in the Interest of S.D.M. and C.L.M., Children

MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-03-00905-CV IN THE INTEREST OF S.D.M. and C.L.M., Children, From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2000-CI-16001 Honorable Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice Delivered and Filed: May 25, 2005 AFFIRMED Appellant Dawn Suzette Molina appeals the trial court’s order striking her motion for enforcement of child support. We affirm. Background Lloyd Molina filed an original petition for divorce on November 2, 2000. Dawn Molina subsequently filed a counter petition for divorce. Both parties appeared in court on April 4, 2001, and entered into a written “Rule 11 Agreement and Order for Final Orders” that was signed by the parties and the trial judge, and filed with the court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11. The Rule 11 agreement set forth the parties’ settlement agreement on the terms of their divorce, including a provision that Lloyd Molina would pay private school tuition for the parties’ son. A divorce decree was subsequently entered on November 9, 2001; the private school tuition provision was not included in the decree. No appeal was taken and the decree became final. On October 3, 2002, Dawn Molina filed a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc as part of a motion for enforcement of child support, seeking to correct the final decree’s omission of the private school tuition provision as a “clerical error.” The trial court denied the motion for judgment nunc pro tunc on February 7, 2003. No appeal was taken. Approximately eight months later, Dawn Molina filed another motion for enforcement in which she sought to enforce as child support the private school tuition provision contained in the Rule 11 agreement. Lloyd Molina responded by filing a motion to strike the motion for enforcement, which was heard and granted by the trial court on November 6, 2003. This appeal followed. Analysis In her first issue, Dawn Molina contends the trial court erred in striking and failing to grant her motion to enforce the private school tuition provision contained in the Rule 11 agreement because the Rule 11 agreement constitutes the final judgment in the case. She argues the signing of the divorce decree was merely a ministerial act, and that a final judgment was rendered by the trial court on April 4, 2001, when it signed the Rule 11 agreement and order. Lloyd Molina responds that the Rule 11 agreement is not the final judgment in the case. We agree. It is clear from the record that while the Rule 11 agreement was an enforceable order, the parties contemplated the subsequent entry of a final judgment. First, the agreement is entitled “Rule 11 Agreement and Order for Final Orders,” indicating that a final judgment was intended to be forthcoming. In addition, the agreement recites that the trial court “may, without further notice, enter binding orders in accordance with [the] agreement.” A judgment or order is final for purposes of appeal if it actually disposes of all pending parties and claims before the court. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). For an order to constitute a final judgment, there must be a clear indication in the record that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case. Id. at 205. Here, the Rule 11 agreement contemplates further action, and, in fact, the parties subsequently did submit a final divorce decree which was signed by the judge on November 9, 2001. Moreover, the trial court’s approval of a settlement agreement does not necessarily constitute rendition of judgment. S&A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995). A judgment is “rendered” when the trial court officially announces its decision on all the matters submitted to it for adjudication either in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk. Id.; see also Arriaga v. Cavazos, 880 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ). In contrast to the Rule 11 agreement, the divorce decree signed on November 9, 2001 disposes of all the parties and claims pending before the court, and contains all of the mandated provisions of a final judgment in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.006 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. Based on the record, we conclude that the divorce decree signed on November 9, 2001 constitutes the final judgment in the case. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in striking the motion to enforce the private school tuition provision that was contained in the Rule 11 agreement, but omitted from the final divorce decree. We note, however, that our holding does not foreclose either party’s ability to bring a separate suit seeking to enforce the Rule 11 agreement as a contractual settlement agreement. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §154.071 (Vernon 1997); see also Compania Financiara Libano, S.A. v. Simmons, 53 S.W.3d 365, 367-68 (Tex. 2001) (holding that settlement terms need not be incorporated into a judgment to be enforceable as contract rights). Ms. Molina’s first issue is overruled. In her second issue, Dawn Molina argues the trial court erred by denying her motion for judgment nunc pro tunc because the decree’s omission of the private school tuition provision was a clerical error. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 316. Ms. Molina did not appeal from the court’s February 7, 2003 order denying her motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. Our jurisdiction was invoked based on her notice of appeal from the November 6, 2003 order striking her last motion to enforce child support. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b). Therefore, this issue is not properly before us and nothing is presented for review. Finally, because we affirm the trial court’s order on other grounds, we need not address the third issue raised on appeal concerning the “Mother Hubbard” clause contained in the divorce decree. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice