Gene Delacruz v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS, AT AUSTIN NO. 3-93-242-CR GENE DELACRUZ, APPELLANT vs. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 331ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 0925756, HONORABLE FORTUNATO P. BENAVIDES, JUDGE PRESIDING This appeal is taken from a conviction for an assault causing serious bodily injury to a child under the age of fourteen years. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(1) (West 1994). (1) In a bench trial, appellant Gene DeLaCruz was convicted. The trial court assessed punishment at fifty-five years' imprisonment. Appellant advances three points of error. In the first two points of error, appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. In the third point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in failing to quash the indictment. We will affirm the conviction. We shall consider the last point of error first in our discussion. In his third point of error, appellant contends that the trial court "erred in failing to quash the indictment for a violation of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Section 21.24." Appellant refers us to article 21.24(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides: "a count may contain as many separate paragraphs charging the same offense as necessary, but no paragraph may charge more than one offense." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.24(b) (West 1989). The indictment charged in one paragraph that on or about September 8, 1992, appellant: did then and there knowingly and intentionally cause serious bodily injury to Lindsey Beth Ochoa, a child younger than fourteen (14) years of age, by squeezing the abdomen of the said Lindsey Beth Ochoa with his hands, by rubbing the abdomen of said Lindsey Beth Ochoa with his hands and an object the description of which is to the Grand Jury unknown and in a manner and by a means which are to the Grand Jury unknown, and by striking the said Lindsey Beth Ochoa with his hands and a blunt object, the description of which is to the Grand Jury unknown and in a manner and by a means which are to the Grand Jury unknown. In his "motion to quash the information" [apparently meaning indictment], appellant urged that the indictment had erroneously alleged three distinct manner and means of committing the alleged offense in one count and paragraph in violation of article 21.24. It is clear that the State may aver in separate paragraphs of an indictment each of the various ways in which a single offense charged may have been committed. Martinez v. State, 498 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Offor v. State, 749 S.W.2d 946, 952 (Tex. App.--Austin 1988, pet. ref'd, untimely filed). In fact, article 21.24(b) expressly authorizes this form of allegation. Offor, 749 S.W.2d at 952; see also Collins v. State, 780 S.W.2d 176, 183 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Appellant, however, misreads article 21.24(b) if it be his interpretation that no other manner of allegation is proper. An indictment may charge one offense in a single paragraph while alleging multiple means for the commission of the offense without being in violation of article 21.24(b). Kingsley v. State, 744 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, pet. dism'd), 784 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The instant indictment does not allege more than one offense, but rather alleges several means of committing the single offense all in the same paragraph. No error is reflected. Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Even if the motion to quash was sufficient to call the trial court's attention to the defect, the record does not reflect that the motion was ever presented to the trial court, and appellant never obtained a ruling on the motion. Nothing is presented for review. Allison v. State, 618 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Ford v. State, 868 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.); Young Sun Lee v. State, 681 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd). To preserve error for review, a defendant must obtain an adverse ruling on his motion or objection. Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Darty v. State, 709 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Scott v. State, 861 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993, no pet.); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.14(b) (West Supp. 1995). The third point of error is overruled. We now turn to the legal sufficiency questions presented. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he (1) intentionally and knowingly caused serious bodily injury to a child as alleged, and (2) committed the offense by the manner and means alleged in the indictment. Two-year-old Lindsey Beth Ochoa was taken to the Little Dudes Day Care Center by a friend of her mother on the morning of September 8, 1992. She appeared normal and in good health. Day care workers testified that they kept the child during the day, that she was not ill, had no visible bruises, and was in good spirits. The child ate her lunch and took her nap. At 2:45 p.m. that afternoon, appellant, the live-in boyfriend of the child's mother, arrived at the day care center to pick up Lindsey as he did frequently. Lindsey ran to him. At 4:48 p.m. on the same day, EMS received a 911 telephone call about a child not breathing. It was shown that appellant made this call. The EMS dispatcher had some difficulty understanding appellant's explanation of the emergency. He talked about having hit the child in the head with a car door, giving her a shower, and related some of the child's past medical history. The first fire fighter to arrive at the apartment where appellant, the child, and her mother lived, found the child lying on the floor. She was cool and dry. Appellant was the only adult there. The child could not be revived. Appellant did not appear upset. An EMS paramedic testified that appellant was unable or unwilling to give any information about what had happened to the child. He told "a long drawn-out story." Finally, appellant stated that he had hit the child's head with a car door and had given her a shower. This raised suspicions because the child was dry and there was no obvious head injury. In addition, the child's body was cool indicating that she had been without vital signs for at least thirty minutes before the paramedic had arrived. The child was pronounced dead at 5:15 p.m. Theresa Ochoa, the child's mother, arrived at the scene and became upset. Appellant, however, showed no emotion. There was testimony from Nanette Nuncio, a co-worker with the child's mother at a tax accounting office, that appellant had repeatedly called the mother at the office beginning about 4:30 p.m. urging the mother to come home as the child had been hit by a car door. Nuncio drove Theresa Ochoa home. There, appellant was unable to explain what had happened. His story did not make sense to Nuncio. Police officers arrived on the scene. Appellant eventually told them about the car- door injury and related that the child went limp in the tub while he was in the process of changing her diapers. He acknowledged that he did not call EMS for fifteen to twenty minutes after the child went limp. Appellant was arrested at the scene and given the proper statutory warnings. He was later transported to the homicide office. Homicide