Wayne Owen Stubblefield v. State

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-02-00321-CR No. 10-02-00322-CR No. 10-02-00323-CR No. 10-02-00324-CR No. 10-02-00325-CR Wayne Owen Stubblefield, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee From the 52nd District Court Coryell County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 16370, 16421, 16422, 16423 and 16424 MEMORANDUM Opinion This appeal concerns five convictions for aggravated assault. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004). We will affirm. In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objection to evidence of statements that Appellant made to police sometime after his arrest. At trial, Appellant argued that the statements were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule, see Tex. R. Evid. 802, as a “[s]tatement of his penal interest,” cf. id. 803(24) (“statements against interest”). He also argued that the statements were admissible as statements of Appellant’s then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. See id. 803(3). Appellant also apparently argued that the statements were admissible under Texas’s confession statute. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 2004). On appeal, Appellant contends that the statements were “res gestae of the arrest” and “necessary to explain or contradict actions and declarations first offered by the State” (emphasis in orig.) (citing Cazares v. State, 488 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)). Neither of these theories of admissibility comports with his theories for admission argued at trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2157 (2004); Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (op. on reh’g). Accordingly, Appellant forfeits his complaint. See id. We overrule Appellant’s issue, and affirm the judgment. TOM GRAY Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Vance, and Justice Reyna Opinion delivered and filed September 29, 2004 Affirmed Do not publish [CR25]