Ellis H. Gilleland v. Joseph J. Rizzo, Acting Executive Director, Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners And Texas Veterinary Medical Association

Gilleland v. Rizzo TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-94-00717-CV Ellis H. Gilleland, Appellant v. Joseph J. Rizzo, Acting Executive Director, Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners; and Texas Veterinary Medical Association, Appellees FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 93-09023, HONORABLE PETER M. LOWRY, JUDGE PRESIDING PER CURIAM Appellant Ellis H. Gilleland sued appellee Joseph Rizzo, Acting Executive Director of the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners, to compel disclosure of complaint files maintained by the Board. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.001--.353 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). Appellee Texas Veterinary Medical Association intervened on Rizzo's behalf. After Gilleland presented his evidence to the jury, the trial court rendered an instructed verdict for Rizzo and the Association. Gilleland's appeal is one more in a series of cases he has brought against members of the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners. Rather than a pursuit of substantive legal rights, Gilleland's suits appear calculated to advance his personal vendetta against the Board's members. Having nevertheless considered his points of error and finding them without merit, we will affirm the trial court's judgment. In points of error two, three, five, and six, Gilleland contests the trial court's grant of an instructed verdict against him. The Association, joined by Rizzo, moved for an instructed verdict after Gilleland presented his evidence to the jury and rested. As one of its grounds for instructed verdict, the Association asserted that Gilleland's evidence failed to raise any factual issue. An instructed verdict is proper when the evidence raises no material factual issue. Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 724 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, writ denied). In reviewing an instructed verdict granted on an evidentiary basis, this Court must determine whether any evidence of probative force exists to raise factual issues on the material questions presented. We must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was instructed, discarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. 1978). If the record contains any conflicting evidence of probative force, a determination of the issue is for the jury. White v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 651 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. 1983). Gilleland argues that controverted factual issues exist on his cause of action, without citing us to the page of the record where any contested facts may be found. See Tex. R. App. P. 74(f). We have nevertheless reviewed the evidence presented in this case. This evidence shows that, on July 17 and 18, 1991, and on June 13 and 17, 1993, Gilleland requested access to the Board's information files on each complaint filed with the Board since 1986 and access to those completed complaint files existing since 1980. See The Veterinary Licensing Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8890, § 18B(a) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring the Board to maintain information files on each complaint filed with it). The Open Records Act excepts from disclosure information "considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.101 (West 1994). The Veterinary Licensing Act makes confidential "the investigation files and records of the Board, including files and records relating to complaints found to be groundless." Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8890, § 9(d) (West Supp. 1996). The only question presented at trial was whether the complaint files Gilleland sought constituted investigation files and records of the Board. While Rizzo and the Association argue that complaint files and investigation files are identical, Gilleland maintains that the two are distinct. In general, a question concerning the legal effect of a statute on the facts presented is a question of law. Najarian v. David Taylor Cadillac, 705 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ). In the specific context of the Open Records Act, the supreme court has declared that the question whether information sought is public, and if so, whether a statute expressly makes it confidential, is a question of law. A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1995). Because the only dispute to be resolved was the legal effect of the Veterinary Licensing Act on Gilleland's requested information, specifically, whether the complaint files he requested qualified as investigation files, we conclude that the only issue to be resolved at trial was a question of law. No factual issue having been presented for the jury's determination, the trial court correctly withdrew the case from the jury. Gilleland argues in point of error two that, because the trial court had granted the motion for instructed verdict, it erred by dismissing the jury rather than instructing it to render a verdict. When the evidence produced before the jury entitles a party to a verdict as a matter of law, the trial court may instruct the jury as to the verdict it must return or it may withdraw the case from the jury and render judgment. Estate of Grimes v. Dorchester Gas Producing Co., 707 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the absence of any issue of fact, the trial court could not have reversibly erred by discharging the jury and rendering judgment for Rizzo and the Association rather than instructing the jury to render a judgment for them. Clark v. Jones, 164 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Tex. Civ. App.