in the Interest H. N. W. and H. M. W.

NO. 07-06-0313-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL A DECEMBER 20, 2006 ______________________________ IN THE INTEREST OF H.N.W. AND H.M.W., CHILDREN _________________________________ FROM THE 100TH DISTRICT COURT OF CHILDRESS COUNTY; NO. 9220; HONORABLE PHIL VANDERPOOL, JUDGE _______________________________ Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPINION Dale and Laura Weatherington (Dale and Laura) appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to H.M.W. and H.N.W. We affirm. Counsel was appointed to represent Dale and Laura on appeal. Subsequently, appointed counsel filed an Anders (1) brief and a motion to withdraw. In his Anders brief, counsel certified to the court that he had made a diligent search of the entire record and had concluded that there is no reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Counsel discussed several possible issues on appeal and why each was, in his opinion, without merit. Counsel also certified that he had informed his clients of his conclusion and of their right, individually, to review the record and file a pro se response to the brief and motion. This court has also contacted Dale and Laura, in writing, informing them of their counsel's brief and motion and of their rights to individually respond thereto, after reviewing the record. Dale has responded alleging several areas of error. Laura has not responded. At the outset we note that this court has previously held that an appellate counsel may file an Anders brief in a proceeding where a party's parental rights have been terminated. In re AWT, 61 S.W.3d 87, 88 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.). As previously stated, counsel detailed in his brief the possible issues for appeal. Further, counsel provided citations to controlling authorities and analysis explaining why each possible issue was without merit. High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Upon conducting our independent review of the record, we are convinced that appellate counsel is correct in his determination that all identifiable grounds for appeal are without merit. As in a criminal case, our review of the record included a search for independent grounds for appeal not otherwise identified or discussed by counsel. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). We have found none. Finally, we have reviewed the possible grounds raised by Dale in his response to the Anders brief. None of the grounds raised have any arguable basis for appeal. Accordingly, counsel's motion to withdraw is hereby granted and the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Mackey K. Hancock Justice 1. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). lse" Priority="1" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/> NO. 07-11-00096-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL D MARCH 25, 2011 EX PARTE RODOLFO M. CASTILLO Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPINION On March 1, 2011, Rodolfo M. Castillo, acting pro se, filed an application for writ of habeas corpus as an original proceeding in this Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 52 (original proceedings). His basic contention in the application is that his retained counsel entered a “no contest” plea to an assault by contact charge in 2008 without his consent. Castillo contends entrance of the plea caused revocation of his parole and his return to incarceration. Because we doubted our authority to consider Castillo’s application, we provided him the opportunity to demonstrate our jurisdiction. He has submitted a response, filed March 14. We have reviewed his application and his March 14 filing. This Court’s jurisdiction over original proceedings is limited to that granted us by the Constitution and laws of our state. Tex. Const., art. V, § 6 (courts of appeals shall “have such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be prescribed by law”). Our authority to issue writs of habeas corpus is limited to those for persons restrained in our court of appeals district by virtue of a court order in a civil case. Tex. Gov't Code § 22.221(d) (West 2010). We have no original habeas corpus jurisdiction in criminal matters. Watson v. State, 96 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. ref’d); Ex parte Hearon, 3 S.W.3d 650, 650 (Tex.App.—Waco 1999, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Layton, 928 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1996, orig. proceeding); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 4.03 (West 2009) (criminal jurisdiction of courts of appeals); cf. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 4.04 (West 2009) (jurisdiction of court of criminal appeals); 11.05 (habeas corpus jurisdiction) (West 2010). Our habeas corpus jurisdiction in criminal matters is appellate only. Dodson v. State, 988 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). The restraint on his liberty Castillo describes in his application arises from criminal proceedings. Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. The application is dismissed. James T. Campbell Justice