Ryan Barganier v. Saddlebrook Apartments

Ryan Barganier v. SaddleBrook Apartments IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-01-285-CV RYAN BARGANIER, Appellant v. SADDLEBROOK APARTMENTS, Appellee From the County Court at Law No. 2 McLennan County, Texas Trial Court # 2001-0154-CV2 CONCURRING OPINION I believe this case is resolved by a straightforward application of Texas Commerce Bank, Nat’l Assn. v. New, 3 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. 1999). Thus, I would address the issues somewhat differently. Did the Court Hear Evidence Before Granting Default Judgment? “If the cause of action is unliquidated or be not proved by an instrument in writing, the court shall hear evidence as to damages and shall render judgment therefor . . . .” Tex. R. Civ. P. 243. In New, the Supreme Court held that affidavits may constitute evidence of unliquidated damages as required by Rule 243. Id. at 517. In that case, Texas Commerce Bank (“TCB”) moved for default judgment against two defendants, New and Pacheco, in a fraud and breach-of-contract case related to a check-kiting scheme. Id. at 515. Attached to its motion for default judgment were two affidavits generally describing the check-kiting scheme and a third affidavit discussing attorney’s fees. New v. Texas Commerce Bank, Nat’l Assn., 971 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998), rev’d, 3 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. 1999). No oral testimony was taken at the hearing on the default judgment, and no reporter’s record was made. Id.; New, 3 S.W.3d at 517. The court rendered default judgment in favor of TCB, and New and Pacheco appealed. New, 971 S.W.2d at 712. On appeal, New and Pacheco asserted, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding damages and attorney’s fees because: (1) no reporter’s record of the default-judgment proceeding was made; and (2) no evidentiary hearing was held pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 243 to determine unliquidated damages. Id. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that: (1) the affidavits were inadmissible hearsay; and (2) a court does not hold “an evidentiary hearing merely by accepting the affidavits attached to the motion.” New, 3 S.W.3d at 517. The Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals was incorrect. The Court explained that “because unobjected to hearsay constitutes probative evidence, [affidavits may satisfy] the requirement of Rule 243 that there be evidence of unliquidated damages.” The Court held that the trial court did not err when it considered the affidavits in rendering its default judgment. Id. The majority finds that it is the “deliberative process, even if engaged in by the trial court in chambers” that satisfies Rule 243's requirement that the “court shall hear evidence”. Tex. R. Civ. P. 243. I find this extension of the holding in New to be unnecessary. The Austin Court of Appeals opinion in New indicates that a hearing was held, but that no oral testimony was taken. New, 971 S.W.2d at 712. In that context, I believe that the Supreme Court’s opinion stands for the proposition that because affidavits, like other unobjected-to hearsay, may be considered for their probative value, they may be adequate evidence of unliquidated damages, even in the absence of oral testimony. I do not believe that the Supreme Court intended that a judge’s solitary deliberations are an adequate substitute for a hearing, as the majority in this case implies, because that situation does not appear to have been presented in New. This case is factually analogous to the situation in New. Saddlebrook moved for a default judgment against Barganier in a breach-of-contract case. Filed contemporaneously with its motion for default judgment were two affidavits: one described the circumstances of the breach of contract, and the other discussed attorney’s fees. Although the default judgment recites that a hearing was held, there is no record of oral testimony being taken at the hearing. The court entered default judgment in favor of Saddlebrook. Following the logic of New, I conclude that the court did not err when it considered the affidavits in rendering the default judgment. Id. Can the Judgment Survive a “No-Evidence” Challenge? Barganier next contends that there was no evidence to support the default judgment because the affidavits should not have been considered. Having found that it was not error for the court to consider the affidavits, I agree that Saddlebrook presented more than a scintilla of evidence to support the judgment. See Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 1992). Was the Evidence Sufficient to Support the Judgment? Barganier’s third issue asserts that even if the affidavits were properly considered, they were insufficient to support the judgment. Affidavits can constitute evidence of unliquidated damages to support a default judgment. New, 3 S.W.3d at 517. In New, the Court held that the affidavits were legally sufficient to support the court’s award because they averred that the affiant had personal knowledge of the facts, described the scheme that resulted in the bank’s loss, and identified the total amount owed on the account. Id. In this case, Zidell’s affidavit shows that he had personal knowledge of the stated facts, that Saddlebrook attempted to collect the amount owed from Barganier but was unsuccessful, and that Barganier owed Saddlebrook $14,509.98. Therefore, I agree that the evidence is factually sufficient. Does the Lack of a Reporter’s Record Require Reversal of the Judgment? Finally, Barganier prays for reversal of the judgment on the ground that there was no reporter’s record. In some cases, the lack of a reporter’s record may entitle a defendant to a new trial because he will be unable to obtain some record of the evidence for review by an appellate court. See Rogers v. Rogers, 561 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Tex. 1978); see also Robinson v. Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. 1972). But the affidavits in this case are part of the clerk’s record, and having found that the affidavits were sufficient to support the judgment, I would simply hold that the lack of a reporter’s record does not require reversal of the judgment. See New, 3 S.W.3d at 517. BILL VANCE Justice Concurring opinion delivered and filed March 26, 2003