--Eastland 1942, no writ). We therefore overrule points two, three, five, and six. In point of error eight, Gilleland argues that the trial court denied him the right to jury trial under the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 15. In point of error one, Gilleland contends that the trial court misrepresented the truth when it stated twice, before Gilleland presented his evidence, that a jury trial would occur. We have not found, nor has Gilleland shown us, where in the record he presented these complaints to the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 52(a). Further, we note that a jury was selected, impaneled, and sworn, which would seem to comport with the statement the trial court made. Because Gilleland has preserved nothing for review, we overrule points one and eight. In points of error nine and ten, Gilleland asserts that, by instructing a verdict, the trial court denied him his federal and state constitutional rights to due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. Because Gilleland's evidence raised no factual issues for the jury to decide, we determine that the trial court acted consistently with due process in instructing a verdict against Gilleland. We overrule points nine and ten. In points of error eleven and twelve, Gilleland complains that the trial court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law, despite his timely request. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. The trial court is not authorized to file findings and conclusions when it has withdrawn the case from the jury. Ditto v. Ditto Invest. Co., 309 S.W.2d 219, 220 (Tex. 1958); Spiller v. Spiller, 535 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.--Tyler 1976, writ dism'd). Because findings and conclusions were not proper in this case, we overrule points eleven and twelve. Gilleland argues in his fourth point of error that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike the Association's intervention in the suit. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 60. Under Rule 60, the Association had the right to intervene if it showed a legal or equitable interest such that, had the action been brought against it, it would have been able to defeat recovery or some part thereof. Guaranty Fed. Savs. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. 1990); Rogers v. Searle, 533 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1976, no writ). Gilleland's motion to strike contains none of the arguments against intervention that he advances on appeal. His failure to present his arguments to the trial court preserves nothing for review. Tex. R. App. P. 52(a); Delley v. Unknown Stockholders of the Brotherly and Sisterly Club of Christ, Inc., 509 S.W.2d 709, 717 (Tex. Civ. App.--Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In any event, we have reviewed the Association's petition in intervention and determine that, as a professional trade group, the interests of the Association and its members in the confidentiality of the Board's complaint files are sufficient to justify intervention. See Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tex. 1993); Guaranty Fed. Savs. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657. We overrule point four. In points of error seven and thirteen, Gilleland complains that the trial court erroneously applied the Open Records Act and the Veterinary Licensing Act retroactively. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.101 (West 1994); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8890, § 9(d) (West Supp. 1995). The court recites in its judgment that, under the version of the Open Records Act in effect on the date of the judgment, the Board is not legally obligated to produce the records at issue. Gilleland argues that the trial court should have applied the previous version of section 552.101 of the Open Records Act, which was in effect when he requested the Board's records. See Act of April 24, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 66, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 506, 507 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(1), since repealed and codified at Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.101 (West 1994)). Gilleland's argument lacks merit because, in enacting section 552.101, the legislature specified that it intended only to codify the existing statute, not to effect any substantive change in the law. Act of May 4, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 268, § 47, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 986. The trial court correctly relied on the current version of the Open Records Act in rendering judgment against Gilleland. Gilleland further argues that the trial court erroneously relied on article 8890, section 9(d) of the Veterinary Licensing Act, as amended in 1993. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8890, § 9(d) (West Supp. 1995). In 1993, the legislature amended section 9(d) to add the italicized words: "The investigation files and records of the Board, including files and records relating to complaints found to be groundless, are confidential." See Act of May 10, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 287, § 13, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1337, 1343. In moving for an instructed verdict, the Association argued that section 9(d), as it existed before the 1993 amendment, governed Gilleland's request and protected the information he sought. The Association argued alternatively that section 9(d), as it was amended in 1993, governed and protected the information. The trial court did not state in its judgment the basis on which it granted the instructed verdict. To reverse the court's judgment under these circumstances, Gilleland must show this Court that the instructed verdict could not be supported on either ground set out in the Association's motion. McKelvy v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex. 1964); Guynn v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, 589 S.W.2d 764, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1979, writ dism'd). Gilleland has failed to challenge the ground based on section 9(d) as it existed before the 1993 amendment. Having waived his right to question this ground, Gilleland cannot obtain a reversal of the instructed verdict. McKelvy, 381 S.W.2d at 62; Guynn, 589 S.W.2d at 770. We therefore overrule points seven and thirteen. Points of error fourteen through twenty