in the Matter of the Marriage of Javier Zamora and Elma Zamora and in the Interest of Maricela Zamora and Rachael Zamora, Minor Children

In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana ______________________________ No. 06-05-00135-CV ______________________________  IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF JAVIER ZAMORA AND ELMA ZAMORA AND IN THE INTEREST OF MARICELA ZAMORA AND RACHAEL ZAMORA, MINOR CHILDREN                                                 On Appeal from the 102nd Judicial District Court Bowie County, Texas Trial Court No. 04D1255-102                                                  Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ross MEMORANDUM OPINION           Appellant, Javier Zamora, has presented this Court with a motion to withdraw his notice of appeal and dismiss his pending appeal in this matter pursuant to Rule 42.1(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a). The motion is signed by the appellant, who is representing himself pro se.           We grant the appellant's motion and dismiss the appeal.                                                                             Donald R. Ross                                                                            Justice Date Submitted:      January 11, 2006 Date Decided:         January 12, 2006 riority="66" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2"/>          In The Court of Appeals                        Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana                                                 ______________________________                                                              No. 06-09-00098-CR                                                ______________________________                                  GEORGE LESLIE SANDERS, Appellant                                                                 V.                                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                                                                                                                                             On Appeal from the 196th Judicial District Court                                                              Hunt County, Texas                                                            Trial Court No. 25,023                                                                                                                                                Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.                                        Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss                                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION             On three separate dates, George Leslie Sanders was caught on video selling methamphetamine to a confidential informant.[1] As a result, he pled guilty to two deliveries of between one and four grams of methamphetamine, for which the jury assessed twenty-nine years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Institutional Division.  Sanders also pled guilty to a larger methamphetamine delivery, for which the jury assessed forty-nine years’ imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine.[2]            On appeal, Sanders complains he was denied due process when, without benefit of purity testing, the State’s witness testified Sanders sold a more pure form of methamphetamine called “ICE.”  Sanders claims this statement was a knowingly false misrepresentation made merely to inflame the jury. He also alleges the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to question him about previous convictions used for enhancement during punishment because “the facts of the case were more prejudicial than probative.” Finally, Sanders argues the trial court erred in denying motions for mistrial after the State asked him about noncooperation with the police in a case in which he was a victim.            We conclude that (1) Sanders waived his complaint regarding use of the term “ICE,” (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of Sanders’ prior retaliation convictions, and (3) admitting the punishment-phase question and answer regarding Sanders’ “non-cooperation” with police was not error. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. (1)       Sanders Waived His Complaint Regarding Use of the Term “ICE”             As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for our review, Sanders must have made a complaint about the use of the term “ICE” as false information to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.            The record reveals that the confidential informant and the investigator, Wesley Russell, both testified Sanders sold “ICE methamphetamine.” Russell explained that ICE was a big problem in the community and that it was “much more potent than the regular methamphetamine.” Sanders did not object to this testimony. Instead, he pointed out during cross-examination that no purity report was requested. The motion for new trial also fails to mention this point of error. Since Sanders failed to object and bring any alleged error to the trial court’s attention, he has not preserved this issue for our review.[3] (2)       The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing Evidence of Sanders’ Prior Retaliation Convictions             Sanders pled true to all enhancement paragraphs. Nevertheless, his counsel called him to the stand to confirm that he had been convicted of retaliation and that no weapon was used during  the commission of the crimes. During cross-examination, the State asked if the previous convictions were for retaliation against two police officers. Sanders objected that “to go behind the conviction itself is just totally inadmissible.”  The State replied it had a right to discuss the basic facts of the case to demonstrate Sanders’ “nature and his credibility as a witness.” The court overruled Sanders’ objection.            The trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence at the punishment phase is subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Manning v. State, 126 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (citing Mitchell v. State, 931 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character, an opinion regarding his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and, notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsible, regardless of whether he has previously been charged with or finally convicted of the crime or act.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 2009).             