Zachary Gentry v. State

In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana ______________________________ No. 06-05-00237-CR ______________________________ ZACHARY GENTRY, Appellant  V.  THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                                               On Appeal from the County Court Marion County, Texas Trial Court No. 11735                                                  Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ross MEMORANDUM OPINION           Zachary Gentry appeals from an order placing him on misdemeanor deferred adjudication community supervision for ninety days and assessing a $150.00 fine in accordance with a plea agreement. His appeal is from the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence. Gentry contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because there was no basis for the arresting officer to stop and frisk him.           Gentry and a companion were walking down the side of a highway in Marion County. They were approached by Constable Jerry Dreesen and Deputy Sheriff Shawn Cox in response to reports that two men were "walking in and out of traffic or in and out of pastures and things north of Jefferson." Dreesen conducted a pat-down search of Gentry and found what he described as a switchblade pocketknife and a small black box containing marihuana. Dreesen arrested Gentry, who was tried in this case for possession of a prohibited weapon.           We are immediately confronted with an issue—separate from Gentry's contentions—that is dispositive of this case: whether the trial judge was qualified to preside in this particular case. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial judge effectively short-circuited the proceedings by stating he had personal knowledge of the actions of Gentry and his cohort. The judge stated that he lived on the road in question, that he was one of the people who almost ran into these individuals, and that he was not sure he was not one of the persons who called Dreesen concerning them. Further, and of most consequence, the trial judge explicitly stated on two occasions that he was making his ruling based on his personal knowledge about the sequence of events.           Although Gentry's counsel suggested that the judge recuse himself because he might be a witness, no issue was clearly raised regarding this issue either at the hearing or on appeal. The initial hurdle, then, is whether this matter is one we should address in the absence of either a clear complaint at the trial court level or a complaint on appeal. For the reasons set out below, we believe we must do so.           In the middle of the State's closing argument at the suppression hearing, the trial judge interrupted: You can stop. Because I'm going to be honest with you, I remember this day. I live on that road. This Motion is going to be denied because I'm one of them that almost hit them. I'm going to deny this Motion to Suppress. I'm not so sure that I wasn't one of them who called Officer Dreesen to be honest with you. I remember this day and I remember the situation. I'm going to deny the Defendant's Motion today; it's not going to be granted.                      . . . .  Like I say, I've got firsthand knowledge of the situation . . . and I believe he has the right to do this [search the defendant].                      . . . .           To be honest with you, my decision is based on what I saw that day.           A defendant's rights arise from distinct rules that generally fall into one of three categories: (1) absolute requirements and prohibitions; (2) rights which must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and (3) rights which are implemented only on request. Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App.1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Absolute requirements and prohibitions, as well as rights which must be implemented unless waived, cannot be made subject to procedural default on appeal because, by definition, they are not forfeitable. Marin, 851 S.W.2d 279. Determining which category a right falls into will usually settle the question of whether a procedural default occurred, and therefore whether the issue was preserved for appeal. Id.           The deprivation of a defendant's right to a trial before an impartial judge is a "structural defect" in the trial mechanism itself. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991). Without the basic protection of an impartial judge, "a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment can be regarded as fundamentally fair." Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986)); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1999).           We acknowledge that an accused may waive even constitutional rights. Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc); Jenkins v. State, 912 S.W.2d 793, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (op. on reh'g) (en banc). Nonetheless, Rule 103(d) of the Rules of Evidence authorizes us, in a criminal case, to "take notice of fundamental errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Tex. R. Evid. 103(d); King v. State, 174 S.W.3d 796, 819 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref'd).           We conclude a defendant does not waive appellate review of the structural defect of his or her right to an impartial judge by failing to object. See Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 132–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (Keasler, J., concurring at 138–39); Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 278.           Beyond the initial preservation of error issue, we are further confronted with unassigned error. In this case, we are not merely addressing possible error, but the type of error that is consistently described as absolutely fundamental in character. See Lott v. State, 874 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Carroll v. State, 75 S.W.3d 633, 634 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.); Wade v. State, 31 S.W.3d 273, 275 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). An appellate court may in its discretion address "unassigned" error, and because of the nature of this issue, in this instance we choose to do so. See Urias v. State, 155 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).           Fundamental error is one that may be presented for the first time on appeal. For example, former jeopardy is fundamental and may be raised at any time. See Muncy v. State, 505 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Also, as presented in this case, an issue concerning the disqualification of a judge may not be waived by the parties, but may be presented on appeal even in the absence of an objection in the trial court. Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Indeed, there is long-standing authority holding that the question of disqualification of a judge (which involves his or her authority to act in a case) may be raised at any time—on appeal or in a collateral attack on the judgment. In re Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding).           The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently elaborated on the differences between structural errors and systemic requirements as those concepts have been used by courts in reviewing actions by the trial courts. Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 339–43. Our analysis here adds an additional layer because we are required to decide whether the matter could properly be raised sua sponte—which involves considerations from both of those concepts. The result of our analysis on the merits, however, is almost a foregone conclusion based on the analysis required to determine whether we could address the issue on its merits.           The bias, or lack of impartiality, of a trial judge may be a ground for judicial disqualification when it is of such a character as to deny the defendant due process. Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). An impartial trier of fact is one capable and willing to decide the case based solely on the evidence before it. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982); Ruckman v. State, 109 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. ref'd).           This case contains one factor that is crucial to our review. Under these facts and this record, we need not examine evidence for implications of partiality, or assume partiality based on comments by the trial judge, or by ambiguous references to the events or even mere knowledge of the location and the facts surrounding the arrest. In this case, as we have quoted above, the trial judge stated clearly that he was making his determination and ruling based, not on the evidence adduced at the hearing, but on his personal knowledge of the event. To do so is error.           We therefore conclude that, under these facts, the trial judge was disqualified from acting in this case because of his stated inability to rule based solely on the evidence adduced at the trial. Thus, having found that the trial judge's action in basing his ruling not on the evidence, but on his personal knowledge, was error requiring disqualification, the actions taken by the disqualified jurist are void.               Having reached this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to address Gentry's contentions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.                                                                             Donald R. Ross                                                                            Justice Date Submitted:      February 2, 2006 Date Decided:         April 12, 2006 Do Not Publish ader, li.MsoHeader, div.MsoHeader {mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-link:"Header Char"; margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:none; tab-stops:center 3.25in right 6.5in; mso-layout-grid-align:none; text-autospace:none; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;} p.MsoFooter, li.MsoFooter, div.MsoFooter {mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-link:"Footer Char"; margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:none; tab-stops:center 3.25in right 6.5in; mso-layout-grid-align:none; text-autospace:none; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;} a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {mso-style-priority:99; color:blue; mso-themecolor:hyperlink; text-decoration:underline; text-underline:single;} a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed {mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; color:purple; mso-themecolor:followedhyperlink; text-decoration:underline; text-underline:single;} p.MsoAcetate, li.MsoAcetate, div.MsoAcetate {mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-link:"Balloon Text Char"; margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:none; mso-layout-grid-align:none; text-autospace:none; font-size:8.0pt; font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-bidi-font-family:Tahoma;} p.MsoNoSpacing, li.MsoNoSpacing, div.MsoNoSpacing {mso-style-name:"No Spacing\,Quotation"; mso-style-priority:1; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; margin-top:0in; margin-right:.5in; margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:.5in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-add-space:auto; text-align:justify; text-justify:inter-ideograph; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} p.MsoNoSpacingCxSpFirst, li.MsoNoSpacingCxSpFirst, div.MsoNoSpacingCxSpFirst {mso-style-name:"No