investigator Jesse Vasquez responded to a dispatch and went to the scene. He later interviewed appellant at the police station where appellant told Vasquez various stories. Vasquez described appellant as being calm and indifferent. Vasquez decided to release appellant pending the result of an autopsy. Appellant refused to leave and insisted on telling the truth about what had happened. Vasquez then took a written statement from him. That statement and other taped interviews were introduced at trial. Assistant medical examiner Suzana Dana testified as to the cause of death. She began by detailing numerous acute bruises on the body which had been inflicted within one to two hours before death. Dr. Dana related that there was extensive bleeding in the abdomen caused by lacerations of the mesentery, the soft tissue that holds the bowel into the back of the abdominal cavity. The injury to the mesentery was a massive injury associated with blunt trauma that forced the tissue against the backbone and caused it to tear and rupture. The injuries to the mesentery indicated repeated trauma, not just a single injury. Dr. Dana was unable to determine just what caused the injuries but testified that they could have been caused by striking either with hands or a blunt instrument. The cause of death was blunt abdominal trauma. Dr. Dana had pointed out in her testimony that the only trauma to the head was a small hemorrhage at the top which would not have led to unconsciousness. There were no chest fractures. Dr. Linda Norton, a forensic pathologist whose special area of expertise was child abuse cases, testified that Lindsey Ochoa was "literally beaten to death." She was unable to tell the exact cause of the blunt trauma, but informed the trial court that the child bled to death as the result of injuries to the mesentery and the injuries were consistent with striking by a fist or other blunt object. The injuries were the result of multiple severe blows. Dr. Norton estimated that death would have occurred within an hour after the infliction of the injuries. In appellant's written statement, he offered nothing to account for the severe abdominal injuries suffered by the child. He did, however, admit to abusive behavior after he picked up the child from the day care center: I now willingly admit that while I had Lindsey with me I struck her with the driver's car door knowing she would be hurt. . . . I intentionally slammed the driver's car door knowing it would strike Lindsey. Later, the statement reveals that after arriving home the child appeared "like in a daze," and appellant stated: I got mad at Lindsey and starting pushing on her chest underneath her ribs and pushed very hard with both hands a lot of times--I got angrier and moved my hands up her chest and pushed hard down on her again. Two members of the indicting grand jury testified that the jury had been unable in the exercise of reasonable diligence to determine the exact manner and means of the child's injuries. Appellant asserted that the child was injured when he tried to perform CPR. This CPR--reckless injury type of defense was rejected by the medical witnesses. Dr. Norton testified that it was preposterous to imagine the child's injuries resulted from CPR "no matter how careless they were." After hearing the evidence and the argument of counsel, the trial court found appellant guilty of assault causing serious bodily injury to a child "by striking the said Lindsey Beth Ochoa with his hands and [or] a blunt object the description of which was to the Grand Jury unknown and in a manner and by a means which was to the Grand Jury unknown." The standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment (in a bench trial), any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the offense charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 3219 (1979); Valdez v. State, 776 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2575 (1990); Dickey v. State, 693 S.W.2d 386, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The standard for review is the same in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Herndon v. State, 787 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); see also Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). (2) Appellant complains that the State failed to prove the culpable mental state of "intentionally" or "knowingly" as alleged. Proof of a culpable mental state relies upon circumstantial evidence. Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Fuller v. State, 819 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, pet. ref'd); Gardner v. State, 736 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987), aff'd, 780 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Intent may be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Knowledge also may be inferred from the conduct of and remarks by the accused and from all the circumstances surrounding the acts engaged in by the accused. Dillon, 574 S.W.2d at 94-95; Parramore v. State, 853 S.W.2d 741, 745 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd); Trejo v. State, 766 S.W.2d 381, 385-86 (Tex. App.--Austin 1989, no pet.); Ercanbrack v. State, 646 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.). In the instant case, there was evidence that appellant had been previously charged with an assault upon the child that resulted in a broken ankle or leg. Appellant admitted that on the occasion in question he intentionally slammed a car door against the child; that later he "got mad" at the child and "pushed very hard with both hands" underneath the child's ribs; and that he got angrier and "pushed hard down on her again." Without reiterating all the circumstances surrounding appellant's acts, various stories, and general conduct, we conclude that a rational trier of the fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the offense charged including the alleged culpable mental states. (3) Nevertheless, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of any of the multiple means of committing the offense as alleged. As noted, the trial court expressly limited its finding to the third manner and means alleged in the indictment. In the light of appellant's written statement and the testimony of the doctors and the grand jurors, the evidence is clearly sufficient to support the finding under the Jackson rationality standard. Appellant's first and second points of error are overruled. The judgment is affirmed. John F. Onion, Jr., Justice Before Justices Powers, Jones and Onion* Affirmed Filed: January 18, 1995 Do Not Publish * Before John F. Onion, Jr., Presiding Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(b) (West 1988). 1. In those instances in which the present Penal Code provision is identical or almost identical to the provision in effect at the time of the offense, the current code is cited for the sake of convenience. 2. Geesa abolished the reasonable hypothesis of innocence analytical construct in circumstantial evidence cases. 3. In a bench trial, the trial court is the trier of fact, the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The trial court may accept or reject any or all of the testimony of any witness. Wright v. State, 603 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Reconciliation of any evidentiary conflicts is solely a function of the trier of fact. Bowden v. State, 628 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).