Marcus Haynes v. State

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-99-00127-CR Marcus Haynes, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 331ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 0983473, HONORABLE BOB PERKINS, JUDGE PRESIDING A jury found appellant Marcus Haynes guilty of capital murder. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (West 1994). Because the State did not seek the death penalty, the district court assessed punishment at imprisonment for life. See id. § 12.31(a); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071, § 1 (West Supp. 1999). Appellant's only point of error challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We will overrule the point and affirm the conviction. In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the question is whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to one element of the offense. He contends the evidence does not support the jury's finding that he intended to kill. See Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). Appellant, age seventeen, and two companions were driving through a northeast Austin neighborhood when they saw a man standing in the front yard of a house. As described in appellant's confession, the driver "turned the car around and told [appellant] he wanted me to rob him." Appellant agreed to do so. He took a pistol, "went behind the man and hit him on the head two times [with the pistol] and took his wallet and ran." The victim of this crime was seventy-year-old Victor Hohle, who died from the blows inflicted by appellant. The medical examiner testified that she found evidence of ten separate blows to the head, three of which shattered the crown of the skull and left bone fragments on the surface of the brain. Another blow to the back of the head caused the brain to move forward in the skull with enough force to fracture the superior orbital plate. To support his claim that the State did not prove an intent to kill, appellant points to testimony by a police officer that appellant appeared surprised when told Hohle was dead, and to testimony by the medical examiner that the stress or excitement of the moment can sometimes cause an attacker to use greater force than he intends. But the rule on which appellant relies, that circumstantial evidence must exclude to a moral certainty all reasonable hypotheses except the defendant's guilt, has been repudiated by the court of criminal appeals and did not apply to proof of the defendant's intent in any case. See Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 161; Moone v. State, 802 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, pet. ref'd). The dispositive question is not whether the evidence excludes the possibility that appellant did not intend to kill Hohle, but whether the evidence rationally supports the jury's determination that he did. An intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant's acts, words, and conduct. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Homicidal intent may also be inferred from the extent of the injuries and the relative size and strength of the parties. Id. Appellant struck Hohle ten times on the head with enough force to fracture the skull twice. The medical examiner found no evidence of defensive wounds, and the jury could infer that the number of blows exceeded that necessary merely to subdue Hohle and take his wallet. While the relative size of the parties is not shown, it is reasonable to infer that the seventeen-year-old appellant was stronger and more vigorous than his seventy-year-old victim. The jury also could infer an intent to kill from appellant's use of a weapon that was deadly both by definition and in the manner of its use. See Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17) (West 1994). We find the evidence clearly sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intended to kill. The point of error is overruled and the judgment of conviction is affirmed. Marilyn Aboussie, Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Aboussie, Justices Kidd and Patterson Affirmed Filed: September 10, 1999 Do Not Publish cy of the evidence. We will overrule the point and affirm the conviction. In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the question is whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to one element of the offense. He contends the evidence does not support the jury's finding that he intended to kill. See Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). Appellant, age seventeen, and two companions were driving through a northeast Austin neighborhood when they saw a man standing in the front yard of a house. As described in appellant's confession, the driver "turned the car around and told [appellant] he wanted me to rob him." Appellant agreed to do so. He took a pistol, "went behind the man and hit him on the head two times [with the pistol] and took his wallet and ran." The victim of this crime was seventy-year-old Victor Hohle, who died from the blows inflicted by appellant. The medical examiner testified that she found evidence of ten separate blows to the head, three of which shattered the crown of the skull and left bone fragments on the surface of the brain. Another blow to the back of the head caused the brain to move forward in the skull with enough force to fracture the superior orbital plate. To support his claim that the State did not prove an intent to kill, appellant points to testimony by a police officer that appellant appeared surprised when told Hohle was dead, and to testimony by the medical examiner that the stress or excitement of the moment can sometimes cause an attacker to use greater force than he intends. But the rule on which appellant relies, that circumstantial evidence must exclude to a moral certainty all reasonable hypotheses except the defendant's guilt, has been repudiated by the court of criminal appeals and did not apply to proof of the defendant's intent in any case. See Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 161; Moone v. State, 802 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, pet. ref'd). The dispositive question is not whether the evidence excludes the possibility that appellant did not intend to kill Hohle, but whether the evidence rationally supports the jury's determination that he did. An intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant's acts, words, and conduct. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Homicidal intent may also be inferred from the extent of the injuries and the relative s