concern original exhibits that Gilleland wished to be made part of the appellate record. See Tex. R. App. P. 51(d), 55(b). In point of error fourteen, Gilleland asserts globally that the trial court erred in failing to transmit to this Court the exhibits that he requested. Because Gilleland does not specify which of the many exhibits he requested are allegedly missing, we overrule point fourteen. See Tex. R. App. P. 74(f). Gilleland complains in his seventeenth and eighteenth points of error that original exhibits from hearings held on March 11 and June 14, 1994, have not been included in the appellate record. Because these exhibits were, in fact, transmitted to this Court, we overrule points seventeen and eighteen. In his sixteenth and nineteenth points of error, Gilleland complains that original exhibits from hearings held on January 4 and June 16, 1994, have not been transmitted to this Court. Gilleland claims that the exhibits from the January 4 hearing are necessary to impeach Rizzo's attorney and one of Rizzo's witnesses. He claims that the exhibits from the June 16 hearing are necessary "to impeach the veracity of the record and corrupt attorney 'officers of the court.'" The issues allegedly raised by these exhibits are collateral to the merits of Gilleland's suit, and Gilleland has not asserted any point of error to which the missing exhibits are pertinent. Because Gilleland has not shown how the absence of these exhibits harms him, we overrule points sixteen and nineteen. Tex. R. App. P. 81(b)(1). In point of error fifteen, Gilleland charges that this Court erred in failing to order the trial court to transmit the exhibits he requested. On April 26, 1995, this Court issued an order directing the district clerk to transmit the original exhibits from hearings held on January 4 and June 16, 1995. Although we have not received these exhibits, Gilleland has not shown how their absence harms him. We therefore overrule point fifteen. In point of error twenty, Gilleland asserts that the errors claimed in points fourteen through nineteen deprived him of due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. Having found no merit to points fourteen to nineteen, we overrule point twenty. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Before Justices Powers, Aboussie and Kidd Affirmed Filed: December 20, 1995 Do Not Publish ee Act of April 24, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 66, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 506, 507 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(1), since repealed and codified at Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.101 (West 1994)). Gilleland's argument lacks merit because, in enacting section 552.101, the legislature specified that it intended only to codify the existing statute, not to effect any substantive change in the law. Act of May 4, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 268, § 47, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 986. The trial court correctly relied on the current version of the Open Records Act in rendering judgment against Gilleland. Gilleland further argues that the trial court erroneously relied on article 8890, section 9(d) of the Veterinary Licensing Act, as amended in 1993. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8890, § 9(d) (West Supp. 1995). In 1993, the legislature amended section 9(d) to add the italicized words: "The investigation files and records of the Board, including files and records relating to complaints found to be groundless, are confidential." See Act of May 10, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 287, § 13, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1337, 1343. In moving for an instructed verdict, the Association argued that section 9(d), as it existed before the 1993 amendment, governed Gilleland's request and protected the information he sought. The Association argued alternatively that section 9(d), as it was amended in 1993, governed and protected the information. The trial court did not state in its judgment the basis on which it granted the instructed verdict. To reverse the court's judgment under these circumstances, Gilleland must show this Court that the instructed verdict could not be supported on either ground set out in the Association's motion. McKelvy v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex. 1964); Guynn v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, 589 S.W.2d 764, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1979, writ dism'd). Gilleland has failed to challenge the ground based on section 9(d) as it existed before the 1993 amendment. Having waived his right to question this ground, Gilleland cannot obtain a reversal of the instructed verdict. McKelvy, 381 S.W.2d at 62; Guynn, 589 S.W.2d at 770. We therefore overrule points seven and thirteen. Points of error fourteen through twenty concern original exhibits that Gilleland wished to be made part of the appellate record. See Tex. R. App. P. 51(d), 55(b). In point of error fourteen, Gilleland asserts globally that the trial court erred in failing to transmit to this Court the exhibits that he requested. Because Gilleland does not specify which of the many exhibits he requested are allegedly missing, we overrule point fourteen. See Tex. R. App. P. 74(f). Gilleland complains in his seventeenth and eighteenth points of error that original exhibits from hearings held on March 11 and June 14, 1994, have not been included in the appellate record. Because these exhibits were, in fact, transmitted to this Court, we overrule points seventeen and eighteen. In his sixteenth and nineteenth points of error, Gilleland complains that original exhibits from hearings held on January 4 and June 16, 1994, have not been transmitted to this Court. Gilleland claims that the exhibits from the January 4 hearing are necessary to impeach Rizzo's attorney and one of Rizzo's witnesses. He claims that the exhibits from the June 16 hearing are necessary "to impeach the veracity of the record and corrupt attorney 'officers of the court.'" The issues allegedly raised by these exhibits are collateral to the merits of Gille