John Anthony Love v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS, AT AUSTIN NO. 3-92-538-CR JOHN ANTHONY LOVE, APPELLANT vs. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 0920544, HONORABLE JON N. WISSER, JUDGE PRESIDING Appellant was originally indicted for the offense of burglary of a building. Penal Code, 63d Leg., R. S., ch. 399, sec. 1, § 30.02, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 926 (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02, since amended). Subsequently, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the reduced offense of theft of property of the value of seven hundred fifty dollars or more but less than twenty thousand dollars. See Act of May 27, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 599, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2244, amended by Act of May 26, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 724, §§ 2,3, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 3273, 3274-76, amended by Act of Mar. 21, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 14, § 284(80), 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 42, 237, amended by Act of May 23, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 565, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2003 (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03, since amended). The trial court assessed punishment at confinement for one year in the Travis County Correctional Center. In five points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his confession. We will overrule appellant's points of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. A common thread running through all of appellant's points of error is the relationship that existed between all persons involved in the instant cause. The owner of the burglarized home, Jeanne Keel, is the ex-wife of then Travis County Assistant District Attorney Terry Keel. Appellant and his family were life-long close personal friends of Terry Keel. Co-defendant William Compeau is Jeanne Keel's brother. Informant Amy Johnson is identified as Compeau's estranged common-law wife. In his first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the confession because no probable cause existed in the affidavit to enable the magistrate to issue the search warrant. While the warrant was for appellant's arrest, and no items were seized, it appears to be appellant's position that his confession was tainted as the result of an illegal arrest. Probable cause must exist to enable a magistrate to issue a warrant of arrest. See Lowery v. State, 499 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). The affidavit for "warrant of arrest and detention" of appellant, sworn to by Detective Tommy Wooley, stated in pertinent part: Jeanne Keel reported the burglary of her residence on Great Divide in Austin on October 28, 1991; Keel related that her house was entered without her permission and a number of items (listed in the affidavit) taken; Amy Johnson gave affiant a sworn affidavit that her estranged husband, William Compeau, told her that he and appellant burglarized the Keel residence and took numerous guns, a television, VCR, and assorted jewelry; on December 10, 1991, Gene Moretka gave Detective Richard Hale a sworn statement that he purchased a Savage Arms .22 rifle (an item Jeanne Keel listed as having been taken from her house) and a Derringer .22 caliber pistol from Bill Compeau; and on December 10, 1991, Terry Keel viewed the rifle and positively identified it as the one stolen from his ex-wife's house. Warrant affidavits should be interpreted in a common sense and realistic manner and the magistrate is permitted to draw reasonable inferences. See Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 118, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1285 (1993). The magistrate is not bound by such standards as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by preponderance of the evidence; "rather his sole concern should be probability." Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927 (1989). Our review of the magistrate's determination must "afford great deference to the issuing magistrate's decision based upon the evidence as a whole." State v. Morgan, 841 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1992, no pet.). It is unnecessary for the affiant to show informants as reliable or credible where information is corroborated by other facts in the affidavit. See Griese v. State, 820 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd). Appellant, in a scholarly treatise, urges us to be the first appellate court to discard the "totality of circumstances" test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), in favor of the earlier standard of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Appellant reasons that Aguilar's somewhat more limited standard is more consistent with Tex. Const. art. I, § 9. The Court of Criminal Appeals has continued to use the Gates standard of "totality of the circumstances" in determining the existence of probable cause. See Amos v. State, 819 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). As an intermediate appellate court, we will follow the standard recognized by the Court of Criminal Appeals. In Hennessy v. State, 660 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), the named informant had no personal knowledge of any illegal substance at the defendant's residence. The basis of informant's knowledge came from statements made to him by one Barnes that Barnes had "scored" narcotics from the defendant's residence. Information detailed in the affidavit about Barnes' activities was shown to have been substantially corroborated by independent police investigation. The Hennessy court found that the informant's credibility and reliability were established because he was a named informant, and because he gave detailed information about Barnes's activities which was substantially corroborated by independent police investigation. Id. at 91. In the instant cause the affidavit shows that a named informant gave affiant an affidavit that her estranged husband, William Compeau, told her that he and appellant took property from the Keel house that corresponded with items Jeanne Keel reported stolen from her home. The affidavit also states that a