Spacing\,QuotationCxSpFirst"; mso-style-priority:1; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-style-type:export-only; margin-top:0in; margin-right:.5in; margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:.5in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-add-space:auto; text-align:justify; text-justify:inter-ideograph; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} p.MsoNoSpacingCxSpMiddle, li.MsoNoSpacingCxSpMiddle, div.MsoNoSpacingCxSpMiddle {mso-style-name:"No Spacing\,QuotationCxSpMiddle"; mso-style-priority:1; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-style-type:export-only; margin-top:0in; margin-right:.5in; margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:.5in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-add-space:auto; text-align:justify; text-justify:inter-ideograph; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} p.MsoNoSpacingCxSpLast, li.MsoNoSpacingCxSpLast, div.MsoNoSpacingCxSpLast {mso-style-name:"No Spacing\,QuotationCxSpLast"; mso-style-priority:1; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-style-type:export-only; margin-top:0in; margin-right:.5in; margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:.5in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-add-space:auto; text-align:justify; text-justify:inter-ideograph; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} span.BalloonTextChar {mso-style-name:"Balloon Text Char"; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-locked:yes; mso-style-link:"Balloon Text"; mso-ansi-font-size:8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:8.0pt; font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Tahoma; mso-hansi-font-family:Tahoma; mso-bidi-font-family:Tahoma;} span.FootnoteTextChar {mso-style-name:"Footnote Text Char"; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-locked:yes; mso-style-link:"Footnote Text"; mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";} span.HeaderChar {mso-style-name:"Header Char"; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-locked:yes; mso-style-link:Header; mso-ansi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";} span.FooterChar {mso-style-name:"Footer Char"; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-unhide:no; mso-style-locked:yes; mso-style-link:Footer; mso-ansi-font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";} .MsoChpDefault {mso-style-type:export-only; mso-default-props:yes; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} .MsoPapDefault {mso-style-type:export-only; margin-bottom:10.0pt; line-height:115%;} /* Page Definitions */ @page {mso-page-border-surround-header:no; mso-page-border-surround-footer:no; mso-footnote-separator:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") fs; mso-footnote-continuation-separator:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") fcs; mso-endnote-separator:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") es; mso-endnote-continuation-separator:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") ecs;} @page WordSection1 {size:8.5in 11.0in; margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in; mso-header-margin:1.0in; mso-footer-margin:1.0in; mso-even-header:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") eh1; mso-header:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") h1; mso-even-footer:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") ef1; mso-footer:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") f1; mso-first-header:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") fh1; mso-first-footer:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") ff1; mso-paper-source:0;} div.WordSection1 {page:WordSection1;} @page WordSection2 {size:8.5in 11.0in; margin:2.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in; mso-header-margin:2.0in; mso-footer-margin:1.0in; mso-even-header:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") eh1; mso-header:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") h1; mso-even-footer:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") ef1; mso-footer:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") f2; mso-first-header:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") fh1; mso-first-footer:url("6-11-060-CR%20McCarty%20v.%20State%20Opinion%20mtd_files/header.htm") ff1; mso-paper-source:0;} div.WordSection2 {page:WordSection2;} -->          In The Court of Appeals                        Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana                                                 ______________________________                                                              No. 06-11-00060-CR                                                ______________________________                                  ROBERT HUGH MCCARTY, Appellant                                                                 V.                                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                                                                                                                                             On Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District Court                                                             Lamar County, Texas                                                            Trial Court No. 23969                                                                                                                                                Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.                                        Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss            MEMORANDUM OPINION             In his most recent trouble with the criminal law, after Robert Hugh McCarty pled guilty to a charge of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and true to two prior DWIs, McCarty was convicted of DWI—as a third DWI offense, making the offense a third-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.04 (basic DWI), 49.09(b)(2) (West 2011) (two prior DWIs makes DWI third-degree felony).