Joseph Baca v. State

NO. 07-01-0397-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL C JUNE 28, 2002 ______________________________ JOSEPH ADAM BACA, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE _________________________________ FROM THE 64TH DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY; NO. A13819-0009; HONORABLE JACK R. MILLER, JUDGE _______________________________ Before QUINN and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ. Pursuant to a plea bargain, on October 5, 2000, appellant Joseph Adam Baca was convicted of unauthorized absence from the Hale County Law Enforcement Center and punishment was assessed at two years confinement in a state jail facility and a $500 fine. The sentence was suspended, but after hearing evidence that appellant had violated the conditions of community supervision, the trial court revoked community supervision and imposed the original punishment. Appellant filed a general notice of appeal challenging the trial court's judgment. In presenting this appeal, counsel has filed an Anders (1) brief in support of a motion to withdraw. Based upon the rationale expressed herein, the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel has certified that he has diligently reviewed the record and, in his opinion, the record reflects no reversible error or grounds upon which an appeal can be predicated. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); Monroe v. State, 671 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1984, no pet.). Thus, he concludes the appeal is frivolous and without merit. In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978), counsel has candidly discussed why, under the controlling authorities, there is no error in the court's judgment. Counsel has also shown that he sent a copy of the brief to appellant, and informed appellant that, in counsel's view, the appeal is without merit. In addition, counsel has demonstrated that he notified appellant of his right to review the record and file a pro se brief if he desired to do so. Appellant did not file a pro se brief nor did the State favor us with a brief. Appellate jurisdiction is invoked by filing a timely and proper notice of appeal. See State v. Riewe, 13 S.W3d 408, 410 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000). To perfect an appeal from a judgment that was rendered on a defendant's guilty plea and in which the punishment assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant, a notice of appeal must (a) specify that the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect; (b) specify that the substance of the appeal was raised by written motion and ruled on before trial; or (c) state that the trial court granted permission to appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3); see also White v. State, 61 S.W.3d 424, 428-29 (Tex.Cr.App. 2001) (holding that the notice requirements set forth in Rule 25.2(b)(3) should be interpreted according to their plain meaning and that failing to meet the requirements fails to invoke the jurisdiction of an appellate court); see also Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex.Cr.App. 2001) (holding that the notice of appeal limitations of Rule 25.2(b)(3) apply to an appeal from a conviction rendered on a guilty plea with agreed punishment). Appellant's notice of appeal does not contain any of the requirements set forth in Rule 25.2(b)(3) necessary to invoke this Court's jurisdiction over his conviction. Thus, our jurisdiction has not been invoked and the appeal must be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction and we are without jurisdiction to rule on counsel's motion to withdraw. Don H. Reavis Justice Do not publish. 1. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). eg, according to Pennington, as to hide something between the seat and console. Pennington asked the driver for ID and, when Ramirez could not produce any ID, asked Ramirez to step out of the car. As Ramirez stepped out, appellee laid a newspaper over the console area. After Pennington handcuffed Ramirez for safety purposes, Pennington had Hawley take Ramirez to the patrol car. Pennington stayed at the car and removed the newspaper that appellee laid out and saw a handgun between the seat and console area. Concurrent with Pennington’s observation, as Hawley took Ramirez to the patrol car, Hawley asked Ramirez if there was anything illegal in the car. Ramirez responded, “a gun.” Upon learning that a gun was located in the vehicle, Hawley placed Ramirez in the patrol car and returned to the vehicle to search it, including appellee’s purse located on the floorboard of the passenger side. Hawley “frisked” the purse for weapons but instead found a set of scales. After asking appellee if he could continue to search the purse, appellee answered yes and further directed Hawley to “stuff in the black bag.” Inside the purse, Hawley found a black bag containing marijuana and methamphetamine. Ramirez was arrested for unlawfully carrying a weapon and appellee was arrested for possession of methamphetamine. At a suppression hearing, appellee contended that the trial court in this case was collaterally estopped from admitting the evidence of the methamphetamine because another trial court had held that the detention of Ramirez and subsequent search of the vehicle was illegal and had suppressed the evidence. See State v. Ramirez, 246 S.W.3d 287 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2008, no pet.). After hearing testimony on the issue, the trial court ruled that the State was estopped from maintaining the lawfulness of the search and seizure and suppressed the evidence seized during the search of Lovington’s purse. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that “[b]y operation of either the ’law of the case’ or estoppel doctrines, this Court concludes that the officers’ continued detention . . . was unlawful.” Appealing the trial court’s suppression of the evidence, the State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in suppressing the evidence in light of the trial court’s own findings of fact and conclusions of law. We agree. Collateral estoppel applies when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment and that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties. See Murphy v. State, 239 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Collateral estoppel deals only with specific factual determinations, not legal claims or legal conclusions. Guajardo v. State, 109 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). When the sole witness at the motion to suppress hearing is the arresting officer and the trial court files findings of fact and conclusions of law, the only question before us is whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts it found. See Ballman v. State, 157 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and because the trial court accepted virtually all of the officers’ testimony, we must give that court almost total deference in reviewing those historical facts found but review de novo the application of the law to those facts. See id. In this case, we note that the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the trial court demonstrate that the trial court believed that [t]he Seventh Court of Appeals upheld [a previous] court’s order suppressing evidence seized from Ramirez . . . . Established, then, is the ‘law of the case’ that the seizure of evidence respecting both defendants in the companion cases was unlawful. The State is estopped from here maintaining the lawfulness of the search and seizure. However, collateral estoppel does not apply because the parties differ in the companion case. In the previous case, Ramirez was the person contesting the legality of the continued detention. See Ramirez, 246 S.W.3d at 289. In this case, Lovington is the party seeking to have the evidence suppressed. Furthermore, the determination of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to continue the encounter after Pennington discovered that neither Ramirez or appellee were the subject of the arrest warrant is a legal conclusion and, thus, not subject to collateral estoppel. See Guajardo, 109 S.W.3d at 460. Thus, the factual determinations made by the previous trial court in Ramirez apply only to that case. Id. We hold that the trial court erred in ultimately concluding that the State was estopped from maintaining the lawfulness of the search and seizure. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to suppress and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Mackey K. Hancock Justice Do not publish. Quinn, C.J., dissenting.