Delair Watson v. State

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-03-00216-CR Delair Watson, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee From the 54th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2002-921-C Opinion ON REMAND A jury convicted Delair Watson of burglary of a habitation and assessed his punishment at thirteen years’ imprisonment. Watson contends in two issues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove that he intended to commit the offense of sexual assault when he entered the habitation in question. We will affirm. On original submission, a majority of this Court held that the evidence is legally sufficient but factually insufficient. See Watson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 627 (Tex.App.—Waco 2005). The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded for further consideration after clarifying the appropriate standard for a factual sufficiency analysis and overruling some of its own prior precedent on this issue. See Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Standard of Review Under the clarified standard of review for a factual sufficiency claim, the reviewing court asks whether a neutral review of all the evidence, though legally sufficient, demonstrates either that the proof of guilt is so weak or that conflicting evidence is so strong as to render the jury's verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15 (citing Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). We “review[ ] the evidence weighed by the jury that tends to prove the existence of the elemental fact in dispute and compare[ ] it with the evidence that tends to disprove that fact.” Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7 (quoting Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). The nature of a factual sufficiency review authorizes an appellate court, although to a very limited degree, to act as the so-called “thirteenth juror” to review the fact finder’s weighing of the evidence and disagree with the fact finder’s determination. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 416-17. Before reversing on the basis of factual insufficiency, “an appellate court must first be able to say, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of the (albeit legally sufficient) evidence contradicts the jury’s verdict before it is justified in exercising its appellate fact jurisdiction to order a new trial.” Id. at 417. Application The sole issue is whether the evidence is factually insufficient to prove that Watson intended to commit sexual assault while in the complainant Jennifer Romo's apartment.[1] The evidence which tends to support the jury’s finding that Watson so intended includes: (1) he dropped his shorts to expose his erect penis, (2) he came toward Romo as she grabbed a butcher knife to defend herself, (3) he did not flee when Romo brandished the knife and told him to leave; and (4) he attempted to take the knife away from her. [2] Watson argues that this evidence is factually insufficient because he did not say anything which would indicate what his intent was and because he never touched Romo. Cf. Walls v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 470, 299 S.W.2d 953, 953 (1957); Baldwin v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 19, 216 S.W.2d 985, 986 (1949). We observed on original submission that Watson’s act of taking hold of the butcher knife could be interpreted as an effort to defend himself rather than an attempt to use force against Romo and overpower her. See Watson, 160 S.W.3d at 630. Thus, the evidence gives rise to conflicting inferences on the issue of Watson’s intent. However, the mere fact that conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the evidence is factually insufficient, even if the evidence supporting a finding on the challenged element may not be characterized as overwhelming. After a neutral review of the evidence, we cannot say “with some objective basis in the record that the great weight and preponderance of the . . . evidence contradicts the jury’s verdict.” See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417. Therefore, we overrule the sole issue presented and affirm the judgment. FELIPE REYNA Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Vance, and Justice Reyna Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed June 13, 2007 Do not publish [CR25] [1] Because our prior determination of Watson’s legal sufficiency challenge remains undisturbed, our scope of review on remand is limited to Watson’s factual sufficiency complaint. [2] Because our opinion on original submission contains a detailed recitation of the underlying facts, we limit our discussion on remand to the facts directly pertinent to the issue before us. By his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this lawsuit as frivolous. We disagree. A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law Generally, the dismissal of inmate litigation under chapter 14 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Brewer v. Simental, 268 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.). “To establish an abuse of discretion, an appellant must show the trial court’s actions were arbitrary or unreasonable in light of all the circumstances. The standard is clarified by asking whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 735-36 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied) (internal citations omitted). In addition, the trial court has broad discretion to dismiss an inmate’s claim as frivolous. Spurlock, 88 S.W.3d at 736. To determine whether a claim is frivolous, the