Joe Salazar v. State

NO. 07-07-0432-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL B SEPTEMBER 24, 2009 ______________________________ JOE CHRISTIAN SALAZAR,                                                                                                  Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                                                                  Appellee _________________________________ FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NO. 55,146-C; ; HON. ANA ESTEVEZ, PRESIDING _______________________________ Memorandum Opinion _______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.           Joe Christian Salazar was convicted of burglary of a building. He appealed that conviction by contending he should have received an instruction on the lesser offense of criminal trespass. We affirmed the judgment by holding that criminal trespass was not a lesser-included offense of burglary of a habitation as pled in this indictment because the latter failed to include facts that would give notice that entry was forbidden. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the matter to us by holding that a habitation implicitly gives notice that entry is forbidden. Salazar v. State, 284 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We, therefore, now consider whether the second prong of the lesser- included offense analysis was satisfied. It requires us to determine whether there appears evidence of record permitting a rational jury to reasonably conclude that if appellant is guilty of anything, it is only of criminal trespass. See Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that a party is entitled to an instruction on a lesser- included offense if 1) the lesser offense is included in the proof necessary to establish the greater offense, and 2) some evidence exists that would permit a jury to rationally find that if appellant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense).           A person commits criminal trespass if he enters or remains on property without effective consent and he had notice that the entry was forbidden or he received notice to depart but failed to do so. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §30.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence from any source that raises the issue that appellant is guilty only of criminal trespass, then appellant was entitled to the instruction. Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). However, the evidence alluded to must affirmatively negate the element present in the greater offense but absent in the lesser. Morris v. State, No. 07-99-0498-CR, 2000 Tex. App. Lexis 7181 at *5 n.1 (Tex. App.–Amarillo October 25, 2000, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication). It is not enough to simply rely upon the State’s failure to prove the particular element. Moreover, if the defendant presents evidence that he committed no offense, then the instruction may not be required. Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).            Here, evidence of record illustrates that police responded to an anonymous report of a possible burglary at a residence in Amarillo. An Hispanic man purportedly was observed going in a window of a vacant house. Later, an individual was seen coming out of the back door of the residence by an officer investigating the call. That individual ran away when the officer identified himself and told him to stop. Approximately seven to ten minutes later, officers saw appellant walking within blocks of the crime scene, believed him to be the suspect they sought, and apprehended him. At that point, appellant allegedly “denied being inside the residence.”           The State indicted appellant for burglary, that is, for entering the abode with the intent to commit theft. Appellant’s defense at trial was founded upon misidentification. He endeavored to show that the color of the clothing worn by the suspect seen coming out of the house did not match that of appellant, that he ran from the officers when found walking on the street because he had outstanding traffic tickets, and that he was not in the residence.           Upon reviewing the record before us, we conclude that the evidence, depending upon who the jurors believed and how they resolved credibility issues, could have supported either a verdict of guilty for the crime charged (burglary) or an acquittal founded upon misidentification. None appears of record permitting a rational jury to reasonably conclude that if appellant committed any offense while inside the house it was simply the crime of criminal trespass. Given this, we cannot say that the second element mandated by Rousseau was and is satisfied.           Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court remains affirmed.                                                                             Brian Quinn                                                                           Chief Justice  Do not publish. Shading Accent 4"/> NO. 07-11-00085-CR  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS  AT AMARILLO  PANEL C  MARCH 23, 2011   CESAR DAN HERNANDEZ-SANDOVAL, APPELLANT  v.  THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE   FROM THE 291ST DISTRICT COURT OF DALLAS COUNTY;  NO. F-0954675-U; HONORABLE SUSAN LYNN HAWK, JUDGE   Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.   ON ABATEMENT AND REMAND  Appellant, Cesar Dan Hernandez-Sandoval, appeals from conviction for the offense of murder, and sentence of life imprisonment.[1] Appellant filed notice of appeal on December 14, 2010. The appellate record was due to be filed by December 17, 2010. On February 17, 2011, by order of the Texas Supreme Court, this appeal was transferred from the Fifth District Court of Appeals to this Court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001 (West 2005). By separate letters, both dated March 1, 2011, this Court notified the district clerk and official court reporter that the appellate record in this case had been due to be filed no later than December 17, 2010, and directed the clerk and reporter to advise this Court of the status of the records on or before March 11, 2011. We received a request for extension of time to file the reporter’s record on March 1, 2011. This request was granted. However, to date, we have neither received the clerk’s record nor any response to this Court’s March 1, 2011 directive. Accordingly, we now abate this appeal and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. See Tex. R. App. P. 35.3(c). Upon remand, the trial court shall immediately cause notice of a hearing to be given and, thereafter, conduct a hearing to determine the status of the preparation of the clerk’s record, and to enter any order necessary under the present circumstances to ensure that the clerk’s record is filed as soon as practicable. The trial court shall cause the hearing to be transcribed. In addition, the trial court shall (1) execute findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the foregoing issues, (2) cause a supplemental clerk=s record to be developed containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law and any orders it may issue relating to this matter, and (3) cause a reporter=s record to be developed transcribing the evidence and arguments presented at the aforementioned hearing. The trial court shall then file the supplemental clerk=s record and any reporter=s record transcribing the hearing with the clerk of this Court on or before April 22, 2011. Should further time be needed by the trial court to perform these tasks, same must be requested before April 22, 2011. It is so ordered. Per Curiam Do not publish.  [1] Because no clerk’s record has been filed in this case, the identification of the offense for which appellant was convicted is as reflected in a partial copy of the judgment that was attached to appellant’s notice of appeal.