Since revision of Article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court has held that introduction of details and facts pertaining to prior convictions is permissible in Texas. Hambrick v. State, 11 S.W.3d 241, 243 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (citing Davis v. State, 968 S.W.2d 368, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). Specifically, if the State seeks “to go behind the conviction with details about the prior offense, the evidence is admissible.” Id.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to question Sanders about his prior retaliation convictions.[4]            For the first time, Sanders raises the contention that the facts are more prejudicial than probative. This contention was not raised in objections during trial or in the motion for new trial. Sanders did not preserve this point of error, and we decline to address it.            We overrule this point of error.  (3)       Admitting the Punishment-Phase Question and Answer Regarding Sanders’ “Non-Cooperation” with Police Was Not Error             While Sanders was on the stand, the State began questioning him about the murder of his friend in which he was also shot. Sanders twice objected to the State’s initial questions referring to the incident and unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial. After a discussion off the record, the State established without objection that Sanders refused to cooperate with the police investigation by refusing to give an affidavit.[5]  Sanders complains the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial.            We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Towery v. State, 262 S.W.3d 586, 598 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Mistrial is an appropriate remedy only when objectionable events “are so emotionally inflammatory that curative instructions are not likely to prevent the jury from becoming unfairly prejudiced against the defendant.” Hines v. State, 269 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d, untimely filed; pet. ref’d [2 pets.]) (quoting Young v. State, 137 S.W.3d 65, 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).            After Sanders explained he was the victim in a shooting, the trial court conducted an off- the-record discussion. When back on the record, Sanders’ counsel objected that the “line of questioning” was irrelevant and immaterial. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the first motion for mistrial. Sanders’ general objection to the State’s line of questioning as irrelevant was properly denied. The court could have decided that the State sought to introduce evidence of Sanders’ character and attitude of noncooperation and retaliation toward police. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07. Moreover, the only statement made by Sanders at the point of objection established he was a victim of a crime. Counsel does not explain how this information could unfairly prejudice the jury against Sanders, rather than cause it to sympathize with him.            The State next asked Sanders if he “refused to cooperate and give testimony regarding the murder of Bruce Wetstone.” Sanders replied, “No, ma’am.” Sanders’ counsel objected and asked the court to instruct the jury to disregard the question and answer. The trial court granted his request, but denied a motion for a mistrial.            When evaluating the effectiveness of a curative instruction to disregard, we look to “the nature of the [improper comment]; the persistence of the prosecutor; the flagrancy of the violation; the particular instruction given; the weight of the incriminating evidence; and the harm to the accused as measured by the severity of the sentence.”  Searcy v. State, 231 S.W.3d 539, 549 n.10 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. ref’d) (quoting Roberson v. State, 100 S.W.3d 36, 41 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. ref’d)).            The court instructed the jury to disregard “the last question and response,” an instruction we presume the jury followed. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Drake v. State, 123 S.W.3d 596, 604 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). We do not find this question to be inoculated with such prejudice that the court’s instruction to disregard it would be ineffectual. Moreover, Sanders fails to explain how his response—that he did not refuse to cooperate with the murder investigation—would prejudice the jury against him. Finally, the jury sentenced Sanders to approximately one-half of the available punishment range for the larger methamphetamine delivery, and approximately one-third of the available range for the two smaller deliveries.            Given the facts of this case, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Sanders’ motions for the “extreme remedy” of mistrial. Lollis v. State, 232 S.W.3d 803, 810–11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. ref’d). This point of error is overruled.            We affirm the judgment of the trial court.                                                                                        Josh R. Morriss, III                                                                                    Chief Justice  Date Submitted:         February 24, 2010      Date Decided:            February 26, 2010  Do Not Publish [1]Sanders appeals from this cause number and judgments entered in cause numbers 06-09-00099-CR and 06-09-00100-CR. The other two cases are the subjects of other opinions issued this date.  [2]The larger delivery was in an amount of four or more grams but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine. [3]Sanders claims in his brief he was denied due process because the statements from Russell were knowingly false. We point out that Russell’s statements were based on his training to identify “ICE.” The fact that no purity testing was conducted on the methamphetamine does not demonstrate Russell’s statements were knowingly false. [4]Because the facts of Sanders’ retaliation convictions were admissible, the trial court did not err in denying Sanders’ repeated motions for mistrial on this basis. [5]Sanders’ brief alleges the State incorrectly asserted he committed a drug-related murder. The record establishes otherwise. Sanders also claims the State’s questions “were false statements knowingly presented to the jury.” The State’s questions, most of which were not objected to, could not constitute knowing misrepresentations of fact as alleged by Sanders in his brief.Â