named person gave a sworn statement about purchasing guns from Compeau and that Terry Keel identified one of these guns as one that was stolen from his ex-wife's house. While Compeau's admission against penal interest was hearsay upon hearsay, his admission was corroborated by police investigation that showed Compeau sold a gun taken from the Keel house. Bearing in mind that our resolution of marginal cases "should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded the warrant," we hold that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant for appellant's arrest based on the "totality of the circumstances" presented in the affidavit. Moreover, a confession, otherwise shown to have been voluntary, is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that its author was under arrest or in custody under invalid process absent a causal connection between the invalid arrest and the confession. See Barber v. State, 737 S.W.2d 824, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The Supreme Court has provided four factors to be weighed in determining whether the taint of an illegal arrest was attenuated, as follows: (1) the giving of Miranda warnings, (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest to the statement, (3) the existence of intervening circumstances, and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). In State v. Johnson, 843 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1992), aff'd, 871 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), the defendant signed a written statement six and one-half hours after his illegal warrantless arrest. While the time factors weighed slightly in favor of the defendant, the court found that other factors were favorable to attenuation of the taint. Miranda warnings, while not decisive standing alone, were given before the defendant gave his confession. A proper arrest warrant was issued after the defendant was taken into custody, and intervening circumstances were found to slightly favor the State. At the time the defendant was arrested, an attempt was being made to secure an arrest warrant by other officers. The court noted that there was no showing that the arresting officer knew that he did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant. The lack of official misconduct was a factor the court considered favorable to the State. The Johnson court concluded that the taint of the illegal arrest was attenuated from the obtaining of the defendant's statement. In the instant cause appellant's arrest was made pursuant to a warrant. Assuming the warrant was invalid, there was no showing that this fact was known to the officers. As hereinafter noted in other points of error, no official misconduct is shown on the part of the officers. Over twenty-four hours elapsed before appellant gave an inculpatory statement. Appellant was given Miranda warnings at the scene of the arrest, upon arrival at the station house, before giving a statement in which he denied taking part in the offense, during the time between the first confession and the second confession, and prior to giving the inculpatory confession. Intervening circumstances following appellant's arrest consisted of appellant's expression of remorse to Terry Keel for having taken property from the Keel's house, appellant's assistance in locating co-defendant Compeau, and Compeau's statement to the officers that they should ask appellant about the location of the stolen jewelry. Assuming that the affidavit was insufficient, the taint of illegality was attenuated under the standard set forth in Brown. Appellant's first point of error is overruled. In his second point of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his motion to suppress because his confessions were involuntary under the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 10 & 19. The written motion to suppress filed by appellant in the trial court relies on the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and unspecified articles of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In appellant's argument in the trial court in support of his motion, no mention was made of the Texas Constitution. An objection stating one legal theory in the trial court may not be used to support another legal theory on appeal. Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Appellant's second point of error is overruled. In his third and fourth points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that his confessions were voluntary. Appellant urges that his confessions were inadmissible under Articles 38.21, 38.22 or 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.21 (West 1979), art. 38.22 (West 1979 & Supp. 1994), & art. 38.23 (West Supp. 1994). In Smith v. State, 799 S.W.2d 417, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), the defendant cited "nonconstitutional doctrines of state law" in addition to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in assailing the voluntariness of his confession. The Smith court held that "voluntariness" under both constitutional and state law doctrines is to be measured according to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 427. Appellant was arrested at his mother's home in the early morning hours of December 11, 1991. Detective Hale testified that he gave appellant Miranda warnings at the scene of the arrest. Approximately one hour later, appellant was again given Miranda warnings at the station house before his first written statement. Appellant's first statement relates that he rode with Compeau to the Keel house but refused Compeau's request to assist him in the burglary. More than twenty hours later appellant was again given Miranda warnings and gave a second written statement in which he acknowledged participation in the Keel burglary. Appellant directs our attention to the testimony of Hale that Keel, who accompanied officers to the scene of the arrest, told him, "Its to your benefit to cooperate with [the officers]." Hale also told appellant it was to his benefit to cooperate in the investigation, "as I do in all investigations"; he added that because "Mr. Keel was an assistant district attorney that it was to his benefit to cooperate"; and since "he [Keel] was assisting us in this investigation that it was to his best interest to cooperate with