Terheathyr Charl Carter v. State

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-08-00249-CR ____________________ TERHEATHYR CHARL CARTER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 07-231476 MEMORANDUM OPINION Terheathyr Charl Carter appeals from her conviction for driving while intoxicated. After Carter entered a negotiated guilty plea, the trial court found her guilty and assessed punishment at 180 days' confinement and a fine of $300. The court then suspended Carter's sentence and placed her on community supervision. In a single appellate issue, Carter contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. We affirm. At the hearing on Carter's motion to suppress, Trooper Jay Smith with the Texas Department of Public Safety testified that at approximately 2:55 a.m. on June 17, 2007, he observed Carter's vehicle change "from the middle lane [of a three-lane feeder road] to the far left lane[,]" without using her signal. Trooper Smith further testified that all of the lanes were clearly marked and that Carter "crossed a clearly marked line[.]" Trooper Smith then stopped Carter for making the lane change without using a signal. On appeal, Carter argues that the Texas Transportation Code does not authorize a traffic stop for the driver's failure to signal a lane change and that no probable cause existed for her detention and ultimate arrest for driving while intoxicated. Carter asserts the trial court abused its discretion by overruling her motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). As Dixon explains: We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's conclusion and reverse the judgment only if it is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. We will sustain the lower court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. We give almost total deference to a trial court's express or implied determination of historical facts and review de novo the court's application of the law of search and seizure to those facts. Id. (citations omitted). To support her argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to suppress, Carter relies on section 545.060 of the Texas Transportation Code and Trahan v. State, 16 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.). In pertinent part, section 545.060 provides that when driving on a road divided into two or more clearly marked lanes, the vehicle operator: "(1) shall drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane; and (2) may not move from the lane unless that movement can be made safely." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.060(a) (Vernon 1999). In Trahan v. State, Trahan was stopped after he failed to signal when he exited from the freeway. 16 S.W.3d at 147. We concluded the stop was improper because there was no evidence that Trahan violated section 545.104(a) of the Texas Transportation Code by turning or changing lanes when he exited the freeway. See id. Section 545.104(a) requires a motorist to signal to "indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104(a) (Vernon 1999). A police officer may lawfully stop a motorist who commits a traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Section 545.104(a) requires a driver to use a signal when changing lanes, and a violation of this section is a misdemeanor offense. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 542.301 (misdemeanor offense), 545.104(a) (Vernon 1999). Thus, when an officer observes a driver change lanes without a proper signal, the officer has probable cause to conduct a traffic stop. E.g., Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 716-17 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd); Dogay v. State, 101 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Contrary to Carter's argument, section 545.060 does not allow a motorist to change lanes without signaling; rather, it adds another requirement, namely that the motorist may not change lanes unless he can do so safely. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 545.060(a), 545.104(a); Coleman, 188 S.W.3d at 717 (refusing to adopt construction limiting signal requirement only to unsafe lane changes). Further, Trahan does not apply here because there was no evidence of a lane change in that case. See Trahan, 16 S.W.3d at 147. In this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing showed that Trooper Smith saw Carter change lanes without signaling. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carter's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we overrule Carter's issue and affirm the trial court's judgment. AFFIRMED. ____________________________ HOLLIS HORTON Justice Submitted on March 4, 2009 Opinion Delivered March 18, 2009 Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Horton, JJ.