[1]            On appeal, McCarty argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction because the two prior DWI convictions were void and thus not available to enhance his offense to a third-degree felony. He claims that the prior DWIs were void because he was indigent and was not represented by counsel during their adjudication. McCarty’s claim on appeal amounts to a collateral attack on the two prior DWI convictions. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because McCarty has not demonstrated from this record that the prior DWI convictions are void.            A collateral attack on a prior judgment is permitted only if the prior judgment is void.  Rhodes v. State, 240 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  “We have long held that a defect that renders a sentence void may be raised at any time.” Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Ex parte Black, 922 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).[2] It is true that a criminal judgment is void if that judgment is rendered in a proceeding in which an indigent defendant is required to face trial without appointed counsel, unless he or she waived the right to counsel.  Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).            When prior convictions are collaterally attacked, the judgments reflecting those convictions are presumed to be regular and the accused bears the burden of defeating that presumption. Swanson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. ref’d). Bald assertions by a defendant that he was without the assistance of counsel at his prior convictions are not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the judgments.  Id. (citing Disheroon v. State, 687 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). The fact that a judgment is silent as to the name of defense counsel alone is insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the records before the court. Chancy v. State, 614 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Ex parte Swinney, 499 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).            McCarty’s two prior DWI convictions were introduced as exhibits for the trial court. McCarty, who was found to be indigent in this case, first argues that he was “clearly indigent” in 1987 and 2007 when the two prior convictions were adjudicated. In support, he cites to his sister’s testimony that he lost a job at Campbell Soup as a result of an arson conviction in 1984. In March 2011, McCarty testified that he received a disability check in the amount of $673.00 per month for the past six years. The assumption McCarty asks this Court to draw is that the disability checks were McCarty’s sole source of income after 1984.            McCarty’s sister also testified, however, that McCarty “did odd jobs” and “did work for the lawn services and different people” in the recent past. This was confirmed by McCarty, who stated that he was employed in “professional yard work, landscaping, mowing yards and stuff” for the past eight years. [F]or a judgment to be void, the record must leave no question about the existence of the fundamental defect.  If the record is incomplete, and the missing portion could conceivably show that the defect does not in fact exist, then the judgment is not void, even though the available portions of the record tend to support the existence of the defect.  Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 668–69. The evidence presented by this record fails to establish that McCarty was indigent during 1987 and 2007.            Also, we do not find that McCarty was without counsel when he pled guilty to the two prior DWI convictions. The 2007 DWI conviction stated on the judgment that McCarty appeared “in person, (and by attorney),” and pled guilty to the offense. The 1987 DWI conviction also indicated McCarty had counsel. This judgment stated that “the Defendant then and there in open court, and in writing, requested permission to waive a trial by jury and to be tried before the Court, to which counsel for both the State of Texas and Defendant added their written consent and approval.”            Where there is a claim that an indigent person was denied counsel, or that a waiver of counsel was involuntary, the record must demonstrate the truth of the claim. Nothing in the prior DWI judgments establishes that McCarty was not represented by counsel; in fact, they suggest the opposite. The fact that McCarty’s counsel was not identified by name is insufficient to overcome the presumption of validity.  See Chancy, 614 S.W.2d at 447; Swanson, 772 S.W.2d at 164 (appellant fails to meet his burden when his “testimony that he was not represented by counsel at the time he pled guilty in the prior felony case is uncorroborated by any evidence in the record”).            Based on the record before us, McCarty has not overcome the presumption of regularity of the prior DWI convictions.  Chancy, 614 S.W.2d at 447; Swanson, 722 S.W.2d at 164. Therefore, the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the trial court’s judgment in this case.            We affirm the trial court’s judgment.                                                                            Josh R. Morriss, III                                                                        Chief Justice  Date Submitted:         September 20, 2011   Date Decided:            September 21, 2011  Do Not Publish    [1]Additionally, based on McCarty’s plea of true to a sentence-enhancement of arson, he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.42(a)(3) (enhancing third-degree felony, with one prior enhancement offense, to a second-degree-felony punishment range), 12.33 (West 2011) (incarceration range for second-degree felony, two years to twenty years).  [2]An appellant does not forfeit this claim by pleading true to enhancement paragraphs. Rich, 194 S.W.3d at 513.