in the Matter of G. O.

Matter of G.O. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS, AT AUSTIN NO. 3-91-447-CV IN THE MATTER OF G.O., APPELLANT FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 169TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 132,441-C, HONORABLE EDWARD S. JOHNSON, JUDGE PER CURIAM Appellant G.O. appeals the district court's order revoking his probation and committing him to the Texas Youth Commission. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05 (1986 & Supp. 1992). Appellant's sole contention on appeal is that the evidence at the hearing on the State's motion to modify disposition was insufficient to sustain the revocation. We will affirm. On June 4, 1991, the district court adjudicated appellant delinquent and placed him on probation for one year. Among the conditions of probation, the court ordered appellant to commit no offense against the laws of the state of Texas. Two months later, the State moved to modify the disposition, alleging that on July 3, 1991, appellant violated this condition of his probation. Specifically, the State alleged that appellant stole a bicycle from Jim Ed Brown by threatening him and placing him in fear of imminent bodily injury. A trial court can modify the disposition of a delinquent child if, after a hearing, it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the child violated a reasonable and lawful court order. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05(f) (Supp. 1992). On appeal, the question is whether the record shows that the trial court abused its discretion in finding a violation of a condition of the probation. In the Matter of P.A.O., 530 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975, no writ); In re Cockrell, 493 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The evidence showed that on the afternoon of July 3, 1991, Jim Ed Brown and his cousin Mike Brown were riding each other's bicycles along a street in Belton. Appellant approached Mike from a house on the street and told him to get off the bike because it was his and had been stolen. Mike got off the bike, and Jim Ed picked it up, telling appellant that the bike belonged to him and that he had not stolen it from appellant. Appellant maintained that Jim Ed had stolen the bike from him and stated that if Jim Ed did not get off the bike, appellant would beat him up. Jim Ed gave the bicycle to appellant, who took it inside the house. Police Sgt. Lockaby, whom a bystander had summoned, went to the house, told appellant to bring out the bike, and took the bike and the two cousins to the police station. Later, Jim Ed Brown and his mother went to the police station where they identified the bike as belonging to Jim Ed. Jim Ed Brown stated that his grandparents had bought the bike for him about five years earlier. Jim Ed's mother, Paulette Drake, testified that her mother bought the bicycle for Jim Ed from a bicycle shop in Temple for $500.00. Though appellant told Sgt. Lockaby that his mother had reported the bike as stolen, when Lockaby searched the past stolen bicycle reports, he found no report from either appellant or his mother. Jim Ed testified that he did not give appellant permission to take his bike. Jim Ed testified that when appellant threatened to beat him up, he feared for his safety and feared that appellant would hurt him. He gave appellant the bicycle because he was afraid. Jim Ed stated that as a result of the incident, he was upset and crying. Sgt. Lockaby testified that when he arrived, Jim Ed had been crying, and looked frightened and shaken; Lockaby initially thought that Jim Ed had been in a fight. From this evidence, the trial court could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant stole a bicycle from Jim Ed Brown by threatening him and placing him in fear of bodily injury. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding, we overrule the point of error. The order of the trial court is affirmed. [Before Justices Powers, Jones and Kidd] Affirmed Filed: February 26, 1992 [Do Not Publish]