jury's role in deciding the law. After the court informed her that the jury decides only factual issues and the court would determine all legal matters, she expressed confidence that she could answer the questions posed in the jury charge based upon the evidence without regard to the effect of her answers. Susan Abold, the second jury panelist at issue, stated that her father had been a doctor who conducted drug research, which might influence her, but she thought she could be objective. Her sympathies lay with the appellees but she felt she could overcome these tendencies and be objective. She once referred to herself as biased, yet several times she agreed that she could base her decision as a juror on the evidence presented at trial. She expressed general concern about a liability crisis involving ever-increasing damages awarded to plaintiffs. However, when asked if she could award appellants the amount of damages proven by the evidence, even five million dollars, she answered that she could. She further stressed that her concerns about high damage awards would not affect her treatment of liability issues. The trial court awarded each side, including appellants, two additional peremptory challenges, for a total of eight. Before exercising the challenges, appellants again requested that the court excuse the two jurors for cause. Appellants further suggested the court do so and then reduce the peremptory challenges to six. Upon the denial of their challenges for cause, the Grossmans informed the court that they would use two peremptory challenges to remove Ziegler and Abold. They further asserted that two panel members they found objectionable, Foley and DeLeon, would remain on the panel after their peremptory challenges were exhausted. Foley subsequently served on the jury. The trial court again refused to excuse Abold and Ziegler, and appellants then used their two additional challenges on these two panelists. After trial, pursuant to the jury's verdict, the court rendered a take-nothing judgment against the Grossmans. The Grossmans complain of the court's refusal to excuse Ziegler and Abold for cause. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 228. By statute, a person is disqualified from jury service if he "has a bias or prejudice in favor or against a party in the case." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 62.105(4) (West Supp. 1992). One may be disqualified due to a bias or prejudice against the subject matter of the litigation, as well. Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. 1963). Prejudice is defined as prejudgment, including bias. Id. at 182. Bias reflects an inclination toward one side of an issue but does not constitute a disqualification unless "the state of mind of the juror leads to the natural inference that he will not or did not act with impartiality." Id. A jury panelist may be biased so as to be disqualified as a matter of law. If so, the court has no discretion and must dismiss the panelist. Id. When disqualification is not conclusively established as a matter of law, whether a panelist is biased or prejudiced is a factual determination for the trial court and it is within the court's discretion to find whether bias nonetheless exists. Swap Shop v. Fortune, 365 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex. 1963). When a court fails to find bias, the question on appeal is whether it capriciously disregarded the competent evidence. Sullemon v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 734 S.W.2d 10, 14-15 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ). Appellate courts must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling below. Compton, 364 S.W.2d at 182; Sullemon, 734 S.W.2d at 15; Gum v. Schaefer, 683 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1984, no writ). In order to preserve error for refusal to excuse a panelist for cause, a party must advise the court, prior to exercising its peremptory challenges, that it will exhaust these challenges and thereafter specific, objectionable jurors will remain. Hallett v. Houston Northwest Medical Ctr., 689 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. 1985). Appellees claim that the Grossmans' failure to comply with procedural requirements prevents us from reaching the merits of their appeal. First, they insist that a party must specify in which order it would have used its peremptory challenges upon the objectionable jurors who remain on the panel as a result of the denial of its motion to excuse others for cause. Specifically, they argue the Grossmans should have designated whether they found DeLeon or Foley more objectionable. Appellees cite no authority supporting such a contention. Indeed, in Sullemon, one court of appeals refused to add any requirements to those outlined by the supreme court in Hallett. It stated that the complaining party need not request additional challenges nor give reasons why it finds the potential jurors who remain objectionable. Sullemon, 734 S.W.2d at 13-14. Next, appellees contend that even if the trial court erred, this action was rendered harmless by the unanimous verdict returned by the jury. Even if Foley had not been on the jury, they argue, at least an 11-to-1 verdict in their favor would still have been returned. They cite two recent cases that suggest such reasoning is valid, Galvan v. Aetna Casualty Insurance Co., 831 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1992, writ denied) and Beavers v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 669, 681 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1991, writ denied). Both cases used this logic as an alternate ground for their holdings, citing Palmer Well Services, Inc. v. Mac Trucks, Inc., 776 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1989), in which the supreme court found as a matter of law that harmful error existed when a juror who had been indicted for a felony was incorrectly allowed to serve and a 10-to-2 verdict was returned. Id. at 577. Palmer, however, did not hold that error in failing to exclude jurors for cause is always harmless when a jury returns a unanimous verdict. It merely pointed out that without the disqualified panelist the remaining nine qualified jurors could not have returned a verdict. Furthermore, Palmer involved the clear situation where disqualification was based on a panelist's felony indictment, and the harmless error doctrine might arguably apply if a unanimous verdict were involved. When a juror should have been excluded for bias or prejudice, however, an absence of harm simply cannot be assumed where the biased juror may assert influence over other members of the jury, even though the fact may not be shown. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 327(b). Assuming the Grossmans' complaint of error is preserved, the question is whether Ziegler and Abold should have been excused for cause. Several cases have involved similar questions of suggested bias. Such was the situation in McBroom v. Brown, 277 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.--Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The juror at issue said at one point he could not render a fair and impartial verdict, yet elsewhere insisted he could follow the evidence to reach an appropriate result. The court held that a question of fact was presented by such conflicting answers and therefore the lower court's ruling must be upheld. Id. at 313. In Sullemon, a juror professed that he might not follow the court's legal definition of "total incapacity" but later said he would try to disregard this tendency when examining the evidence. 734 S.W.2d at 16. In Ratcliff v. Bruce, 423 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [14th Dist.], writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 848 (1968), a potential juror in a lawsuit against several physicians was herself the wife of a doctor. The court found she was qualified to serve when she insisted she would be honest and fair. Compton, the seminal Texas case on bias, involved a juror who disapproved of anyone who sued to recover for an injury, insisting that he himself would "grin and bear it." 364 S.W.2d 179. Nevertheless, the trial court refused to excuse him for cause and the supreme court overturned the appellate court's holding that he was disqualified. In examining the record, we decline to hold that either panelist was proven to be biased as a matter of law. Further, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, neither was the trial court's failure to find them biased or prejudiced contrary to the evidence so as to constitute an abuse of its discretion. Both gave conflicting answers when asked whether they could judge the case fairly. Although the trial court observed that Abold was "close to the line" of disqualification, it was better able to observe the panelists' demeanor and reactions to the questions asked and determine their ability to serve impartially. We overrule the Grossmans' five points of error, all of which relate to the issue of bias. In a single point of error, the Guardian appeals the trial court's award of her fee, assessed as a court cost. She first complains that the amount awarded her, $10,000, was insufficient to compensate her for her work. She asks that this Court award her $88,000, the amount she claims to be the value of her effort. The fee awarded a guardian ad litem lies within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned unless a clear abuse of discretion is apparent from the record. Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Tex. 1987); Celanese Chem. Co., Inc. v. Burleson, 821 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The issue is not whether the appellate court agrees with the amount or would have awarded a greater sum, but whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion. We cannot say that the record reflects an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. A guardian ad litem represents a minor only where its parents' interests diverge from its own. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 24 (Tex. 1992). The trial court therefore determined that the sum of $10,000 adequately compensated the Guardian for the time spent in pursuance of her duty to represent a minor to the extent the minor's interest was adverse to its parents and may have determined a portion of the Guardian's work concerned matters which presented no such conflict. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 173. The Guardian complains that the only "evidence" before the court was her own assessment of the value of her time and in effect argues that the court was bound to accept and rule in accordance with her testimony. The finder of fact may accept or agree with all, part, or none of a witness's testimony about the work performed, its necessity, and its value. The evidence, however persuasive, is not binding or dispositive of the matter. Although an appointed attorney is entitled to reasonable compensation, we know of no rule that a court-appointed ad litem must be compensated at the rate properly chargeable in other instances of employment. Granted, the trial was long and involved, and the trial court believed the Guardian's participation was valuable in reaching a just result. But the trial court may have determined that the fee awarded was commensurate with the parties' ability to pay and the result achieved. The court had witnessed the entire trial and had sufficient information upon which to base its award. Furthermore, it is well established that there need not be any evidence in the record to support the court's award of ad litem fees. Alford v. Whaley, 794 S.W.2d 920, 925 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ); Transport Ins. Co. v. Liggins, 625 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e). The Guardian also complains that the trial court erred by assessing only half of the ad litem's fee against the appellees. She would have us force the appellees, the prevailing parties, to pay the entire sum awarded her. She cites no authority supporting her contention that failure to assess all her fee against appellees constitutes error. Appellees, on the other hand, insist in their cross-point of error that as prevailing parties they should not be required to pay any ad litem fees; instead, all of her fee should be assessed against the Grossmans, as normally the losing party must pay all court costs. Tex. R. Civ. P. 131. The trial court in its discretion may assess all or part of the costs against the prevailing party as long as "good cause" exists. Tex. R. Civ. P. 141. Unless the record demonstrates an abuse of discretion, the trial court's assessment of costs for good cause should not be disturbed on appeal. Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. 1985). An appellate court should scrutinize the record to determine whether it supports the trial court's decision to tax the prevailing party with the costs. Id. We hold that the record reflects evidence from which the trial court could determine good cause existed for assessing a portion of the costs against appellees. For example, appellees originally agreed that an ad litem for the child should be appointed. Later, after the Guardian had spent significant time successfully opposing appellees' motion for summary judgment, appellees attempted to terminate her participation at trial. The court could have found that these tactics, while acceptable, required additional work by the Guardian and were thus grounds for assessing part of the ad litem costs against appellees. We overrule appellees' cross-point. For the same reasons, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the court's refusal to apportion all of the costs against the prevailing party. The lower court assessed costs equally between the parties, just as the trial court did in Rogers. The record supports this allocation. Moreover, the Guardian fails to cite authority that gives her standing to complain about which party is ordered to pay her fee. The Grossmans do not challenge by a specific point of error the award of fees against them. We overrule the Guardian's point. As we have overruled the Grossmans' points of error, we need not reach appellees' cross-points relating to other issues in the trial. The judgment is affirmed. Marilyn Aboussie, Justice [Before Justices Powers, Aboussie and B. A. Smith; Justice Powers not participating] Affirmed Filed: December 23, 1992 [Do Not Publish]