in the Interest of J.R.R. and M.L.R., Children

NO. 07-07-0210-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL A DECEMBER 11, 2007 ______________________________ IN THE INTEREST OF J.R.R. AND M.L.R., CHILDREN _________________________________ FROM THE 140TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2005-531,634; HONORABLE JIM BOB DARNELL, JUDGE _______________________________ Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Michael J. Riedel, proceeding pro se, perfected this appeal from the trial court’s order modifying a prior order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. The clerk’s record was filed on July 23, 2007. Initially, Riedel’s brief was due to be filed on August 22, 2007. The deadline was twice extended, first by notice from this Court, and then by Motion for Extension of Time filed by Appellant, to October 25, 2007. Riedel did not file his brief. This Court then notified him by letter of November 15, 2007, to file the brief by November 30, 2007, together with a response reasonably explaining how Appellee is not significantly injured by the failure to file a brief. Appellant was advised that failure to do so would result in dismissal of the appeal per Rules 38.8(a)(1) and 42.3(c) and (d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant did not respond nor file his brief. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed. Patrick A. Pirtle Justice span> Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Gregory Dean Banister, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a notice of appeal seeking to challenge an order signed by the Honorable Kelly G. Moore denying his motion to recuse the Honorable Felix Klein from participating in the resolution of a writ of habeas corpus filed in the 154th District Court of Lamb County, pursuant to article 11.07, section 3(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Having considered the substantive basis of this appeal, we dismiss for want of jurisdiction. This Court is obligated to determine, sua sponte, its jurisdiction to entertain an appeal. Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1994, writ denied) (citing New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2s 677, 678 (Tex. 1990)); State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), overruled on other grounds, State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901-03 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). As a general rule, a judgment must be final before it can be appealed. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Otherwise, the appeal is interlocutory and this Court is without jurisdiction to review the decision except for those statutory exceptions permitting interlocutory appeals. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (Vernon 2008). A trial court’s ruling on a motion to recuse does not fall within one of those exceptions. Recusal is governed by Rule 18a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. In Arnold v. State, 853 S.W.2d 435, 544 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993), the Court held that Rule 18a applies to criminal cases absent “any explicit or implicit legislative intent indicating otherwise.” Rule 18a(f) provides in part that if a motion to recuse is denied, it may be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment. By letter dated April 24, 2009, the Clerk of this Court advised Appellant that the order being appealed appeared to be interlocutory. Appellant was afforded until May 14, 2009, to demonstrate grounds for continuing the jurisdiction of this Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). That deadline was extended to June 15, 2009, after an extension of time was granted. On June 16, 2009, Appellant filed a Motion Demonstrating Why This Court Should Not Dismiss Banister’s Appeal For Want Of Jurisdiction. By that motion, Appellant argues that the Legislature intended for interlocutory orders to be appealable. He also questions whether the “collateral order doctrine” permits this Court to exercise jurisdiction over an order on a motion to recuse that does not arise from a final judgment. We conclude that the collateral order doctrine does not apply. See In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 120 (Tex. 2004). Appellant’s complaint is adequately vindicable in the Court of Criminal Appeals. Under article 11.07, section 3(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, his application for writ of habeas corpus is returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Additionally, the Court of Criminal Appeals is the only court with jurisdiction in a writ of habeas corpus proceeding filed pursuant to article 11.07, section 3(b). See Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). A convicting court’s role, in this case, the 154th District Court of Lamb County, is defined in article 11.07, section 3(c) and (d). Article 11.07, section 5 clearly provides that “[a]fter conviction the procedure outlined in this Act shall be exclusive and any other proceeding shall be void and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner.” Article 11.07 contains no role for courts of appeals. In re McAfee, 53 S.W.3d 715, 718 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] Dist. 2001, orig. proceeding). Therefore, we conclude that a trial court’s ruling on a motion to recuse stemming from an 11.07 application for writ of habeas corpus is not reviewable by direct appeal to courts of appeals. Notwithstanding Appellant’s diligent effort, this Court cannot create jurisdiction where none exists. Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). Consequently, Appellant has failed to demonstrate why this purported appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). Patrick A. Pirtle Justice Do not publish.