Melissa Lynette Daniels v. State

NO. 07-06-0077-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL A SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 ______________________________ MELISSA DANIELS, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE _________________________________ FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY; NO. 17,662-B; HONORABLE JOHN BOARD, JUDGE _______________________________ Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Melissa Daniels, appeals her plea of guilty to 30 counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and 23 counts of indecency with a child. The jury sentenced appellant to 30 years incarceration on the aggravated sexual abuse counts and ten years incarceration on the indecency counts. Appellant's counsel has filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969). We affirm. Appellant's counsel, in compliance with Anders and Gainous, states that he has diligently reviewed the appellate record and is of the opinion that the record reflects no reversible error upon which an appeal can arguably be predicated. Counsel thus concludes that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel's brief presents a summation of the procedural history of the case and discusses why, under the controlling authorities, there is no reversible error in the trial court proceedings and judgment. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Counsel has attached an exhibit showing that a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw have been forwarded to appellant and that counsel has provided appellant a copy of the record for her review and has advised her of her right to file a pro se response to counsel's motion and brief. The clerk of this court has also advised appellant by letter of her right to file a response to counsel's brief. Appellant has not filed a response. We have made an independent examination of the record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous grounds upon which an appeal could arguably be founded. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). We have found no such grounds. Appellant's counsel has moved for leave to withdraw. See Johnson v. State, 885 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex.App.-Waco 1994, writ ref'd). We carried the motion for consideration with the merits of the appeal. Having considered the merits and finding no reversible error, appellant's counsel's motion to withdraw is granted and the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Mackey K. Hancock Justice Do not publish. d by the valid arrest warrant demonstrates that the evidence found during the search of appellant's person was not discovered through exploitation of the initial illegal arrest." Reed v. State, 809 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no pet.); see Welcome v. State, 865 S.W.2d 128, 133-34 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd); Brooks v. State, 830 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.); accord, Johnson v. State, 496 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding that the photographs of appellant taken at the police station after a purportedly illegal arrest were admissible since, at the time the photos were taken, the appellant was also the subject of a pre-existing and valid arrest warrant involving unrelated crimes). Here, while the initial detention may have been improper, Horton discovered that appellant was the subject of a valid arrest warrant. Furthermore, the contraband found on appellant and in the car was the fruit of two searches conducted once appellant was arrested under the outstanding warrant rather than for his conduct leading up to the initial stop. Thus, Reed, Welcome, Brooks, and Johnson control the outcome of this appeal and compel us to hold that discovery of the contraband was sufficiently attenuated from the initial detention so as to purge the contraband of any alleged taint. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Brian Quinn Chief Justice Do not publish. 1. The trooper testified that the posted minimum speed limit for the area was 45 miles per hour.