Robert King Conway, Jr. v. Richard Thompson

NO. 07-06-0284-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL B FEBRUARY 28, 2008 ______________________________ ROBERT CONWAY, APPELLANT V. RICHARD THOMPSON, ET AL., APPELLEES _________________________________ FROM THE 87TH DISTRICT COURT OF ANDERSON COUNTY; NO. 9991; HONORABLE DEBORAH OAKES EVANS, JUDGE _______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPINION           Appellant Robert Conway appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his claims with prejudice pursuant to a plea to the jurisdiction. We reverse the dismissal. Background           Conway, a prison inmate, filed a pro se and in forma pauperis suit against Robert Thompson III, Martina Cordell and Leslie Hazlewood, employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. He alleged the defendants wrongfully confiscated his cowboy boots and broke his word processor. His pleadings placed a “tangible” value of $270 on the word processor and $125 on the boots.           After answering the suit, appellees filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting Conway had failed to plead actual damages above the district court’s minimum jurisdictional limit. They argued that minimum jurisdictional limit is $500. The trial court agreed, and dismissed Conway’s suit. He appealed, and the appeal later was transferred from the Twelfth Court of Appeals to this Court.                                                                 Analysis           Through four points of error, Conway contends the trial court erred when it dismissed his lawsuit based on appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction, erred when it dismissed his petition with prejudice, erred when it dismissed his suit without notice and erred when it refused to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Standard of Review           In his arguments to this Court, Conway appears to urge an abuse of discretion review. However, we review a trial court’s granting of a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144, 119 S.Ct. 2018, 143 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1999); Levatte v. City of Wichita Falls, 144 S.W.3d 218, 222 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). We will apply a de novo standard of review to the trial court’s dismissal of Conway’s suit. Minimum Amount in Controversy           When a defendant asserts that the amount in controversy is below the court's jurisdictional limit, the plaintiff's pleadings are determinative unless the defendant specifically alleges that the amount was pleaded merely as a sham for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction, or the defendant can readily establish that the amount in controversy is insufficient. Bland Independent School Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The phrase “amount in controversy,” in the jurisdictional context, means the sum of money or the value of the thing originally sued for. Tune v. Tex. Dep’t of Public Safety, 23 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tex. 2000). Conway originally sued for damages and alternatively requested the return of his cowboy boots, which he valued at $125, and the repair or replacement of his word processor, which he valued at $270. Whether we consider Conway’s suit as one seeking damages or for other relief, we agree with appellees that the amount in controversy, for our purpose here, is $395.            Conway and appellees acknowledge the differing opinions among the courts of appeals with regard to the minimum amount in controversy currently required to invoke the jurisdiction of a district court. Compare Chapa v. Spivey, 999 S.W.2d 833, 835-36 (Tex.App.–Tyler 1999, no pet.) (minimum jurisdictional amount is still $500) with Arteaga v. Jackson, 994 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (as result of 1985 constitutional and statutory amendments, minimum jurisdictional amount was reduced to $200.01). Our Supreme Court has taken note of the question but has not had occasion to resolve it. See, e.g., Dubai Petr. Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 n.4 (Tex. 2000) (noting there may no longer be a jurisdictional minimum for district courts). See also Sultan v. Mathew, 178 S.W.3d 747,756 (Tex. 2005) (Hecht, J., dissenting) (also noting “whether any such limit remains [after the 1985 constitutional amendment] is an unresolved question”); Smith v. Clary Corp., 917 S.W.2d 796, 799 n.3 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (referring to “open question whether district courts now have minimum jurisdictional amounts after the 1985 constitutional amendments”).           The damages Conway seeks are under $500. He filed his petition in the 87th Judicial District Court, a court within the Twelfth Court of Appeals District. The Twelfth Court of Appeals has held that a district court's minimum jurisdictional limit is $500. See Chapa, 999 S.W.2d at 834.           We, however, have agreed with the courts that, focusing on the express language of the constitutional and statutory provisions addressing jurisdiction of the district courts, hold the current minimum amount in controversy required for district court jurisdiction is $200.01. See Ramirez v. Dietz, No. 07-04-0108-CV, 2006 WL 507947 (Tex.App.–Amarillo March 1, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Nelson v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 07-03-0050-CV, 2003 WL 22069558 (Tex.App.–Amarillo Sept. 5, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.)).           Appellees urge us to recognize that the trial court acted correctly based on Twelfth Court of Appeals case law. Conway responds that we must follow our own prior holdings, and that appellees’ remedy is to seek Supreme Court review. Confronted with this clear difference in the law as applied by the appellate court from which this case was transferred and our own previous decisions, we agree with the view expressed in American Nat’l Ins. Co. v. International Bus. Machine Corp., 933 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1996, writ denied). The court there stated that in such a circumstance a transferee court should not blindly apply either the transferring court’s precedent or its own but instead should reach its best conclusion as to what the law of the State of Texas is on the issue before it. Id. Having again examined the question, we will adhere to our previous conclusion that the rationale set forth in Arteaga v. Jackson, 994 S.W.2d at 342, expresses the law of our state on the minimum amount in controversy necessary to sustain jurisdiction in the district courts, that is, that such amount is $200.01.           