Jeffrey Leante Randle A/K/A Jeffery L. Randle v. State

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ________________ NO. 09-08-00089-CR _____________________ JEFFREY LEANTE RANDLE A/K/A JEFFERY L. RANDLE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 96375 MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury found Jeffrey Leante Randle guilty of delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine), and the trial court sentenced Randle, a repeat felony offender, to twelve years of confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice--Institutional Division. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102(3)(D) (Vernon Supp. 2008); 481.112(a),(c) (Vernon 2002). In this appeal, Randle contends the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, we affirm the judgment. An officer with the Jefferson County Narcotics Task Force conducted a sting operation with an informant. The informant told the officer that the informant had purchased cocaine from a man whom he knew only as "Chief," and the informant agreed to cooperate in a sting operation. The officer set up surveillance equipment inside the informant's home in Jefferson County, and the Port Arthur Narcotics Unit monitored the outside perimeter of the residence. The informant called "Chief" and asked for cocaine worth one hundred dollars. Approximately fifteen minutes later, "Chief" arrived at the home. The officer, observing through video equipment set up in a back room of the home, recognized "Chief" as a man he knew from past experiences to be Jeffrey Randle. At first, Randle gave the informant three pieces of cocaine worth sixty dollars. Because Randle gave him an amount of cocaine less than the informant had requested over the telephone, Randle told the informant to go out to Randle's vehicle and obtain more cocaine from a "secret spot" in the vehicle. The informant went to Randle's vehicle and returned with more cocaine. The informant gave Randle the cocaine he had retrieved from Randle's vehicle, and Randle cut it into five more pieces. The informant paid one hundred and sixty dollars for the eight rocks of cocaine with money supplied by the officer through the Jefferson County Task Force. In addition to hearing the testimony of the officer and the informant, the jury reviewed the recording. The officers monitoring the perimeter of the residence followed Randle in his vehicle as he left, but were not able to arrest him because Randle switched vehicles sometime later. Randle was arrested the following day. The officer field-tested the rocks sold to the informant and they tested positive for cocaine. He put the cocaine from the transaction in a plastic bag, sealed it, and dated and put his initials on it. He also noted on the bag the case number that related to the offense. He secured it in a vault at the Jefferson County Narcotics Task Force office. He delivered the evidence to the crime lab four days after he observed the drug transaction. The officer explained that he did not deliver the evidence to the crime lab the day after the transaction, which was a Friday, because he was involved in the follow-up investigation of Randle. The officer waited until the next Monday to deliver it because the lab was closed on Saturday and Sunday. A forensics analyst at the Jefferson County Crime Lab also testified at trial. She stated she removed the evidence from the vault for testing. Her testing confirmed the rocks amounted to 2.32 grams of cocaine. She also put her initials on the plastic bag containing the cocaine. The defense did not call any witnesses at trial. In a legal sufficiency review, an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Generally, the trier of fact is the sole judge of the facts proven and of the weight to be given the testimony. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ("Appellate courts should afford almost complete deference to a jury's decision when that decision is based upon an evaluation of credibility."). In a factual sufficiency review, the court considers the evidence in a neutral light. Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The issue is whether the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is so weak that the fact-finder's determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or whether the contrary evidence so greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the conviction that the fact-finder's determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Id. A person commits the offense of delivery of cocaine, a substance in Penalty Group 1, if he knowingly or intentionally delivers the controlled substance. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102(3)(D) (Vernon Supp. 2008); 481.112(a) (Vernon 2002). "Deliver" means "to transfer, actually or constructively, to another a controlled substance . . . , regardless of whether there is an agency relationship. . . ." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(8) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Actual delivery consists of transferring or surrendering "'the real possession and control of a controlled substance from one person to another person.'" Heberling v. State, 834 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting Conaway v. State, 738 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); see also Ex parte Perales, 215 S.W.3d 418, 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "Transfer" is the "voluntary relinquishment of possession in favor of another." Thomas v. State, 832 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The indictment charged Randle with having intentionally and knowingly delivered a controlled substance by actual transfer, and the jury charge reflects an instruction with similar content. In challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, Randle claims there is insufficient evidence that Randle knowingly and intentionally possessed the cocaine, or that the cocaine that was tested was the same that he allegedly possessed. Through audio and video equipment, the officer observed Randle give the informant the first three rocks of cocaine. The officer also heard Randle tell the informant to get more cocaine out of Randle's vehicle. After the informant retrieved the drugs and brought them inside, the officer saw the informant give the cocaine from the vehicle to Randle, who cut it into five more pieces. The jury heard the testimony of the officer and the informant, and reviewed the recording of the transaction. Randle knew he had more cocaine in his car, and the fact that he sent the informant to retrieve it does not establish Randle did not possess or transfer the cocaine. Actual transfer can be effected by making drugs available to another. See Nevarez v. State, 767 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); see also Rodriguez v. State, 970 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd) (Delivery by actual transfer was effectuated by the defendant's telling the undercover officer that the cocaine was in a shoe box). Randle voluntarily surrendered possession of the cocaine to the informant. The jury heard testimony establishing that the substance Randle delivered was tested and determined to be cocaine. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the verdict. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Randle knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine to the informant. Furthermore, a neutral view of the entire record does not demonstrate that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, nor does it demonstrate that the proof of guilt is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Appellant's issue is overruled. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ____________________________ DAVID GAULTNEY Justice Submitted on July 1, 2009 Delivered July 29, 2009 Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Horton, JJ.