City of El Paso v. Robert Millard, Individually, and D/B/A El Paso Sports & Recreation Co. and SAR Investments, Inc., D/B/A Construction Investment Development & Playground Constructor, Inc.

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS ) CITY OF EL PASO, ) No. 08-03-00493-CV ) Appellant, ) Appeal from ) v. ) County Court at Law No. 3 ) ROBERT MILLARD, Individually and d/b/a ) of El Paso County, Texas EL PASO SPORTS & RECREATION CO., ) and SAR INVESTMENTS, INC., d/b/a ) (TC# 2000-3128) CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT                    ) DEVELOPMENT & PLAYGROUND ) CONSTRUCTOR, INC.,                                     ) ) Appellees. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION The City of El Paso appeals the partial denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. It brings this accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We affirm. FACTUAL SUMMARY Around October 30, 1990, Robert Millard purchased a trailer which he reconditioned and parked on property owned by SARS Investments and located in El Paso County. Millard used the trailer to store tools, equipment, furniture, and other personal property. In late July 1998, Millard needed tools and other items from the trailer and sent an employee out to the property to retrieve them. When the employee arrived, the trailer wasn’t there. He notified Millard who then went to the property to see for himself. Upon verifying that the trailer was missing, Millard filed a report with the police department. Sam’s Club Warehouse employees told Millard that the police department may have removed the trailer since they had seen three police vehicles in the area. When Millard went to the police department with this information, he was told that three patrol cars would not have been dispatched to handle such a situation. A detective was to be assigned to the case and Millard was advised to find out which company removed the trailer. He discovered that El Paso Towing had towed it and that there was a $1,060 storage fee, which he was unable to pay. Millard asked to see the trailer and check its contents, but the towing company denied his request. Millard filed a complaint and ultimately learned that the trailer had been sold at auction by El Paso Towing without notice to him. He was later notified by the police department that an internal affairs investigation had been conducted. The impounding officer reported that he had removed the trailer for safekeeping because it had been heavily vandalized. The investigation resulted in a finding of misconduct by the officer and disciplinary action was taken. Millard sued the City of El Paso and El Paso Towing, alleging inverse condemnation. The City answered and filed a motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction. Millard then amended his pleadings, alleging inverse condemnation and fraud by the City, and conversion, negligence per se, and fraud by El Paso Towing. The trial court granted the plea as to the fraud allegations but denied it with regard to the constitutional taking. It also denied summary judgment on the issue of limitations. This accelerated appeal follows. GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY FRAUD For purposes of convenience, we will address the City’s issues in reverse order. In Point of Error Two, the City complains that a governmental entity cannot be liable for fraud. Although the trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss based on the allegation of fraud, the City anticipated that Millard would raise the issue on appeal. Since the City raised this issue in anticipation of a cross point which did not materialize, we overrule Point of Error Two. PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION In Point of Error One, the City argues that Millard failed to properly plead a constitutional cause of action for a “taking” in order to waive sovereign immunity, and thus, the trial court erroneously denied its plea to the jurisdiction. A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea by which a party contests the trial court’s authority to determine the subject matter of the cause of action. City of Saginaw v. Carter, 996 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); State v. Benavides, 772 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). The plaintiff has the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993); City of Saginaw, 996 S.W.2d at 2. Standard of Review Subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question, and we review the trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard. City of Saginaw, 996 S.W.2d at 2; Texas Dept. of Health v. Doe, 994 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex.App.--Austin 1999, pet. dism’d by agr.). In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction, we look solely to the allegations in the petition and accept them as true. See City of Saginaw, 996 S.W.2d at 2-3; Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey v. Board of Regents of the University of Texas System, 909 S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tex.App.--Austin 1995, writ denied). We do not examine the merits of the case. See City of Saginaw, 996 S.W.2d at 3. If the petition does not allege jurisdictional facts, the plaintiff’s suit is subject to dismissal only when it is impossible to amend the pleadings to confer jurisdiction. City of Saginaw, 996 S.W.2d at 3; see Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 874 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex.App.--Austin 1994, writ denied). The Constitutional Provision Article I, section 17 provides: No person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person; and, when taken, except for the use of the State, such compensation shall be first made, or secured by a deposit of money; and no irrevocable or uncontrollable grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be made; but all privileges and franchises granted by the Legislature, or created under its authority shall be subject to the control thereof. Tex.Const. art. I, § 17. Stated simply, when a governmental entity takes, damages, or destroys property for public use, immunity from both suit and liability is waived. City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 149 (Tex. 1995); Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980). Was There a “Taking”? Millard sued for inverse condemnation, which is “[a]n action brought by a property owner for compensation from a governmental entity that has taken the owner’s property without bringing formal condemnation proceedings.” Black’s Dictionary 287 (7th ed. 1999). Millard alleged that the City’s act of entering upon private property and taking his trailer to abate a public nuisance amounted to an intentional taking or destruction of, or damage to, his property for a public use without adequate compensation. The petition referenced notations in the police records that the trailer had been removed because it was heavily damaged by graffiti, some of which involved a local gang. Millard complained that the City’s actions resulted in an inverse condemnation because he received no notice of the trailer’s removal or sale and that as a result, any governmental immunity was waived. The City countered that Millard had to establish that (1) the City intentionally performed certain acts, (2) which resulted in a “taking” of Millard’s property, (3) for public use. City of Abilene v. Smithwick, 721 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex.App.--Eastland 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The City argued that its acts were negligent rather than intentional, and that the taking was not for public use. Negligent or Intentional Act? Texas jurisprudence has consistently held that the property damage must not result from negligence in order to maintain an inverse condemnation action. Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 790. If the damage is clearly attributable to negligent acts of the agents of the governmental unit, there is no liability under the rationale that damages from unintended and negligent acts result in no benefit to the public. Texas Highway Dept. v. Weber, 219 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex. 1949). The City reminds us of the three elements of negligence: (1) a legal duty; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately resulting from that breach. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990). The initial inquiry in a negligence action is whether a duty existed. See id. The City contends that a police officer has a duty to prevent and suppress suspected crime and to keep the peace in a manner that a reasonably careful police officer would use in the same or similar circumstances. It admits that the officer involved violated that duty in seizing Millard’s trailer, but refers us to the internal affairs investigation which concluded that the officer had “erroneously impounded” the trailer. It characterizes this “mistake” as “negligence.” Millard counters that the taking was intentional. He focuses on the fact that he did not consent to the taking of his property, that the police entered onto private property, and that his trailer and its contents were removed under their direction. This, he concluded, was a purposeful act. In looking solely to the allegations pled and accepting them as true, we agree. We begin by examining two cases in which the courts rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations of an intentional taking. In A.C. Aukerman Co. v. State, 902 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. denied), a case involving patent rights, the court found the plaintiff had not pled that the State itself had appropriated the patent rights but that the State had obtained the benefits of the patents. In a summary judgment context, the court found this insufficient to establish a taking by the State as a matter of law because the plaintiff had failed to allege an intentional act by the State which resulted in the taking of its property. Id. In Texas Highway Department v. Weber, 219 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex. 1949), the plaintiff alleged that his hay crop had been taken or damaged when a fire set by Texas Highway Department employees spread to the crop and destroyed a substantial part of it. The court found the damage occasioned by the fire was not necessarily an incident to, or necessarily a consequential result of, the act of the employees in clearing the grass from the highway, but that the spreading of the fire onto his premises was purely and solely the result of negligence. Id. Consequently, it could not be said that the hay crop was taken or damaged for public use. Id. Here, Millard did not contend that the City obtained benefits from a third party’s taking of his trailer or that the damage was merely consequential to another act of the City. He pled that the City entered onto private property and purposefully took his trailer. Accordingly, the pleadings allege a taking due to an intentional act by the City. Public Use? The Constitution limits compensation to damages “for or applied to public use.” Tex.Const. art. I, § 17. What constitutes public use is a question for the court. Dyer v. Texas Electric Service Co., 680 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). A constitutional taking for public use occurs only when there results to the public some definite right or use in the business or undertaking to which the property is devoted. Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 86 S.W. 11, 14 (Tex. 1905), aff’d by, 204 U.S. 667, 27 S.Ct. 785, 51 L.Ed. 671 (1907); Loesch v. Oasis Pipe Line Co., 665 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Tex.App.--Austin 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The trend in Texas leans toward defining public use in terms of the general benefit to the State. Dyer, 680 S.W.2d at 885, citing Housing Authority of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79, 85 (1940). Except in isolated instances, judicial decisions have narrowed the meaning of “public use” to those situations in which the damages are incident to the construction and operation of a public work. Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 790. In Steele, the plaintiffs were away when escaped convicts hid out in their house. Id. at 789. Police discharged incendiary material into the residence in a manner designed to cause, and with the intent to cause, the residence to catch fire. Id. The Steeles sued, alleging they were entitled to compensation. Id. at 788. However, the court found that judicial restraints limited the damages that were compensable. Id. at 790. Whether property was destroyed for public use could be established by proof that the City ordered the destruction because of a real or supposed public emergency to apprehend armed and dangerous men who had taken refuge in the house. Id. at 792. Similarly, “public use” may include matters of public health and safety, including unsafe buildings which constitute nuisances. City of Houston v. Crabb, 905 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.). In searching the El Paso Municipal Code, we find provisions declaring junked vehicles public nuisances if they: (1) are located in a place where they are visible from a public place or public right-of-way and (2) are detrimental to the safety and welfare of the general public, (3) tend to reduce the value of the private property, (4) invite vandalism, (5) create fire hazards, (6) constitute an attractive nuisance creating a hazard to the health and safety of minors, and (7) are detrimental to the economic welfare of the City by producing urban blight adverse to the maintenance and continuing development of the city. El Paso Municipal Code § 9.08.010 (2003). Junked vehicles are defined as motor vehicles, truck-tractors, trailers and semitrailers that (1) do not have a lawfully attached unexpired license plate or a valid motor vehicle inspection certificate; (2) are wrecked, dismantled, or discarded; (3) are inoperable or have remained inoperable for more than seventy-two hours if on public property or thirty consecutive days if on private property. El Paso Municipal Code § 9.08.020 (2003). Section 9.08.030 allows removal of a junked vehicle to abate a public nuisance. El Paso Municipal Code § 9.08.030 (2003). Millard’s trailer would have qualified as a junked vehicle. It was a trailer that may be transported upon a public highway; it bore unknown expired Michigan plates; and it was inoperable due to a flat left rear tire. See El Paso Municipal Code § 9.08.020. The presence of the trailer apparently invited vandalism since it had already been vandalized by gang-related graffiti which would qualify the trailer as a public nuisance. See El Paso Municipal Code § 9.08.010. Therefore, the taking of the trailer falls within one of the limited exceptions to the requirement that the public use be one of construction or maintenance of public works. Again taking the allegations in the petition as true, Millard has demonstrated that his trailer was towed for “public use” because it was removed to abate a public nuisance due to gang-related graffiti. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 17. Because we conclude that Millard properly pled an intentional act by the City which resulted in a taking of his property for public use under Article 1, section 17, we overrule Point of Error One. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. July 29, 2004 ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Justice Before Panel No. 4 Barajas, C.J., Larsen, and McClure, JJ.