trial court may consider if: (1) the claim’s realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(b); see Spurlock, 88 S.W.3d at 736. B. Discussion As noted above, appellant filed a motion to consolidate this matter with trial court cause number 24,114—a motion that was not ruled upon by the trial court. In that motion, appellant admitted that the operative facts in this matter are interrelated, “hopelessly intertwined,” and arise from similar events and circumstances as that of trial court cause number 24,114. Furthermore, in his unsworn declaration of previous filings, appellant’s description of the facts involved in trial court cause number 24,114 is substantially similar to appellant’s recitation of facts in this matter. Because appellant’s claim in this matter is substantially similar to his claim in trial court cause number 24,114, section 14.003(b)(4) authorized the trial court to dismiss this matter as frivolous. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(b)(4); see also Spurlock, 88 S.W.3d at 736; Obadele v. Johnson, 60 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (“The purpose of sections 14.003 and 14.004 is to reduce the problem of constant, often duplicative, inmate litigation requiring the inmate to notify the trial court of previous litigation and the outcome. When an inmate complies with section 14.004, the trial court can determine, based on previous filings, if the suit is frivolous because the inmate had already filed a similar claim.”). As a result, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing appellant’s suit as frivolous under chapter 14. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(b)(4); Brewer, 268 S.W.3d at 767; Spurlock, 88 S.W.3d at 736; see also Doyle v. Teske, No. 12-09-00359-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 2360, at **6-7 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 31, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that when a trial court does not make separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, we must assume that the trial court made all findings in support of its judgment, and we must affirm the trial court’s judgment if it can be upheld on any legal theory finding support in the record). Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second issue on appeal.[3] IV. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. AL SCOGGINS Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed July 6, 2011 [CV06] [1] On August 4, 2009, appellant filed a motion seeking to consolidate this matter with the dispute filed in trial court cause number 24,114, a case which is still pending in the trial court. Specifically, in his motion, appellant asserted that “the facts underlying each action are interrelated and hopelessly intertwined . . . [and] arise from similar events and circumstances . . . .” Moreover, in compliance with section 14.004 of the civil practice and remedies code, appellant filed an unsworn declaration of previous filings, in which he described the matter in trial court cause number 24,114 as follows: Smith v. Quada, Jr., et al., 24114, Walker County State Disitrict [sic] Court (12th Judicial) in Huntsville, Texas; names multiple defendant prison officials (Robert [H.] Quada, Jr.; Garland Goodrum, A Crofton, L. Jones; Scott Bailey; Steven Jeffcoat; Herbert Gary; Tracy Bailey; Lonny Johnson; Kelly Strong; Robin R. Robinson; Charless [sic] Bell; Robert Treon; and Nathanial Quarterman . . . brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation, denial of equal protection, denial of access to courts, inter alia. The crux of this action stems from (1) prison officials reprisls [sic]/harassments perpetuated against Plaintiff due to his exercise of both administrative grievances and redress through courts, and (2) among other things, (2) flagrant manipulation and exploitation of legal storage box policies to deprive Plaintiff of adequate space to secure all his legal materials per AD 03.72. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004 (Vernon 2002); see also Parker v. Thomas, No. 10-08-00318-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 6990, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 25, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). On appeal, appellant argues that there is “a factual dispute as to whether the two suits are substantially similar . . . .” However, we note that appellant has already judicially admitted, through his motion for consolidation, that the two suits are substantially similar, and such an admission is binding upon appellant. See Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2001) (“‘Assertions of fact, not plead in the alternative, in the live pleadings of a party are regarded as formal judicial admissions.’” (quoting Houston First Am. Savs. v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. 1983))); see also AEP Tex. Cent. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 286 S.W.3d 450, 459 n.24 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. denied) (noting that a “judicial admission is binding on the party admitting it, and he may not introduce contradicting evidence”). Also in his unsworn declaration of previous filings, appellant listed numerous other lawsuits in which he filed pro se, many of which were dismissed as frivolous or for some other reason. [2] Appellees have not filed an appellate brief in this matter. [3] Given our disposition of appellant’s second issue, we need not address appellant’s remaining sub-issues, as their resolution is not necessary to our disposition. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.