David L. Self v. Mary Helen Soriano

CV6-109 TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-96-00109-CV David L. Self, Appellant v. Mary Helen Soriano, Appellee FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 215,932, HONORABLE PAUL R. DAVIS, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING PER CURIAM David L. Self tendered a transcript which the Clerk of the Court filed on February 21, 1996. A review of the transcript revealed that it contained no appealable order. By letter, the Clerk's office informed appellant that based on the text of his motion to reconsider and his notice of appeal, it appeared that he perfected his appeal from an order signed January 5, 1996 that resulted from a hearing held December 15, 1995. That order, however, dealt only with sanctions for appellant's failure to respond to certain discovery requests and other violations of the discovery rules. Such an order is not an appealable interlocutory order. Two orders signed on January 8, 1996, indicated that the cause was set for trial. Our letter asked appellant to tender any documentation showing that he was appealing a final order by April 1, 1996. No response has been received. (1) Discovery sanctions are not appealable until the trial court renders a final judgment. Bodnow Corp. v. City of Hondo, 721 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. 1986); Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. 1986); Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639-40 (Tex. 1986); Velez v. DeLara, 905 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, no writ); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 807 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding). Appellant attempted to appeal from an order which is neither final nor subject to interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 51.012 (West 1986); Tex. R. App. P. 60(a)(2). Before Justices Powers, Jones and B. A. Smith Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction Filed: May 1, 1996 Do Not Publish 1. 1 The letter also cautioned appellant that the appellate timetables continued to run and that any necessary motions for extension of time should be tendered. Appellant's brief was due April 4, 1996. Appellant has not tendered either a brief or motion for extension of time to file a brief.