Billy McKee, Individually and as Independent of the Estate of Thelma McKee v. David G. McNeir, M.D. Dennis Dove, M.D. Individually and D/B/A Dove & Associates, and Barry L. Horowitz, M.D.

NO. 07-03-0412-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL E NOVEMBER 22, 2004 ______________________________ BILLY JOE MCKEE, individually and as independent executor of the estate of THELMA MCKEE, deceased, Appellant v. DAVID G. MCNEIR, M.D., DENNIS DOVE, M.D., individually and d/b/a DOVE & ASSOCIATES, and BARRY L. HOROWITZ, M.D., Appellees _________________________________ FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NO. 87,938-B; HON. JOHN B. BOARD, PRESIDING _______________________________ Opinion _______________________________ Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ., and BOYD, S.J. (1) Billy Joe McKee, individually and as independent executor of the estate of Thelma McKee, deceased (McKee), appeals from a judgment denying him recovery against Dr. David G. McNeir (NcNeir), Dr. Dennis Dove, individually and d/b/a Dove & Associates (Dove), and Dr. Barry L. Horowitz (Horowitz). His sole issue involves the trial court's refusal to admit evidence, during the rebuttal phase of the trial, of prior medical malpractice claims against Dove. (2) McKee sought to admit the evidence 1) because the defendants purportedly "opened the door" to it and 2) for purposes of rebutting Dove's opinions. However, the trial court excluded it because it was not rebuttal evidence, no one had opened the door to its admission, and its prejudicial effect "would far outweigh any probative value" it may have. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Standard of Review The appropriate standard of review is one of abused discretion. That is, before we can say that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, we must conclude that the decision evinced an instance of abused discretion. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753-54 (Tex. 1995). It evinces such an instance when it fails to comport with guiding rules or principles. Id. Next, and assuming arguendo that we were to hold that the trial court did err, authority prohibits us from reversing the judgment unless we determine that the "case turn[ed] on the evidence excluded . . . ." Id.; accord, Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. 2004) (so holding). And, the burden lies with the complainant to demonstrate that. Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d at 144. As to the guiding principles applicable at bar, we find several in the Texas Rules of Evidence. The first mandates that evidence of other wrongs is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show that he acted in conformity with that character. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). It may, however, be received by the trial court if offered for other purposes, such as to prove motive, plan, scheme, knowledge, or identity, for instance. Id. Finally, even if admissible, the trial court may still exclude it if the probative value of the evidence, if any, is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing of the issues, or misleading the jury. Tex. R. Evid. 403. Application of Standard Underlying McKee's argument on appeal is the proposition that the evidence of other malpractice claims was admissible due to the similarity between the alleged neglect there involved and that involved here. Yet, our review of the record fails to illustrate that such a contention was urged below. Again, McKee informed the trial court that the evidence was admissible to discredit Dove's opinions and because the door to its use had been opened. Nowhere did he urge that it was admissible due to its similarity to the circumstances or claims before us. Since the grounds asserted on appeal must comport with those mentioned at trial to preserve a complaint, Moser v. Davis, 79 S.W.3d 162, 169 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.), and they do not here, the issue was waived. Next, to the extent that evidence of similar wrongs may be admissible, despite Rule 404(b), it is clear that, at the very least, the circumstances of the incidents and conditions under which they occurred must be reasonably similar. Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d at 138 (involving unintended acceleration of a vehicle); Farr v. Wright, 833 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (involving a malpractice claim). And, the degree of similarity required depends upon the fact or issue in dispute. Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d at 138. Yet, even if similar, the evidence remains subject to exclusion if it creates undue prejudice, confusion, or delay. Id. Additionally, inherent in both Nissan and Farr is the requirement that the proponent of the evidence illustrate that the supposedly similar incident actually occurred. Simply put, if the incident did not happen, then it could hardly be admissible to prove the occurrence of some other act or event. And, therein lies the problem here. The only evidence of record purporting to illustrate the existence of the extraneous incidents of malpractice were copies of pleadings and final orders issued by various courts. Yet, most anything can be said in a pleading, whether true or not. Consequently, including an allegation favorable to the pleader in such a document is seldom evidence of its occurrence. See In re M.C., 65 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (stating that "generally, pleadings are not admissible as proof of their contents in favor of the pleader"). Furthermore, the final orders accompanying each pleading in question say nothing about the veracity of the particular plaintiff's claims. Instead, they either indicate that the claims were settled or that recovery was denied; none state that Dove was negligent or that the incident described in the respective pleading actually happened. So, because the incidents underlying McKee's complaint before us appear as nothing more than mere allegations in various pleadings, we find no basis upon which to infer that they actually occurred or that they were reasonably similar to those underlying the claims against Dove. In short, the record does not permit us to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence in question. Thus, we overrule McKee's issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Brian Quinn Justice 1. John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon 1998). 2. Though some 20 different suits were mentioned at trial, not all involved medical malpractice claims. Furthermore, McKee represented during oral argument and in his brief that he is concerned only about eight particular instances of litigation. lse" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/> NO. 07-10-00120-CV; 07-10-00121-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL C MARCH 9, 2011 HARVEY FLOYD HODO, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY; NO. 18700-A, 18765-A; HONORABLE RICHARD DAMBOLD, JUDGE Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Harvey Floyd Hodo, an inmate proceeding pro se, perfected appeal from two trial court orders, dated March 23, 2010, in each referenced cause, which, pursuant to section 501.014(e) of the Texas Government Code, authorized the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, to withhold from Hodo’s inmate trust account the following amounts to pay for costs associated with his criminal convictions: (1) $1,586.50 in cause number 18700-A; and (2) $486.50 in cause number 18765-A. Hodo filed pro se notices of appeal on April 6, 2010, challenging the withdrawal orders. On June 17, 2010, this Court abated the appeals for 180 days to allow Hodo time to take such action as is necessary to (1) obtain the necessary documentation of the underlying court orders; (2) compare the underlying court order to the withdrawal orders; (3) file appropriate motions to modify, correct, or rescind the withdrawal orders; (4) present those motions to the trial court; (5) schedule any necessary hearing; and (6) obtain from the trial court final appealable orders addressing those motions. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.2; see also Iacono v. Lyons, 6 S.W.3d 715 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (finding appeal prematurely filed and abating and remanding to permit the jurisdictional defect to be cured). On January 10, 2011, this Court received a supplemental clerk’s record in these appeals that includes a November 12, 2010 Order on Defendant’s Motion to Rescind the Withdrawal Notification Orders, which modified the March 23, 2010 withdrawal orders to omit the assessment of attorney’s fees and “Juvenile Crime and Delinq. Fee.” As a result of these modifications, the trial court recalculated the costs associated with Hodo’s criminal convictions to be $1,286.00 in cause number 18700-A; and $286.00 in cause number 18765-A. The trial court further entered Amended Orders to Withdraw Funds reflecting the modifications. These appeals were reinstated on January 10, 2011. On January 11, 2011, Hodo was notified that, by order of this Court, his appellate brief was due to be filed on or before February 10, 2011. Hodo did not file his brief nor request an extension of time to file his brief by this date. Consequently, by letter dated February 18, 2011, the Clerk of this Court notified Hodo that his brief was past due and that failure to file his brief with this Court on or before February 28, 2011, could result in dismissal of his appeal pursuant to Rule 38.8(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Hodo has neither filed his brief nor responded to this Court’s February 18, 2011 correspondence. Accordingly, we now dismiss this appeal for want of prosecution and failure to comply with a notice from the Clerk of this Court requiring a response or other action in a specified time. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), (c). Mackey K. Hancock Justice