Ronald Craig Wiley v. State

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN ON REMAND NO. 03-99-00047-CR Ronald Craig Wiley, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. CR-98-173-K26, HONORABLE WILLIAM LOTT, JUDGE PRESIDING We affirmed appellant Ronald Craig Wiley's conviction for arson on original submission. See Wiley v. State, No. 03-99-00047-CR (Tex. App.--Austin Mar. 9, 2000) (not designated for publication). Appellant petitioned for discretionary review, complaining among other things that we did not address the contention that he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense. The court of criminal appeals granted review on that ground only, vacated our judgment, and remanded the cause for this Court to address the constitutional issue. See Wiley v. State, No. 732-00 (Tex. Crim. App. June 28, 2000) (not designated for publication). Because the issue was fully briefed on original submission, supplemental briefing was not required. See Bell v. State, 956 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Appellant sought to present a witness who would have testified that she saw Charles Thomas, who was convicted of attempted arson in 1992, inside the building three days before the fire. The district court excluded this testimony pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 403. Appellant contends this ruling violated his constitutional rights to due process and due course of law, and to compulsory process. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10, 19. Appellant does not present separate arguments under the federal and state constitutions. Few rights are more fundamental than that of the accused to present witnesses in his own defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). In the exercise of this right, however, the accused must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence. See id. Rule 403 authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See Tex. R. Evid. 403. Appellant does not argue that rule 403 is unconstitutional on its face, and could not. Trial courts must be given wide latitude under the constitution to exclude evidence that is repetitive, marginally relevant, or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). We explained in our original opinion why we believe the district court did not abuse its discretion under rule 403 by excluding the proffered testimony. For the same reasons, the court did not abuse its constitutional discretion to exclude unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or marginally relevant evidence. Appellant's constitutional right to present witnesses in his own behalf was not violated. Issue one is overruled. Our disposition of appellant's remaining issues was not disturbed by the court of criminal appeals. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Jan P. Patterson, Justice Before Justices Jones, Kidd and Patterson Affirmed on Remand Filed: August 10, 2000 Do Not Publish