Conway has plead actual damages in the amount of $395, an amount in excess of the jurisdictional amount required for district court jurisdiction. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in its conclusion it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his suit. We sustain Conway’s first issue.           Given our disposition of Conway’s first issue, we do not reach his remaining issues. Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.                                                                  James T. Campbell                                                                            Justice Quinn, C.J., dissenting.                                            l style='margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align: justify;mso-pagination:widow-orphan'>  AT AMARILLO  PANEL C  MAY 19, 2010  ______________________________   BENNY JOE PALOMO, APPELLANT  V.  THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE   _________________________________  FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;  NOS. 18,223-B, 18,368-B, & 18,369-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, JUDGE  _______________________________  Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. OPINION ON ABATEMENT On February 25, 2010, in each referenced cause, pursuant to § 501.014(e) of the Texas Government Code, the trial court signed and entered an Order to Withdraw Inmate Funds.[1] By the withdrawal notifications entered in each cause, the trial court directed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division to withhold the following amounts: (1) $1,810.31 in cause number 18,223-B; (2) $616.50 in cause number 18,368-B; and (3) $616.50 in cause number 18,369-B. Appellant filed pro se notices of appeal on May 5, 2010, challenging the withdrawal notifications. While each withdrawal notification contained the statement that "court costs, fines and fees have been incurred as represented in the certified Bill of Cost/Judgment attached hereto," none contained an attachment of any kind. Furthermore, while the judgment entered in each case provides that "the State of Texas do have and recover of said [Appellant] all court costs in this prosecution expended . . . ," the summary portion of each judgment leaves costs blank.            In Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2008), the Texas Supreme Court held that a withdrawal notification directing prison officials to withdraw money from an inmate trust account pursuant to § 501.014(e) is a civil matter[2] akin to a garnishment action or an action to obtain a turnover order. Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 317-19. In determining whether Harrell was accorded constitutional due process in that proceeding, the Court balanced three factors discussed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and noted that Harrell had "already received some measure of due process." Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 320.            The three Eldridge factors considered in Harrell are: (1) the private interest affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. The Court found that private interest to be easily ascertainable--"the amount identified in a prior court document", i.e., "the costs assessed when the convicting court sentenced him." Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 320. Regarding the risk of erroneous deprivation, the Court identified the risk as modest where withdrawal notifications under the statute are based on an amount identified in a previous court document. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 501.014(e)(1)-(6) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The Court noted that "Harrell was . . . notified of the costs assessed when the convicting court sentenced him" and he was free to contest them at the time they were assessed. Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 320. However, the Court went on to recognize there could be a greater risk of erroneous deprivation in instances in which the amount in the withdrawal notification varied from the amount in the underlying judgment or those instances where there were clerical or other errors. Id. In assessing the final factor, the Government's interest, the Court addressed the fiscal and administrative burdens of added or alternative procedures and concluded that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice would face expending more money than it would collect if it were required to conform to "full-blown" statutory garnishment requirements. In the Court's opinion, such a drawn-out procedure might subvert the Legislature's goal of efficient cost-collection. Id. Harrell had been convicted of drug charges in 1997 and 2003. In 2006, the convicting trial court signed an order authorizing the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division to withdraw funds from his inmate trust account to pay for court costs and fees for appointed counsel. Harrell was provided with copies of the withdrawal notifications. He then moved to rescind the withdrawal notifications alleging denial of due process. His motion was denied, and his direct appeal to this Court was dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the ground that no statutory mechanism was available for appealing a withdrawal notification. See Harrell v. State, Nos. 07-06-0469-CR and 07-06-0470-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6416, at *3 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Aug. 13, 2007), rev'd, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2008).            In reversing this Court and rendering judgment affirming the trial court's order denying Harrell's motion to rescind, the Supreme Court held that due process entitles an inmate to receive notice[3] and an opportunity to be heard, even though those requirements might be accorded the inmate after funds are withdrawn. Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 321. It concluded that because Harrell had received notice (a copy of the withdrawal notification) and an opportunity to be heard[4] (the motion to rescind), he had received all that due process required. Id. The Court added, "[t]he Constitution does not require pre-withdrawal notice or a comprehensive civil garnishment proceeding." Id.             On the limited record before this Court, we are unable to determine if Appellant has been given all that due process requires. Specifically, we are unable to determine whether Appellant has been (1) provided with the necessary underlying documentation and (2) afforded an adequate opportunity "to compare the amounts assessed by the trial court [in the underlying criminal proceedings] to the amount[s] withdrawn and alert the court of any alleged errors." Id. Because the trial court has not entered an appealable order either granting or denying a motion to confirm, modify, correct, or rescind the prior withdrawal notification, we find Appellant's notices of appeal to be premature. See Williams v. State, __ S.W.3d __, Nos. 07-10-0091-CV, 07-10-0100-CV, and 07-10-0101, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS, 2998, at *8-9, (Tex.App.--Amarillo April 22, 2010, no pet. h.).            Accordingly, this Court sua sponte abates this appeal for 180 days from the date of this order to allow Appellant time to take such action as is necessary to (1) obtain the necessary documentation of the underlying court order; (2) compare the underlying court order to the withdrawal notification; (3) file an appropriate motion to modify, correct, or rescind the withdrawal notification; (4) present that motion to the trial court; (5) schedule any necessary hearing; and (6) obtain from the trial court a final appealable order addressing that motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.2. See also Iacono v. Lyons, 6 S.W.3d 715 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). All appellate timetables will begin to run from the date a final, appealable order is signed.            It is so ordered.                                                                                    Per Curiam  [1]This document is not an "order" in the traditional sense of a court order, judgment, or decree issued after notice and hearing in either a civil or criminal proceeding. The controlling statute, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 501.014(e) (Vernon Supp. 2009), describes the process as a "notification by a court" directing prison officials to withdraw sums from an inmate's trust account, in accordance with a schedule of priorities set by the statute, for the payment of "any amount the inmate is ordered to pay by order of the court." See id. at § 501.014(e)(1)-(6). See also Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315, 316, n.1 (Tex. 2009). This document is more akin to a judgment nisi. A judgment nisi, commonly used in bond forfeiture proceedings, is a provisional judgment entered when an accused fails to appear for trial. A judgment nisi triggers the issuance of a capias and it serves as notice of the institution of a bond forfeiture proceeding. It is not final or absolute, but may become final. See Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. State, 273 S.W.3d 157, 163 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Nisi means "unless," so a judgment nisi is valid unless a party takes action causing it to be withdrawn. Id. Similarly, a withdrawal notification issued pursuant to § 501.014(e), triggers a trust fund withdrawal, serves as notice of the collection proceeding, and continues to operate unless the inmate takes action causing the notification to be withdrawn. Therefore, rather than refer to that document as an order, we prefer to use the term "withdrawal notification" to avoid confusion with an underlying court order or judgment ordering the payment of a sum falling within at least one of the six priority categories listed in the statute.  [2]See Johnson v. Tenth Judicial District Court of Appeals at Waco, 280 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) (holding that orders directing withdrawal of funds from inmate trust accounts is not a criminal matter).  [3]In assessing the risk of erroneous deprivation of property, the Supreme Court in Harrell considered the risk to be "modest" because notice under the statute is "based on an amount identified in a prior court document." Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 320 (emphasis added). The Court went on to comment that the risk would be minimized if the trial court included a copy of the underlying order or judgment that assessed costs when it issues a withdrawal notification. We wholeheartedly adopt the Supreme Court's recommendation in this regard. We express no opinion as to whether a clerk issued bill of costs or a statement in an underlying court document which merely assesses "costs of court" against the defendant without stating the basis or amount of those costs constitutes adequate notice for purposes of due process. We further note that the mere assessment of attorney fees does not make them collectable through this process. Under article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court has authority to order reimbursement of appointed attorney fees only if the court makes a fact-specific determination that a defendant has financial resources that enable him to offset, in part or in whole, the costs of the legal services provided. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.05(g) (Vernon Supp. 2009). See also Mayer v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. PD-0069-09, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 100, at *11 (Tex.Crim.App. March 24, 2010). [4]While the court of appeals's opinion is silent on whether a hearing was held on Harrell's motion to rescind, Harrell v. State, Nos. 07-06-0469-CR, 07-06-0470-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6416, at *3 (Tex.App.--Amarillo, Aug. 13, 2007), rev’d, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2008), the trial court did enter a specific order denying his motion to rescind the withdrawal notification. We read the Supreme Court's opinion as assuming that, by this process, Harrell was given "an opportunity to be heard." Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 321. Â