David Phillip Campbell v. State

David Phillip Campbell v. State of Texas IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-99-058-CR DAVID PHILLIP CAMPBELL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee From the 54th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court # 96-49-C O P I N I O N The court revoked David Phillip Campbell’s community supervision for attempted indecency with a child and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment and a $500 fine. Campbell presents two issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s findings; and (2) whether he is entitled to reformation of the written judgment to make the findings recited therein correspond with the findings the court orally pronounced at the conclusion of the revocation hearing. The State’s revocation motion alleges twelve grounds for revocation of Campbell’s community supervision, the last four involving violations of the financial requirements of his community supervision. At the revocation hearing, the State presented the testimony of two community supervision officers who testified to each of the twelve allegations. Campbell testified in his own defense. He testified that he did not earn enough money to pay his rent, utilities, truck payment, and insurance in addition to satisfying the financial obligations of his community supervision. On cross-examination, he agreed that he had never brought in paycheck stubs or any other documentation to verify his financial status despite repeated requests for this information by his community supervision officer. He testified that he has no dependents. He did not present any documentation in the revocation hearing to verify his financial status. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 21(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (defendant bears burden of proving affirmative defense of inability to pay in revocation hearing). The court orally pronounced findings at the conclusion of the hearing that Campbell had committed the first eight violations of community supervision alleged in the revocation motion. The court made no oral findings on the alleged financial violations. However, the court signed a written judgment on the same day which contains written findings that Campbell committed all twelve of the violations alleged in the motion. The first issue presented by Campbell is whether the evidence offered at the revocation hearing supports the court’s findings. He promptly concedes, however, that he “cannot show that any of the allegations which the court found to be true are not supported by evidence.” Accordingly, we answer his first issue in the affirmative. In Campbell’s second issue, he questions whether he is entitled to reformation of the written judgment to make the written findings therein conform to the oral findings pronounced at the conclusion of the revocation hearing. Settled case law establishes that, in revocation proceedings, the written findings of the court control over the oral pronouncement when the written findings are supported by the pleadings and the evidence. See Eubanks v. State, 599 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Aguilar v. State, 542 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); accord Francis v. State, 792 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); cf. Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (oral pronouncement of sentence controls over written judgment); Mazloum v. State, 772 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (revocation judgment reformed where particular written finding not supported by evidence). The pleadings and evidence support the written findings. Thus, we answer Campbell’s second issue in the negative. We affirm the judgment. REX D. DAVIS Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Davis Justice Vance and Justice Gray Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed August 23, 2000 Do not publish