Certain Primary Underwriters at Lloyd's, London of M.E.C. &/Or Mobile Express Corporation and Certain Excess Underwriters at Lloyd's, London M.E.C. &/Or Mobile Express Corporation v. Herring Bank F/K/A Herring National Bank

NO. 07-08-0490-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL B APRIL 29, 2009 ______________________________ CERTAIN PRIMARY UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S, LONDON OF M.E.C. &/OR MOBILE EXPRESS CORPORATION AND CERTAIN EXCESS UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S, LONDON OF M.E.C. &/OR MOBILE EXPRESS CORPORATION , APPELLANTS V. HERRING BANK F/K/A HERRING NATIONAL BANK, APPELLEE _________________________________ FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NO. 93,282-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, JUDGE _______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. ON MOTION TO DISMISS           On April 27, 2009, appellants Certain Primary Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London of M.E.C. &/or Mobile Express Corporation and Certain Excess Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London of M.E.C. &/or Mobile Express Corporation filed a motion to dismiss their appeal. According to the motion, the parties reached a settlement. In the motion, counsel for appellants states that he conferred with counsel for appellee and counsel for appellee does not oppose the motion. Appellants further request taxation of appellate costs against them.           The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1). Costs of the appeal are taxed against appellants.           Having dismissed the appeal at appellants’ request, we will not entertain a motion for rehearing and our mandate will issue forthwith.                                                                 James T. Campbell                                                                            Justice  "70" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List"/> NO. 07-10-0158-CR                                                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS                                        FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS                                                                  AT AMARILLO                                                                      PANEL D                                                            SEPTEMBER 2, 2010                                            ______________________________                                                        MONICA SASHA JONES,                                                                                                             Appellant                                                                              v.                                                         THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                                                                             Appellee                                           _______________________________                              FROM THE 66TH DISTRICT COURT OF HILL COUNTY;                        NO. 32,549; HON. F.B. (BOB) MCGREGOR, JR., PRESIDING                                           _______________________________  Memorandum Opinion _______________________________  Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.            Appellant Monica Sasha Jones appeals the judgment adjudicating her guilty of endangering a child. Through a single issue, she contends that she was denied due process when the trial court “re-reviewed the original presentence investigation report.” We affirm.   Issue – Due Process            Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and denied her due process when it reviewed a presentence investigation report (at the adjudication hearing) that was prepared five years earlier instead of ordering a new one. The record does not disclose where that objection or concern was contemporaneously brought to the attention of the trial court, however, and this is problematic.              To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complainant must object to the purported error. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that failure to make an objection may waive constitutional error); Nunez v. State, 117 S.W.3d 309, 319 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that the failure to timely and specifically object at trial may waive even constitutional rights). Furthermore, the objection must be made as soon as the ground for same becomes apparent. House v. State, 909 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1995), aff’d, 947 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Appellant did not comply with these directives here. The trial court expressly informed the litigants of its intent to “re-review the presentence investigation” report. No objection was made by appellant. So, she failed to preserve the purported error. See Summers v. State, 942 S.W.2d 695, 696-97 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (holding that the appellant waived objection to the failure to order a PSI because the objection was not raised below).[1]            Accordingly, we overrule her issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.                                                                                                                                                                                   Brian Quinn                                                                                    Chief Justice     Do not publish.  [1]To the extent that appellant’s issue could also encompass the notion that she was denied opportunity to present evidence on punishment, we again note that no one raised that particular ground below. Thus, it too was waived. See Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. App.–Waco 2005, pet. dism’d).