us." Hale further testified that he told appellant that if a defendant cooperates in the investigation and doesn't have a lengthy criminal history he may end up with probation. Appellant denied that he was given Miranda warnings at the scene of the arrest. Compeau's car was at the scene of the arrest. After the officers were unable to find Compeau, appellant agreed to assist the officers in locating him. Appellant testified that after he told officers Hale and Tommy Wooley he wanted an attorney, the officers told him that "Terry [Keel] is going to help you all he can; the courts and the judges will go easier on you if you just come clean. And from what it looks like Terry is going to help you all he can." Before he made his second confession, appellant stated that Keel told him that he was going to get out on a personal bond; "I'm not going to get you out if you make me look like a fool on this false statement, but if you come clean and make another statement I'll hold up to my promise and I'll get you out as soon as possible." The testimony of the State's witnesses reflects that no mention was made about a confession until appellant told Terry Keel that he was sorry about having gone into the house, and said "I'm going to give them a statement. I'll tell them where everything is, I'm going to co-operate." Hale testified that the co-operation he sought from appellant was the location of Compeau and the recovery of the property. Hale denied ever promising appellant that he would receive probation. Hale said his statement to appellant was that defendants who co-operate and do not have a criminal record may get probation. Both Hale and Wooley testified that appellant never mentioned anything about wanting an attorney. Keel testified that following a call from appellant's mother he went to Judge Wisser and requested that appellant be released on a personal bond. It was after his conversation with Judge Wisser that Keel went to see appellant and told him that he had done what he could to get him out on personal bond. Keel stated that he told appellant, "I knew about the statement he had given . . . if you are going to say anything to them you shouldn't lie to them . . . they know that you gave a false statement to them." Keel denied that he ever told appellant that his getting out on personal bond was conditioned upon him giving a statement and stated that his efforts toward getting appellant released on personal bond had occurred prior to his visit with appellant. Appellant's testimony about wanting an attorney and his release on personal bond being conditioned on giving a statement were controverted. The trial court, as the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses, acted within its authority in disbelieving appellant's testimony. See Gentry v. State, 770 S.W.2d 780, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Before a promise will render a confession inadmissible, it must be shown that the promise induced the confession. See Jacobs v. State, 787 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In order to induce the confession, the promise must be (1) positive, (2) made or sanctioned by someone in authority, and (3) of such an influential nature that a defendant would speak untruthfully in response thereto. Id. In Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), the officer admitted discussing with a defendant charged with capital murder that he knew of a case where a murderer confessed and received a term in a mental institution, and that in some cases leniency is shown if suspects give a statement. The officer denied that he told the defendant what to write or that he promised appellant leniency in return for a confession. The court concluded the officer's statement was simply a statement of fact; the defendant failed to demonstrate that the party in authority positively and unequivocally promised leniency in return for a confession. Id. at 254. In the instant cause, appellant has not shown that a party in authority positively and unequivocally promised probation or leniency in return for a confession. Neither the officers nor Keel induced appellant to confess by implicitly or explicitly suggesting a deal, bargain, agreement, exchange, or contingency where they would make sure that appellant received leniency or probation. See Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We hold that the totality of the circumstances support the trial court's findings that appellant's statements were voluntary and neither coerced nor induced by promise or benefit. In his fifth point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress his confessions due to prosecutorial misconduct. Appellant's complaint is directed toward the pre-trial conduct of Keel. Appellant states that he knows of no standard by which prosecutorial misconduct is disapproved by appellate courts, but asks that his confessions be suppressed as a method of precluding such conduct in the future. In support of his position, appellant cites sections of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct and A.B.A. Standards Relating to the Administration of Justice. Our disposition of points of error three and four are dispositive of assertions that Keel's conduct induced the confession. Assuming that Keel's conduct constituted violations of ethical rules, such violations have not resulted in the suppression of evidence. See Pannell v. State, 666 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The Pannell court held: [W]e now hold that the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility are not laws of the State of Texas as were contemplated by Article 38.23 [Code of Criminal Procedure]. Thus, violation of one of these disciplinary rules in obtaining evidence for a criminal proceeding will not bar introduction of that evidence at trial. We agree with our brothers in the federal system that such ethical violations are to be dealt with by means of the administrative mechanisms specially established for dealing with such unethical conduct. Id. Appellant's fifth point of error is overruled. The judgment is affirmed. Tom G. Davis, Justice Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Davis* Affirmed Filed: September 14, 1994 Do Not Publish * Before Tom G. Davis, Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(b) (West 1988).